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Social Cleavage and Party Support

A Comparison of Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom

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List of Abbreviations

(1) Political parties and institutions in Japan

Diet	Lower House of Japan
Domei	All Japan Labor Federation
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
Komeito	Clean Government Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NLC	New Liberal Club
SDF	Social Democratic Federation
Sakigake	Pioneer Party
Sinseito	New Party (or Renewal Party)
Sohyo	General Council of Trade Unions of Japan
Soka Gakkai	Buddhist lay organization affiliated with the Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism

(2) Political parties and institutions in South Korea

DLP	Democratic Liberal Party
DJP	Democratic Justice Party
DP	Democratic Party
FLD	Federation for Liberal Democracy
Gukhoe	National Assembly of Korea
NCNP	National Conference for New Politics
NMDP	New Millennium Democratic Party
NKP	New Korea Party
NPRP	New Politics Reform Party
UNP	Unification National Party

(3) Political parties in the United Kingdom

Alliance	SDP + The Liberals
Conservative	Conservative Party
Labour	Labour Party
LP	Liberal Party
Plaid Cymru	Welsh Nationalist Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SNP	Scottish National Party
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the core of democracy, as Schumpeter (1950) claims, there must exist political parties as the most important mediating institution for resolving social conflicts arising among different societal groups. To study elections, therefore, clarifies how the political parties compete with alternative policies and how they are anchored into diverse social divisions. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue, one of the main goals of comparative election studies is to probe the structural factors underlying the diverse support base of party systems. According to Lipset and Rokkan, two transformation processes, i.e. the National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, created social cleavages that became linked to party divisions and voting behavior. Thus, electoral studies deal with identifying diverse cleavages linking party systems and social bases of voting behavior.

One of the initial goals of election studies is to break down the dominant attitudinal and behavioral orientations of different social groups. The function of 'input' or 'bottom-up' in democratic decision-making processes, e.g. what people demand from politicians or which political parties representing different ideological and social groupings they support, can be probed within the domain of election study (Lipset, Trow, Coleman, 1956:15; Harrop and Miller, 1987:244-245).

A plausible measure of party support is the aggregated votes of the electorate identified in various social divisions. Elections here are an institution through which the electorate makes their goals penetrated in the representative democracies. Ballots carry a certain meaning of social wishes and demands expressed in democratic elections. Research analyzing election results and patterns of voting behavior,

therefore, can be regarded as an empirical study exploring the 'control-choice functions of democratic mechanisms' in the sense that the votes cast in elections would imply aggregated evaluations of parties, political leaders and salient social issues (Butler, Penniman and Ranney, 1981:1; Harrop and Miller, 1987:1-2; Merkl, 1993:257-258).

Another concern of election and voting behavior studies is both political and social change. One important indicator of change is fluctuation. If electoral fluctuations can be measured in consecutive elections, this will probably imply that something has happened in society. Political realignment has to be foreseeable in the sense that the voters' opinions will be expressed through the votes they cast in elections. The aggregated votes cast for political parties can, therefore, be regarded as an effective indicator of voters' evaluations of political parties and the changing political situation as a whole. Gathering evidence on realignment, alignment and dealignment is another concern of researchers in election and voting behavior studies.[1]

This is one of the major reasons why election studies have remained an important topic in political science. As a geologist explores the seismic center of an earthquake in order to clarify certain scientific enigmas, e.g. the strength of shock waves, duration of time and

[1] The literature in line with 'alignment' polemics is quite comprehensive. The main concern of the polemics has been that voters traditionally aligned on the basis of class, religion, and region no longer exist and that new groups of voters, such as those more likely to switch parties, are tending to reshape unstable forms of party systems into more stable ones. Pioneer work was carried out by Särlvik and Crewe (1983). See also Budge and Farlie (1983), Dalton *et al* (1984), Budge *et al* (1987), Denver (1989) and Bartolini and Mair (1990). Some polemics against weakening dealignment can be found in Wyman, White and Miller (1995) and Miller and Shank (1996). Some British polemics can be found in Heath *et al* (1985), Heath (1991), and Heath *et al* (1994) on declining class voting. For a comparative perspective on dealignment and declining class voting, see Franklin and Mackie (1989). Postmaterialism and cultural shifts were also argued to be plausible reasons for weakening party alignment. Some examples are Inglehart (1977), Dalton and Kuechler (1990), Dalton (1994), Inglehart and Abramson (1994), Rohrschneider (1993), and Inglehart (1997).

plausible causes of the event and, more importantly, to forecast the next likely occurrence, the main task of the psephologists is to concentrate on exploring the social bases and changing patterns of party support in order to understand the implications of the votes cast and to speculate on plausible changes in the proceeding elections and political parties.

This volume is about electoral sociology. The central interest is three-fold: The first goal is to scrutinize how social bases of the electorate are attached to party support. As argued before, elections provide information on the extent to which society is organized and divided by diverse cultural and economic factors. The first issue is to probe how different social divisions of voters are linked to their party support in elections. The second goal is to examine whether any sign of social and political change can be detected. A sequence of election studies provides information on the extent to which society is stable or changing. The nature of social stability or instability is the core of the sociological model of election study. However, the dominant part of our knowledge on elections and voting behavior is accumulated from experiences in western liberal democracies (Norris, 1998:*xiii*). Thus, the third aim of this study is to expand our knowledge on different implications of social bases of voting by comparing two different cultures. Two countries from Asian culture, i.e. Japan and South Korea, and one country from Western culture, i.e. the United Kingdom, will be compared in exploring social bases of voting behavior.

The starting point in electoral sociology is the concept of social cleavage and its impact on the emergence of political party systems. How social cleavages emerge in a given society and when they become salient in conjunction with the rise and fall of modern party systems are two questions to be examined in the proceeding chapter.

CHAPTER 2

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND PARTY SYSTEM

Definitions of Social Cleavage

According to Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, cleavages are to be regarded as criteria that divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups. Relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places.[2] They suggest three types of cleavage: (1) ascriptive or 'trait' cleavages: race or caste; (2) attitudinal or 'opinion' cleavages: ideology or preference; and (3) behavioral or 'act' cleavages: those elicited through voting and organizational membership. They argue that cleavage patterns change as society also changes. Cleavages are 'criteria dividing social members into different groups in specific time and space'.

Scott C. Flanagan defines cleavage as 'potential lines of division within any given society'. According to him, three different forms of cleavage exist: (1) segmental cleavages: racial, linguistic or religious differences; (2) cultural cleavages: young-old, urban-rural, traditional-modern or authoritarian-libertarian; (3) economic-function cleavages: class, status or role differences.[3] However, it seems to be somewhat unclear as to how to distinguish between the different cleavages in Flanagan's terms. For example, religion can be classified as a cultural

[2] Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor (1970), *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

[3] Flanagan, 1973:64.

cleavage, since different religious activities and affiliations are deeply rooted in the cultural belief systems of people, embedded in time-honored traditions of society. This can also be closely related to the cognitive and attitudinal tendencies that may affect the social activities of the people. Urban-rural and traditional-modern distinctions can also be categorized under economic-function cleavages.

Despite its lack of clarity, however, Harry Eckstein supports Flanagan's classification. Eckstein suggests three kinds of political divisions: (1) specific disagreements over concrete policy issues, such as actual value allocation by the political system, and special procedural issues, such as specific techniques of allocating values through legitimate decision-making; (2) cultural divergences in general belief and value systems, i.e. divergences in cognition, values, modes of evaluating alternatives and emotional dispositions in politics; and (3) segmental cleavage, which emerges where salient lines of objective social differentiation, such as tribal and racial, regional, rural-urban, sex, generation, religion, language and occupational differences, exist.[4] For Eckstein, politically relevant cleavages are perceived as 'dividing lines of different groups based on policy perceptions, cultural-emotional diversities, and segmental discrepancies in a given political system'. Thus, the two elements, i.e. segmental/cultural divergence and economic-functional/policy-line related, run parallel to the classification made by Flanagan and Eckstein.

Hans Daalder developed a more diverse and far-reaching set of cleavages than his predecessors did. He suggests five lines of division: (1) class or sectional interests (the landed versus the moneyed interests; parties representative of industry or commerce, labor or agriculture); (2) religion (modernists versus fundamentalists, Catholics versus Protestants, clericals versus anticlericals, Anglicans versus non-conformists); (3) geographical conflict (town versus countryside, center versus periphery; (4) nationality or nationalism (ethnic minority

[4] Eckstein, 1966:33-34.

parties, extreme-nationalist movements, parties having their real allegiance to another nation-state, etc.); and (5) regime (status quo parties versus reformist parties, revolutionary or counterrevolutionary parties).[5] He argues that European countries reveal considerable differences according to the character and the intensity of the lines of cleavage that form the basis of political conflict and organization.

These differences depend partly on objective differences in social structure and partly on circumstances such as whether and to what extent particular cleavages have been effectively politicized in the society in question. For Daalder, the cleavage structure is understood in terms of causal factors related to the emergence of saliently politicized factions that have affected characteristics of party systems in European political development. Thus, the analytic terms developed by Daalder can be used as a basis for the formation of modern party systems in Western Europe.

In their seminal work *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967), Lipset and Rokkan argue that there are four major cleavages dominating modern western party systems: (1) subject versus dominant culture (center-periphery), (2) church versus state (church-state), (3) primary versus secondary economy (land-industry), and (4) workers versus employers (workers-capitalists).[6] According to them, these four cleavages stemmed from two revolutions, i.e. the National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, and were crucial in the formation of the modern European party system. Their notion of a 'freezing party system' is renowned among scholars studying cleavages and party systems.

As far as party system formation in relation to the emergence of salient social cleavages is concerned, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson's definition does not diverge much from that of Daalder or that of Lipset and Rokkan. Lane and Ersson define the concept of cleavage as 'a division based on some distinctive criteria of individuals, groups

[5] Daalder, 1966:67-68.

[6] Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Mair (1990).

or organizations among whom conflict may arise'.[7] They argue that we should distinguish between latent and manifest cleavage, because belief, value or action are not by necessity properties of cleavages. Their classification of latent and manifest cleavage is somewhat similar to Rae and Taylor's classification of attitudinal and behavioral cleavage. However, the way in which Lane and Ersson define salient political cleavages is somewhat similar to Daalder's in relation to the effect of cleavages on the formation of European party system.

There seems to be a clear distinction between Lane/Ersson and Daalder in terms of the effect on the formation of party system in Western democracies. In Daalder's and Lipset and Rokkan's definition, there is a close link between politically and socially salient cleavages and characteristics of the party system of the Western democracies. However, Lane and Ersson simply argue that salient cleavages, such as religious, ethnic, class-based and regional, are meaningful for probing political phenomena in sixteen European countries.[8] One critical drawback of Lane and Ersson's discussion, therefore, is how to decide which cleavages are politically meaningful and which are not involved in the formation of the present party system of Western Europe. This is because, as Lane and Ersson indicate, there can be a myriad of criteria that divide people into diverse groups.

Some common features can be drawn from the definitions and classifications made above. The concept of 'cleavage' can be regarded as a 'division or dividing line' of social members into different fractions of individuals, groups, and organizations among which conflict *potentially* exists. From this definition and arguments of the four political scientists, two categories of cleavage can be proposed: (1) segmental cleavages, which are similar to Flanagan and Eckstein's segmental cleavage and to Rae and Taylor's ascriptive cleavage; and (2) value-related (cognitive or economic) cleavages, which are similar

[7] Lane and Ersson, 1987: 46.

[8] *Ibid.*

to Rae and Taylor's attitudinal and behavioral cleavage and to Flanagan's cultural and economic-function cleavage as well as to Eckstein's different policy-line based cleavages.[9]

Table 2-1. Classification of Social Cleavage Structure

Segmental cleavages	Value-related cleavages	
	Cognitive cleavages	Cleavages related to distribution of resources
• Tribe • Race • Caste • Language • Region • Sex • Occupation • Urban-rural • Religion • Young-old	• Libertarian vs. Authoritative • Universalism vs. Particularism	• Education • Income • Class

Note: The classification of segmental cleavage depends mainly upon how well the potential conflict lines between different social groups can be drawn, whereas that of value-related cleavages depends mainly upon what value antagonism and value allocation can divide the members into parts. In statistical terms, segmental cleavages can be measured on the nominal scale level, while the value-based cleavages on the ordinal or internal scale levels.

Aim of the Study and Selection of Comparable Cases

As Daalder and Lane/Ersson argue, the pattern of social cleavage is a basis for probing the potential conflict structure of a given society. Probing the dominant social cleavage structure is, therefore, also a

[9] Segmental cleavages are highly related to the phenomenal characters voters possess, whereas value-related cleavages are related to either what ideological properties or attitudes toward social values the relevant political actors hold or to how many material goods they acquire. Daalder's and Lane/Ersson's classifications are integrated in two categories of cleavage structures. Lipset and Rokkan's classification can be identified either with segmental or value-related cleavages.

basis for understanding the pattern of voting behavior of the people, on the one hand, and grasping the characters of the party system, on the other.

This study involves a comparative analysis. Three countries, i.e. Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom, have been selected. The societies of these three countries are both different from and similar to each other in many aspects. The United Kingdom has maintained a long tradition of liberal democracy. Modern representative democracy with universal franchise, however, was introduced in 1948.[10] Japan introduced a liberal-democratic political system under American military rule. Western-style democratic parties competed for popular votes in competitive elections. South Korea, however, experienced a harsh dictatorship from the end of liberation from Japanese colonial power until 1987. The United Kingdom is an island situated apart from the European continent along the British channel. South Korea and Japan are located in Far East Asia with quite similar ethical and ideological backgrounds, *Confucianism*. Japan is also an island situated along the Korean Channel and Pacific Ocean. In this sense, Japan seems to be similar to the United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom has maintained a Christian tradition in the Anglican Church for several centuries. During the interwar period, Britain and Japan were colonial powers, while South Korea was ruled by the Japanese colonial power. Japan was regarded as an Asian wonder in terms of economic expansion and well-being during the post-war era, while Britain remained a strong economic power throughout long periods of modern history. South Korea resembles Japan in economic growth and

[10] In 1948 the university and the business franchises that allowed a person more than one vote were abolished. University graduates elected 12 MPs by single transferable vote. Occupiers of business premises worth over £10 a year were allowed to vote in the constituency where their business was located as well as from their residence. In 1922 there were 72,000 university voters, 0.3 per cent of the electorate, while there were 209,000 business voters in England and Wales or 1.1 per cent of the electorate (Butler, 1953: 146-153; Rose, 1991: 438-439).

expansion, being one of the four Asian tigers. Thus, these three countries provide us with excellent units of cross-cultural and cross-national comparison for both the Most Different Systems (MDS) and the Most Similar Systems (MSS) design research.[11]

This study sheds light on the relationship between a set of selected cleavages, i.e. gender, age, occupation, income, education, religion, urban-rural and region, and party support in the three countries.[12] The main concern is to investigate whether there is any difference in the pattern of voting choice among the different groups of people, i.e. between men and women, among the different generations, among the different occupations, between the high and low incomers, etc. How can the similar or different patterns of voter choice be detected? What are the main features of the differences and in relation to which criteria? To identify what the similarities or differences are, it seems necessary to use a 'yard-stick' with which different dispositions of the voters can be measured.

Participating in an election involves selecting a candidate or a party within a given party system. Voting for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, for instance, may be explained by one of the following four strategies. Firstly, the voter has been supporting Labour for a long time (e.g. the voter's sentiment of party attachment to Labour is stronger than to other parties). Secondly, the voter makes an estimation that the party or candidate would be the best or at least better than other alternatives (e.g. Labour or the candidate chosen advocates better policies or has the best or a better image than the others. Of course, the image of party leader is included in their evaluation). Thirdly, the voter has a perception that the party would

[11] On differences and strength of the MDS and MSS designs, see Przeworski and Teune, 1970:24-35; Holt and Turner, 1970:7-13; Meckstroth, 1975:132-157; Lijphart, 1975:69; Landman, 2000: 27-32. For the logic of comparative analysis, see Smelsher, 1975:2-3; Almond and Powell, Jr., 1978:18; Lijphart, 1971:682-693; Lijphart, 1975:158-177; Peters, 1998; Landman, 2000.

[12] Segmental cleavages such as tribe, race, caste and language are not seriously politicized issues in Korea, Japan and the United Kingdom.

not be worse than other alternatives (e.g. Labour or the candidate selected does not advocate worse policies or have a worse image than the others). Fourthly, there is no difference between the parties (e.g. there is no positive reason why the voter selected Labour or the candidate). In all cases mentioned above, it may be said that there are *at least* two parties to be comparatively weighed in a given party system and that there must be criteria with which to weigh them. That is to say, in measuring the voters' dispositions, consideration must be given to how many parties there are, what kind of ideologies, policy or images the political parties represent and how people vote in a given party system. Without understanding the ideological dispositions and identities of the different political parties, it is difficult to investigate either what the essence of similarities or differences in voting behavior is and what role the different cleavages may play in the formation of a party system. In the following section, we begin by discussing the different kinds of parties and party systems in the three countries.

Political Parties and Party Systems

The term 'party system' has been defined in a myriad of ways. What are the main criteria used to define a political party system? A classical definition was offered by a French political scientist Maurice Duverger. He defines the concept of party system as 'a particular relationship amongst all characteristics like party numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical localization, and political distribution.'[13] The main aspect of Duverger's definition is the number and size of parties. Douglas W. Rae proposes the notion of 'not merely a collection of parties but the system of competition between parties and/or the matrix of competitive relationships between parties'.[14] A common feature which can be drawn from the two definitions is that there are two elements, i.e. the number of parties and the competitive

[13] Duverger, 1954:203.

[14] Rae, 1971:47-48.

relationship between the parties. If there is only one hegemonic party, like the Communist party in the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China or like Mexico's PRI rule, the system can be referred to as a 'dominant' party system, a form of non-liberal democratic political system.

Giovanni Sartori's definition is somewhat similar to the two preceding ones. Paying special attention to the role of pluralism in Western democracies, he relates pluralistic diversity in a society to the structure and characteristics of party systems. His idea is well expressed in his term 'party pluralism' or 'multiparty system', which simply denotes the existence of more than one party, but the underlying connotation is that parties, in the plural form, are the product of 'pluralism'.[15] He argues that parties make for a 'system' only when they are parts (in the plural form), and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition.[16] Thus, multiple political parties are a main criterion for a liberal democratic party system.

Jean Blondel provides another type of definition. According to Blondel, the term party system implies a system both with respect to the internal structure of parties that are concerned with the formulation and the implementation of policies and to their interrelationship.[17] Parties are regarded as crucial political actors linking voters' demands and the implementation of policies. Parties need the internal capacity to formulate policies that are to be distinguishable from those formulated by other parties. Thus, the internal capacity of parties and the mutual relationship in the formation and implementation of policies are the main criteria of a party system.

To summarize the definitions presented by several political scientists, we may offer a general common typology of party systems

[15] Sartori, 1976:13-l8.

[16] *Ibid.,* p.44.

[17] Blondel, 1978:76.

in terms of 'internal structure and competitive relationships among parties and the properties of parties'. That is, to analyze which political parties and party systems exist in a political system, we have to comprehend both how many parties there are and what kind of party system properties exist. How can we then identify the properties of different parties?

Klaus von Beyme's contribution is useful in this context. According to him, two indicators of party system properties can be used to measure the character of a party system. They are: (1) the number of relevant parties with more than two per cent of the vote, i.e. two-party systems, moderate pluralism, polarized pluralism and one hegemonic party in polarized pluralism; (2) ideological/left-right distance, i.e. Communists, Socialists, Liberals, Conservatives, Bonapartists or supporters of royal dictatorship.[18] The indicators proposed by Beyme are similar to those of Lane and Ersson. Lane and Ersson suggest a set of indicators which were found in their factor analysis: number of parties, ideological distance between parties, realignments behind the parties and lines of cleavages in the party system.[19] In their study of the party systems of the European democracies, they propose a five-dimensional model covering: 1) fractionalization, i.e. the variation in the number and strength of the constituent parts of party systems; 2) functional orientation, i.e. the variation between traditional bourgeois parties and religious and ethnic parties; 3) polarization, i.e. the variation in the ideological distance between the political parties along the right-left scale; 4) radical orientation, i.e. the variation in the strength of leftist parties; and 5) volatility, i.e. the variation in net mobility between political parties.[20] These five dimensions are useful in focusing on the characteristics and changing patterns of party

[18] Klaus von Beyme (1985), *Po1itica1 Parties in Western Democracies* (New York: St. Martin's Press), p.255-264.

[19] Lane and Ersson, 1987.

[20] Lane and Ersson, *op.cit.,* p.177.

systems, i.e. the trends and fluctuations of a party system over a given period of time.

However, with regards to questions such as 'where or in what categories a party can be placed along a party system dimension' or 'on the basis of what ideological foundation political parties are linked to voters', the model faces a critical drawback. In fact, such questions are closely related to how well the pattern of voter choice in a competitive party system may be understood. In this context, a new concept of 'party dimension' with which one can measure the placement and ideological foundations of the political parties in a given party system seems to be necessary.

Party System Dimension

There can be various categories among which one can differentiate between political parties: Conservative, Liberal, Social Democratic, Communist, Green, ethnic or religious parties.[21] However, it is not an easy task to classify a party in a party system. This is even more difficult when various political parties and party systems are to be compared. The main concern here is that a set of 'common measures' with which to make comparisons of the different political parties and party systems seems to be indispensable.

Lipset suggests two different categories of party groupings: left, liberal and progressive, on the one hand, and their opposites, right, conservative and reactionary, on the other. He argues that these two groupings have been defined on the basis of many different issues such as political democracy versus monarchy, the free market system versus traditional economic restrictions, secularism versus clericalism, agrarian reform versus landlordism and urban exploitation of the countryside, social reform versus *laissez-faire* and socialism versus

[21] See more discussion on the different kinds of political parties in Western Europe in Lane and Ersson, *op.cit.,* pp. 97-l05.

capitalism.[22] Even though this grouping does not include political parties supporting such issues as regional and/or ethnic autonomy, xenophobic interests and new green politics, he argues, it is usually possible to locate parties on a left-right continuum during any given period and at any given place.[23]

Table 2-2. Conservative vs. Progressive Party Dimensions

Dimensions	Progressive parties	Conservative parties
Left-right dimension	Left-oriented	Right-oriented
Main policy issues	Distribution Balance in wealth Responsibility in common	Affluence and growth Industrialization Individual responsibility
Change and reform of social order	Somewhat radical change and reform for equality	Status-quo or defending current hegemony
State	Extended/interventionist	Limited/directive
Values related to welfare state	Universalism Solidarity Social obligation We	Particularism Individualism Private self-help I
Civil society	Pluralist	Individualist

For this study, the 'conservative-progressive' party dimension from Beyme's two dimensions based on a left-right scale and Lipset's historical two groupings of political parties will be adopted. To appropriately operationalize this dimension, the following indicators are used: left-right score, issue score, social change score, class

[22] Lipset, 1981:233.

[23] *Ibid.* Lipset argues that the issue of equality and social change overlaps the older left-right issues like democracy versus monarchy and clericalism versus secularism. In some sense, new issues tend to converge into the old left-right dimension in the long term.

representation score and value score (for details, see Table 2-2). Conservative-oriented parties have strong tendencies to be placed on the right side of the scale, involving maintaining the existing value and power allocation structure, pursuing continuous economic development and privatization policies, keeping the role of the state limited and minimal and, finally, placing more stress on individual interests and private self-help in relation to welfare state issues, while progressive-oriented parties stand for the opposite attributes of these indices.

Table 2-3. Political Parties in Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom up to 1992

Countries	Progressive-oriented	Conservative-oriented
Japan [1]	Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Japan Communist Party (JCP) Social Democratic Federation (SDF)	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Clean Government Party (CGP) Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)
Korea [2]	Democratic Party (DP) New Government Party (NGP)	Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) Unification National Party (UNP)
United Kingdom [3]	Labour	Conservative Liberal

Note: Party doctrines of the relevant parties, election manifestos, and a variety of policies were considered in estimating the conservative-progressive indices.

1. All of the political parties from the 1960's were included up to 1991. The New Liberal Club (NLC) , a splinter fraction of the leading Liberal Democratic Party, was excluded because of its lack of party organization.
2. Since there have been too many parties during the last four decades, only political parties that hold at least one seat in Korean Congress *Gukhoe* after the Assembly Election of 1992 are included in the table. Party manifestos and policy issues were evaluated in order to place the parties on the progressive-conservative continuum.
3. For the Conservative-Progressive dimension analysis of the political parties of United Kingdom, the three major parties were included.

The six indicators are based principally on the relative estimation of relevant political parties and are related to the magnitude of 'progressiveness' or 'conservativeness' of parties in their positions on salient issues and values. If all of the parties can be arrayed along six

dimensions, the average score marked along the six dimensions in a given political setting can be calculated.[24] In such a way, a conservative-progressive party dimension can be constructed, which can be used in the comparison of political parties and a voters' party support pattern in different countries. As depicted in Table 2-3, all of the political parties in Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom can be classified according to the conservative-progressive party dimension.

Material and Structure of the Study

This study covers the post-war era up to 1992. The limited time span is tied to the need for acquiring empirical data sets for the study. The study is based on the materials gathered under the auspices of the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD). In collecting data sets, two basic principles were given priority. Firstly, the elections should be democratic and take place under rules of fair competition. It goes without saying that elections conducted under authoritarian and undemocratic governmental structures within which election rigging and fraud are consistently issues of contention are beyond our consideration. Data from before the 1988 Korean Assembly Election was excluded, because it was not until the unprecedented democratic measures of 1987 that the Korean electoral system was transformed into a more democratic and competitive one.

Secondly, to probe changing patterns of voting behavior, the data should be based on at least two different data sets. The findings can, thus, be corroborated, specified and clarified by comparing at least two different parliamentary elections in each country. The 1988 Korean National Assembly election data compiled under the auspices of the Korean Survey Gallup Poll Ltd has been used. Survey data for the 1992 Korean Assembly election was purchased from the Korean

[24] The six dimension scores are approximations of the party manifestos, policy positions and election campaign strategies.

Election Study Institute by the SSD.[25] For the Japanese data, two survey data sets from the 1976 and 1983 Diet elections were obtained from the 'Leviathan Data Bank of Tsukuba University'.[26] For the British data, with the exception of the 1992 data, the 1987 British Parliamentary election data kept in the Economic and Social Research Council Data Archive (ESRC: Essex University Data Bank) could be acquired through the SSD.[27]

Thirdly, the University of Oxford and Essex research teams within the framework of the British Election Studies have compiled an extensive data set. This resulted in the publication of a compendium of *The British Electorate 1963-1992*.[28] Since the compendium contains a wide range of topics in tabulated form, it is useful for analyzing the

[25] Korean data were compiled by the author and filed in the Swedish Social Data Service's archive. A reason for the lack of data is the requirement for democratic elections. As a Korean researcher indicates, most of the dozen parliamentary elections that have been held in Korea since 1948 emerge as largely ritualistic affairs, due to the lack of free and fair competition (Koh, 1985: 883). After the introduction of the Sixth Republic in 1988, however, democratic norms and rules were established in the daily lives of Koreans. Both the availability and reliability of Korean survey data have also been enhanced. The amount of survey research has increased from that time on. In this context, the founding of the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC) is significant for domestic as well as foreign researchers. KSDC is partly financed by a government fund and systematically compiles not only survey data but even aggregate data.

[26] The author is indebted to Professor Ikuo Kabashima, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo. He was head of the Leviathan Data Bank of Tsukuba University at the time the two data sets for this study were provided.

[27] John K. Curtice, Professor of Department of Government of University of Strathclyde, provided me with survey data including socio-economic and party choice variables for the 1992 election. I am indebted to him for his support, without which this book would not have been published. I am also indebted to SSD for its assistance in collecting materials. The data sets were compiled at the SSD archive after the translation of Korean data was carried out. Two Japanese data sets archived at SSD were translated into English by Japanese researchers.

[28] Crewe, Fox and Day (1995).

relationship between change in social cleavage structure and party support in Britain during the three decades. The compendium will be used to explore changing patterns of voting behavior in Britain.

Thus, this study aims at mapping out the relationship between social cleavage structure and party support during the 1960's (the United Kingdom), the 1970's (the United Kingdom and Japan), the 1980's (the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea) and the beginning of the 1990's (the United Kingdom and South Korea). In order to analyze patterns of party support among voters, it is necessary to define which parties exist in a political system. Without a clear definition of political parties and party systems, comparison of party support among voters in different countries with different party names and party ideologies would be very difficult. The main concern of Part Two is, therefore, to examine changes in the party systems in Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom. In Japan and South Korea, the party systems are characterized by being multiparty with one dominant party, such as LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) in Japan and right-oriented DJP (Democratic Justice Party) and DLP (Democratic Liberal Party) during the 1990's in South Korea, whereas in the United Kingdom, the two-party system has remained intact during the post-war era. On the parliamentary level, the Liberals and regional parties, such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party), in the United Kingdom proved unable to challenge the dominant two-party system. However, the evolution of new parties and party systems in Japan and South Korea since 1992 is not covered in this book. The victory of Tony Blair's New Labour in 1997 is not dealt with either. Part Three will scrutinize the association between the cleavage variables including gender, age, occupation income, education, urban-rural, class, region and religion and the patterns of party support in the three countries. In other words, the simple relationship between social cleavage variables and party support pattern based on contingency tables will be explored in the first half, consisting of two empirical Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter

6, a causal model based on path analysis will be examined in order to explore multiple effects of cleavage variables on party support. Thus, in Part Three both bivariate and multivariate analyses will be used to explore the effects of social cleavage variables on party choice in the three countries. Part Four will compare the overall direct and indirect effects of cleavage variables on party support, findings and implications of the comparisons including discussions on intercultural similarities and differences between the three countries in relationship to social cleavage structure and party support. In conjunction with the final discussion, the power of the social cleavage model in the comparative study of voting behavior will be taken up.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Old parties survive or die out as new parties emerge on the political stage. In some countries the party system is constantly changing, as in emerging democracies, while others are relatively stable, as in Western democracies. Any change in political parties linking voters to legislative organs as well as to executive institutions reflects changing patterns of societal and political symbiosis. This chapter examines the changing patterns of party strength and party systems that were dominant during the post-war period in the three countries.

Party System Change in Japan During the Postwar Era

The Japanese party system has undergone drastic changes between 1955 and the new election to the House of Representatives in 1993, after the split of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In the 1950's, after the amalgamation of the parties within the Conservative and Socialist blocs, between the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, on the one hand, and between the Right-wing Socialist Party and the Left-wing Socialist Party, on the other, a two-party system consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was formed. Even though other minor parties, such as the Japanese Communist Party and Labor Peasant Party, existed, they did not play any crucial role in the two-party system. The two major parties dominated the Japanese party system throughout the 1950's.

After the formation of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and finally its break from the Japan Socialist Party in January 1960, the Japanese two-party system changed. During the 1960's, it was transformed to a multiparty system. After the Komeito, or Clean Government Party, was established in November 1964 as a political arm of Soka Gakkai (a Buddhist lay organization affiliated with the Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism), five parties were represented in the lower house.

The strength of the two newly established parties in the 1960's, i.e. DSP and Komeito, varied between 5 and 10 per cent of the Diet. During most of this time the Komeito maintained its position as the third largest party in the Diet, while stressing progressive to centrist policies and political ethics. The party won 25 seats in the general election of the lower house in 1967 and took another leap forward in the December 1969 general election, winning 47 seats by acquiring 10.9 per cent of the vote. Although it has generally managed to remain in third place in both houses of the Diet, behind the LDP and the JSP, its share of the vote in general elections has never risen above 11 per cent (See Appendix 2). Of all the political parties in Japan, however, the Komeito maintains the strongest organizational structure. Party loyalty among Soka Gakkai members towards the Komeito are likely to be the strongest compared to other party-interest organization relationships.[29]

The DSP, financially backed by Domei (the All Japan Labor Federation),[30] received between 4.8 (1990) and 8.8 (1986) per cent in the Lower House elections.[31] The swing of the DSP seems to be closely

[29] Hebrenar, 1992:162.

[30] In Japan there are two different major labor unions: one is Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) and the other is Domei. The former supports the JSP, whereas the latter supports the DSP.

[31] At the beginning of the 1990's, there were approximately 45 million workers in Japan. Slightly over 12 million are labor union members, with 78 per cent of that number belonging to private sector unions and 22 per cent to public sector unions. Only 25.2 per cent of Japanese workers are unionized.

linked to the strength of the Japanese Communist Party. In the 1972 election, for instance, only 19 of 65 DSP candidates were elected as a result of the gain of 6.9 per cent, whereas the JCP increased its seats by 27.1 per cent to a total of 38 winning members through gains of 10.4 per cent. Many of these JCP gains were at the expense of the DSP, which was a victim of the JCP's organizational superiority and strategic campaign attacks.[32] Four years later, the DSP responded to the JCP's challenge and won 29 seats through a 6.2 per cent gain, whereas the JCP dropped to 17 seats despite a gain of 10.3 per cent.[33]

A remarkable characteristic is that throughout these elections the Liberal Democratic Party has overwhelmed the opposition party block. The total sum of the opposition party votes has been just about the same as the votes received by the ruling conservative party. In consideration of this, the Japanese party system has sometimes been referred to as a one-and-one-half party system in many Japanese studies. During the entire postwar era, unlike many Western industrial democracies, there has been one party rule for about forty years in Japan. How could the Japanese party system be dominated by the absolute supremacy of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party for such a long period of time? In other words, how could the leading Liberal Democratic Party have maintained power during the entire postwar era without any serious threat from the socialist block?[34]

The 12 million unionized Japanese workers belong to over 30,000 individual labor unions organized on a company-by-company basis (Hrebernar, 1992:187). Domei membership was geographically concentrated to the urban industrial prefectures, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa (Kanto region), Osaka, Hyogo (Kinki region), and Aichi (Chubu region), represented the real Domei and even DSP strongholds. In contrast, it has little organizational strength in rural prefectures like Tottori (Chukogu region), Kochi (Shikoku region), Yamanashi (Chubu region), and Nara (Kinki region).

[32] Hrebenar, 1992:197.

[33] In the 1976 election, the winning per cent of the JCP was almost same as in 1972. However, the number of seats won dropped by 44.7 per cent.

[34] Though not the concern of this book, modern Japanese politics from 1993 on seems to be closely linked to the factors discussed here. The

One party rule would not be possible without a combination of supporting factors. The most powerful explanation is the absence of alternative forces. Seven R. Reed points to the absence of substitutes for conservative forces as the most important factor in the long-term rule of the LDP. As he describes it: "The threat of losing power is the strongest guarantee of elite responsiveness to the electorate. When this threat is weak or nonexistent, other mechanisms can ensure some degree of responsiveness but they are necessarily weak substitutes."[35] The split among leftist forces is also closely related to the unchallenged strength of the LDP. The traditional weakness and divisions of the socialist and other opposition parties provided rich soil for conservative forces to flourish.[36]

Closely linked to the absence of alternative oppositional forces is the weakness and division of the socialist parties as plausible reasons for the unchallenged success of the LDP. The left socialist parties have suffered from the ideological rigidity associated with Marxism and Leninism during the entire post-war era. Ties to the North Korean Labour Party have been strong. The foreign policy of the United States was described in terms of imperialistic hegemony in global politics. It was not until 1986 that the Japanese Socialist Party adopted the "New Declaration", in which the JSP officially abandoned the Marxist and Leninist doctrines. However, on such issues as Japan-U.S. security arrangements, the legality of the self-defense forces and rearmament, nuclear power and policy towards Korea, the party still had difficulties speaking with one voice, even after the 1986 "New Declaration". In a revised declaration issued in June, 1993 (the so-called "1993 Declaration"), the JSP revealed its limits in relation to issues such as

disappearance or weakening of the crucial factors behind the hegemony of the LDP would seem to be plausible reasons for the multiparty system and LDP's new fate in the Japanese party system of today.

[35] Reed, 1986:452.

[36] Kang, 1990: 174-183 and Eccleston, 1989:139-143.

dispatching U.N. peace-keeping troops to Cambodia. This position remains rigid in JSP policy.

Japanese politics has also been characterized by factional politics. As Reed argues, the existence of various factional groups within the LDP was a basis for LDP's success in the power struggle in Japanese politics.[37] The boss-member relationship is a form of master-subordinate relationship in Japanese Samurai culture. Traditionally, the factional bosses have been responsible for financial support of the members of their factions by conducting campaign financing in the elections. In turn, the members of the factions give support for the leaders of the factions.[38] Thus, it may be said that the factions can be regarded as small parties within the LDP. Until the dissolution of the major factions in 1993, the factional hegemonies played a significant role in the LDP domination of Japanese politics.[39]

These factional politics seems to be closely linked to the electoral system based on the medium-sized (3, 4, or 5 members) district system that Japan maintained during the post-war era.[40] Hrebenar adds:

[37] There were at least five major factions in the LDP before the party split in 1993, i.e. the Takeshita faction, the Miyazawa faction, the Watanabe faction, the Mitsuzuka faction and the Komoto faction.

[38] Koichi, 1988:100; Eccleston, 1989:133-139; Shin, 1990:408-413; and Hrebenar, 1992:252-259.

[39] After the scandal over tax evasion and bribes from Japanese gangsters involving Ganemaru Shin shook Japanese society and the LDP, the largest Takeshita faction split into smaller fractions, such as the Obuchi faction and the Ganemaru faction. The main figures of the 1993 revolt against the leading group within the LDP, Tsutomu Hata and Ichiro Ozawa, on the one hand, and Masayoshi Takemura, on the other, were members of the Takeshita and Mitsuzuka factions, respectively. Being disappointed at the then Prime Minister Miyazawa's reform policies against corruption and the unrealistic electoral system, they formed the new parties 'Shinseito (Renewal Party)' and 'Sakigake (Pioneer Party)', respectively, before the 1993 lower house election. The conflict between factions finally resulted in party splits and the failure of the LDP to gain majority support in the 1993 lower house election (See the election results in *Appendix 2*).

[40] Eo (1990), pp. 156-165. For more details on the Japanese electoral system

"From the multimember parliamentary districts to the chronic malapportionment and the straitjacket campaign activities restrictions, Japanese electoral laws have operated to keep Japan a one-party dominant nation".[41] The multi-member constituencies made the factional ties closer and served to maximize factional strength in elections so as to protect candidates from loss against other LDP candidates within a constituency. As a consequence, the strength of the LDP could be maximized after elections.

During the post-war era, Japan developed the second largest economy in the world. The expansion of the economy was led by the LDP government. In other words, the LDP dominance could be prolonged due to constant economic growth and expansion of social welfare during post-war era.[42] Under the reign of the LDP, the economy continued to expand during the entire post-war era by 11-12% annually. Until the 1960's, the electoral strength of the LDP never fell below 50% of the total votes cast. In the 1970's and 1980's, the level of voter support for the LDP stabilized around 45% until 1993.[43] During the period between 1990 and 1993, however, popular support for the LDP dropped by almost 10 percentage points. Figure 3-1 demonstrates the overwhelming dominance of the LDP throughout the postwar era in the Japanese party system.

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before the reforms carried out in 1995, see Shiratori (1984), 'Rules of the Game (Chapter 2)' in Hrebenar (1992), 'Elections and Electoral System (Chapter 7)' in Kishimoto, and Chapter 11 on Japan in Bogdanor & Butler (1983). The most undemocratic aspects have been argued to be the unbalanced representation of the electorate in prefectures and the over-representation in the composition of the Diet (e.g. LDP has been regarded as a highly over-represented party).

[41] Hrebenar, 1977:980.

[42] Kil, 1990:145-148.

[43] However, it cannot be denied that the business-politics tie and money politics were inevitable consequences of the long LDP-dominated party system (Kim, 1990:166-173; Hrebenar, 1992:54-78).

Figure 3-1. Party Support in the Elections to the House of Representatives (1955-1993)



Note: For all party entries, see Appendix 2.

LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
JSP	Japanese Socialist Party
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
Independent	Groups without party affiliation

To sum up, two major phenomena can be observed in the history of the Japanese party system during the post-war era up to its dissolution in 1993. The first is a long-term gradual decline in party support for the LDP that began in the early 1950's and continued until 1979, even though the LDP maintained its dominant position in power. The LDP lost voter support from over 50 per cent of the total vote in the 1950's and 1960's to below 50 per cent of the vote in recent decades, and has not returned to the level of the 1950's. On the contrary, opposition votes have been fragmented and split. As a result, a number of minor parties, such as the New Liberal Club, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, were established at the expense of the two major parties during the post-war era.

Since the 1960's, Japan has maintained a multiparty system. Based on the voters' ideological perceptions of the political parties, the Japanese party system can be presented on a conservative-progressive scale. The political parties can be arrayed on the basis of the average values calculated from voters' party perception. As Figure 3-2 demonstrates, the right and left extreme parties, the conservative LDP and the communist JCP, are located on the right and left sides of the continuum with values of 4.2 and 1.6. The second largest party, the Japanese Socialist Party, was perceived by the voters to be one of the leftist parties (2.2). The JSP was widely supported by the Sohyo members. There are two center parties in the Japanese party system. The Buddhist Komeito and the social democratic DSP are positioned at right-of-middle positions with 3.1 and 3.4.

Figure 3-2. Japanese Party System Based on Conservative-Progressive Dimension (before the reshuffle of political parties in 1993)



1. The data was taken from the JES83 survey. The question in the questionnaire reads: "We have a lot of talk these days about conservatives and progressives (Liberals). What is your political position on this scale?" For the political parties, the form is: "Then, what about the following political parties? Where do you place the political position of each political party? a) Liberal Democratic Party; (b) Democratic Socialist Party; (c) Komeito (Clean Government Party); (d) Japan Socialist Party; and (e) Japan Communist Party."
2. To calculate the positions of the political parties on the conservative-progressive continuum ranging from 1 to 5, all codes were transformed except '3': '1' to '5', '2' to '4', '4' to '2', and '5' to '1'. According to the recoding scheme, the averages for three parties, i.e. LDP, DSP, Komeito, JSP, and JCP were 4.2, 3.4, 3.1, 2.2 and 1.6, respectively. The respondents are positioned between Komeito and DSP with a value of 3.2.
3. Missing data and DK (Don't Know) entries were not included in the calculation.

What is interesting here is that the Social Democrats are placed to the right of the Komeito. This is no surprise, however, if we look at the party platforms and the policies that characterize the parties. Even though the Social Democrats rely primarily on the support of labor unions, e.g. the support of Domei, the party has held a strongly pragmatic view of policy, including such policies as maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, retention of a minimal self-defense capability and an anti-nuclear weapon policy.

One can understand this as an effort to gain support from other class strata. The party is not an exception in adopting 'catch-all party' programs, which are largely found in modern party systems. As far as the Komeito is concerned, it is a more difficult task to place the Komeito on a left-right scale. Even though the party has changed its policy profile, including more pragmatic and flexible perspectives on such issues as self-defense and Japan-U.S. security, the party platform still contains some clauses on "humanistic socialism," which can lead people to regard the party as a militant socialist party. That is why it is difficult to classify the party as either socialist or conservative. But, as many argue, the Komeito constituency is basically conservative, and its rhetoric is not matched by its day-to-day deeds.[44] The party is difficult to grasp in ideological terms. Komeito is argued to be a party for all people, regardless of left-right ideologies. However, viewed in terms of voter perceptions, the party can be located in a middle position, leaning slightly towards conservative ideologies in the Japanese party system. Based on the voters' perceptions of the ideologies of the political parties, the Japanese political parties can be placed on the conservative-progressive scale, which is similar to the left-right scale often used in the literature on Western party systems.[45]

[44] Hrebenar, 1992:179.

[45] Since the 1993 election when the LDP lost power, the political party system has been stumbling. One characteristic change in the Japanese party system is that the LDP's strength dropped to the level of 30%, while the largest socialist party JSP failed to retain its position as the largest opposition party. Its strength dropped from 24.4% in 1990 and 15.4% in 1993 to 2.2% in

Party System Change in Korea During the Postwar Era

Since the First Republic was established in 1948, Korea has experienced six regime changes, two of which were short-lived governments in the periods of 1960-1961 and 1979-80 transformed by force into authoritarian ones. During these periods, three authoritarian governments have ruled Korean politics, which inhibited the introduction of the type of democratic political system that flourished in Western industrial democracies during the postwar era. The modern history of Korean politics since the First Republic has been characterized by instability, illegitimacy and political underdevelopment.[46] Except for the three recent peaceful regime changes after the presidential election in 1988, political successors seized hegemonic power by reliance on physical forces, e.g. military coups or at least support of military forces in a direct or indirect manner. Elections seldom played any important role in Korea during the reign of authoritarian regimes. It was not until the 1992 presidential election that an ex-opposition leader, Kim Young Sam, could introduce a civilian government as a result of a fairly contested election. Since then, the pattern of Korean politics has been similar to that of Western political systems in which regular competitive elections play an important role.[47]

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the single-member districts and 6.4% in the proportional representational districts. The newly formed Shinshinto took over the position as second largest party with 28% of the popular vote. The Japanese Communist Party became the largest party in the socialist block at the cost of the JSP. In the 1996 election, the JCP became the third largest party after Shinshinto with 12.6% and 13.1% in the single-member districts and the multi-member proportional representational districts, respectively (Curtis, 1999) (see details in Appendix 2 of this book).

[46] For chronological changes in Korean politics, see Ahn, 1983:41-54.

[47] In the 1998 presidential election, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung seized power in coalition with Kim Jong Pil, another opposition leader.

Table 3-1. Regimes and Party System Change in Korea (1948-2000)

Regimes	Period	President	Ruling party	Opposition party
The First Republic	1948-1960	Syngman Rhee	Liberal Party (LP)	Democratic Party (DP)
The Second Republic	1960-1961	Jang Myon	Democratic Party (DP)	Socialist Mass Party (SMP)
The Third Republic	1961-1973	Park Chung Hee	Democratic Republican Party (DRP)	New Democratic Party (NDP)
The Fourth Republic	1973-1979	Park Chung Hee	Democratic Republican Party (DRP)	New Democratic Party (NDP)
The Fifth Republic	1981-1988	Chun Doo Hwan	Democratic Justice Party (DJP)	Democratic Korean Party (DKP) Korea National Party (KNP) New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP)
The Sixth Republic	1988-1993	Roh Tae Woo	Democratic Justice Party (DJP)	Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP)
			Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) [1]	Democratic Party (DP) [2]
	1993-1998	Kim Young Sam	Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) [3] New Korea Party (NKP)	Democratic Party (DP) Unification National Party (UNP) New Politics Reform Party (NPRP)
	1998-	Kim Dae Jung	National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) [4] Federation for Liberal Democracy (FLD)	New Korea Party (NKP) [5]

Source: The Central Election Management Committee (CEMC) (1983, 1992), *The History of Political Parties in Korea* I, II, and III; CEMC (1992), The 14th National Assembly Election.

Note: 1. Three parties, i.e. the then government party, the Democratic Justice Party, and two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party, merged into a mammoth party, the Democratic Liberal Party, in January 1990. Before the party fusion, the government party held just 41.8 per cent of the assembly and suffered significant losses to the majority opposition parties. As a result of the unexpected merger of the three parties, the ruling party acquired an overwhelming majority amounting to 73.4 per cent of the Korean assembly *Gukhoe*. This tripartisan integration reflects the ideological symbiosis of the Japanese '1955 system' in terms of institutionalizing conservative dominance. See more details in Park (1990).

2. The Democratic Party led by Kim Dae-Jung has changed its party name from Party for Peace and Democracy to Democratic Party after merging with the other opposition party in the middle of the 1990's.

3. The name was changed to Democratic Party for One Nation (DPON) by the then president Kim Young Sam. In 1997, the DPON was changed to NKP by the presidential candidate of the ruling party Lee Hoe Chang. After the election held in April 3, 2000, the NKP as an opposition party remained the largest party in the Korean party system.

4. The party name was changed to New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) by the president Kim Dae Jung prior to the National Congress Election held on April 13, 2000. Winning the presidential election held in December 1997, Kim Dae Jung formed a coalition government with Kim Jong Pil, the leader of the FLD.

5. The party changed its name to Grand National Party (GNP) in 1998 under the reign of Lee Hoe Chang as party leader.

Korean voters have experienced various political parties that have risen and fallen at the same pace as the rise and fall of successive regimes (see Appendix 3). It is hardly surprising that there have not been any parties that survived for as long a span of time as those found in Western democracies. This seems to be due to party politics having been thoroughly dependent upon authoritarian regimes. Opposition parties and party leaders that opposed the position of the government party were severely suppressed and even ostracized from the political scene by well-organized, pro-government forces such as the KCIA, the military and the police. Another factor that may have led to fluctuations in party systems is the existence of successive regimes that have had different bases of political power during different phases of development. That is to say, regime changes have meant a reshuffling of political parties in new political environments.

Since the political parties were formed and dissolved repeatedly under successive regimes, the life span of the political parties could be no longer than that of the political regimes themselves. The aftermath of illegal and abnormal regime changes accompanied this political upheaval and totally rearranged existing power structures. This situation has, thus, made it impossible for Korean voters to sustain their attitudes towards the political parties and to maintain consistent party affiliations.

Two survey studies conducted in the late 1980's and early 1990's may provide plausible explanations. In Table 3-2, the data demonstrates that Korean voters have a low level of party preference or image match in relation to the political parties. One out of four Korean voters did not prefer or support any particular party. It is clear that there have been a large number of 'middle-of-the-road' or neutral voters in Korea. This may be ascribed to the fact that political parties have changed many times during the past 50 years and that, as a result, voters have had no chance to experience political parties as legitimate political actors in order to form either positive or negative

images of them at all. Therefore, it would be improper to discuss the pattern of party identification or party loyalty in such a nation as Korea, which has had unstable and fluctuating party systems.

Table 3-2. Patterns of Adjacent Party of Korean Voters

Parties	October 1988*		December 1992**	
	%	Freq.	%	Freq.
Conservative-oriented government party	19.7	394	39.7	470
Reform-oriented opposition party	56.0	1119	37.6	445
No party affiliation	24.3	487	22.7	269
Total	100	2000	100	1184

Note: The missing values were excluded.
* The data was taken from the results of survey research conducted by the Social Science Research Center at Seoul National University in Korea. The question used in the questionnaire reads: "Which party do you feel you are personally standing closest to?"
** The data was taken from survey data acquired from research conducted by the Institute for Korean Election Studies. The question reads: "To which party do you feel closest?

Two questions are of central importance at this point: What are the crucial bases for distinguishing different political parties in Korean party systems? On the basis of which criteria can the Korean party systems be identified in relation to Western party systems? To understand Korean politics and party systems more clearly, it seems necessary first to discuss these questions.

In order to distinguish political parties in different phases of development, it can be interesting to follow up the results of parliamentary elections (see the results of the National Assembly elections in Appendix 3). Figure 3-3 shows a change in election results based on two groupings of political parties: the government party and a group of opposition parties.[48] These two groupings are deeply rooted in the pattern of modern Korean politics.[49] Because the Koreans have

[48] Independents are left out of the discussion here because they cannot be regarded as any organized political force.

[49] Grounds for using the classification of government vs. opposition

not experienced peaceful regime change since the First Republic, save the recent two cases, a kind of conflict structure appeared.[50] The conflict was one between the government party that represented economic development and national security based on authoritarian rule, on the one hand, and opposition parties that represented human rights, justice and equality based on liberalism and democratization, on the other. Politics was a field of eternal power struggles between two political forces: one for authoritarianism (or anti-democratization) and the other for democratization.[51] As a result, two groups of voters, i.e. Conservative government party supporters and reform-oriented opposition ones, may have existed on the voter level. Two competing camps were arrayed along the line of the government-opposition party continuum.

Figure 3-3 demonstrates that there has been a consistent confrontation between the two groups. Government party supporters remained stable at around 36-37 per cent during the 1980's and 1990's, while those of the opposition parties has fluctuated somewhat. Another survey confirms the pattern of government-opposition group perception on the individual level.[52] 37 per cent of respondents

grouping in Korean politics are well discussed in Cho, 1992:161-175.

[50] In 1998, the first regime shift between ruling and opposition parties occurred. The largest opposition party candidate Kim Dae Jung won the presidential election by defeating Lee Hoe Chang, the ruling party candidate. The victory of Kim Dae Jung was the first time in the history of the Korean democratization process in which a peaceful regime change between ruling and opposition parties occurred.

[51] Korean democracy has been more stable and has returned to the normal orbit of democratic evolution after the introduction of the Sixth Republic. A variety of democratic measures were taken by the regime elected through a direct presidential election. The electoral system was also reformed to insure fair competition in elections. See Choe, 1997:61 and Choe (2000).

[52] The survey was carried out just after the 1992 presidential election by the Institute for Korean Election Studies in the period between December 19 and 27. The question reads: "What kind of political dispositions do you have? Do you support the government party or one of the opposition parties?"

answered that they were more inclined to be a government party sympathizer, while 34 per cent answered in favor of one of the opposition parties. About 27 per cent of those interviewed located themselves at a middle-of-the-road position Thus, it can be said that the two-group classification of political parties is usefully applicable to Korean party systems.

Figure 3-3. Party Strength of Government- and Opposition Parties (1973-1996)



Source: Central Election Management Committee (CEMC) (1973, 1986), *The History of Elections in Korea*; CEMC (1992), *The 14th National Assembly Election*. Chosun Ilbo, April 12, 1996.
Note: The figures for the opposition parties are the sums of the second and third largest parties in every election.

The next effective tool in distinguishing political parties in Korea is an indicator of the degree of 'conservativeness or progressiveness' of the political parties. The meaning of the conservative-progressive (or conservative-liberal) continuum in Korean politics, however, is different from that in Western democracies. In Korea, the term 'conservativeness' may contain a connotation of political goals striving for stable political change, consistent expansion of the economy, welfare rather than equal distribution, and for national security

against the military threat from North Korea rather than benefits in the interests of the middle and upper classes in society. On the contrary, the term 'progressiveness' underscores a set of political goals such as realization of democratization, legitimate regime change and human rights rather than articulating the interests of the working class in society. Therefore, the conservative-progressive dimension used in Korea contains different notions in Western democracies.

The degrees of conservativeness or progressiveness of the Koreans are presented in Table 3-3. The evidence reveals that Koreans became more conservative in the late 1980's. Those who had conservative sentiments increased by 6.7 percentage points, while those who had progressive ones or none showed a slight drop of 5.5 and 2.2 percentage points, respectively. The data indicate that after the introduction of the Sixth Republic by president Roh Tae Woo in 1988,[53] Koreans emotionally began to lean more towards conservative views. After the 1988 Olympic games, Koreans have suffered from social disorder and economic instability such as a high rate of inflation, fierce labor strikes, frequent radical movements of students and workers and party mergers among three ruling and opposition parties. Therefore, the social disruption has contributed to Korean voters holding conservative sentiments and leaning towards conservative ideologies, striving for more stability in society and expanded economic affluence. This reflects the general tendencies of people who needed consistent economic development and gradual, rather than radical, social change. Thus, the changing aspects of the ideological sentiments of the voters reflect political and social events that can in a direct or indirect manner affect the spectrum of political evaluation by the people.

[53] In the literature, the regime ruled under Roh is often called a 'half-civilian' government due to the fact that even though the president was elected directly by the people, the president was originally from the military. Some call the Roh government the '5.5th Republic' (Kim, 1988:490).

Table 3-3. Change of Conservative and Progressive Orientations (1988-1990)

Parties	1988	1989	1990	Diff. (1988-1990)
Extremely Conservative	3.8	4.2	5.5	+1.7
Conservative	22.5	25.5	27.5	+5.0
Middle-of-the-road	41.2	41.7	39.0	-2.2
Progressive	29.5	26.0	25.5	-4.0
Extremely progressive	4.0	2.5	2.5	-1.5
Number of Cases	1468	1534	1513	

Note: The data were taken from survey research conducted by the Social Science Research Center at Seoul National University. The question reads: "Which position do you feel you belong to when considering your political inclination?" In calculating the difference between 1988 and 1990, the plus (+) sign denotes that conservative sentiments of voters increased, while the minus (-) sign denotes that voters changed in the direction of less progressive, except for the middle-of-the-road item for which (-) merely denotes a drop in percentage. Missing data and those who refused to answer were omitted.

The Korean party system based on the voters' evaluation of the party positions on the conservative and progressive scale is illustrated in Figure 3-4. Two different sets were introduced here. The first one is the direct reflection of voters' perceptions on political parties measured by a survey. The second one is based on secondary data – such as party platforms and different policy positions of the political parties – due to the absence of direct survey data on the contemporary political parties. Considering this, the positions of the parties in the second set are somewhat approximately calculated, but also refer to the data in the preceding figure.

As depicted in Figure 3-4, the then ruling DLP in 1990 is located in the middle of the right end with the value of 3.8, while the two opposition parties are positioned on the left and about middle positions on the conservative-progressive continuum with 2.5 and 3.1, respectively. Voters themselves lean somewhat towards conservative sentiments, but this is not extremely high (3.1).

After the amalgamation of the two opposition parties and the establishment of another conservative party, the UNP, just before the 1992 assembly election, the party system was reshaped. It is not difficult to

locate the political parties on the conservative-progressive scale.[54] The then ruling DLP, without question, can be located on the most extreme position on the right end, whereas the largest opposition party led by Kim Dae-Jung, also without question, can be located at the moderate extreme position on the left end. Because there has not been and still is no extreme left party in the Korean party system, there can be no argument about this location.

There are two middle-of-the-road parties that can be positioned at a center position on the conservative-progressive scale. However, it would not be a mistake to locate the UNP at a right-of-middle position, reviewing party platforms and policy proposals. The party unveiled conservative policy preferences in the 1992 assembly and presidential election campaigns and received many votes by focusing their attacks on the failure of the economic policy of the government and ruling party. It is a fact, however, that the backbone of the UNP's economic policy is very similar to that of the government party.[55] Another centrist party, the NPRP, can be located at a moderately progressive position, considering its party doctrine, election manifesto and party ideology and policies for a new clean and fair political system, accelerated democratization, welfare policy and equality.[56] Therefore, the DLP should be located on the right side of the scale, but

[54] Because of the lack of appropriate data, an approximation was made for the party system in 1992. Here the following sources were considered in locating the political parties in terms of the conservative-progressive scale: party platform, campaign manifesto and policy preferences. For details, refer to CEMC (1993).

[55] The economic policies of the UNP were focused on the competitive and free market economy, an export-centered economy, and cheap and massive housing supply for the populace (Dong-A Ilbo, 1993-3-26). The party leader, Jung Ju-Young, was a founder and owner of the largest *Chaebol* (conglomerate) in Korea, Hyundai, and was therefore regarded as a new conservative alternative.

[56] For party doctrines and ideologies, refer to CEMC (1993), *Party Platforms and Election Manifestos of Registered Political Parties* (Seoul: CEMC).

not in an extreme position, followed by the UNP, the NPRP and the DP to the left, in that order.

Figure 3-4. Korean Party System Based on Conservative-Progressive Dimension (1990 and 1992)

(1990)



(1992) An Approximate Party Disposition



Source: For the 1990 party system, data was taken from a survey conducted by the Social Science Research Center at Seoul National University, while, for the analysis of 1992 party system, a set of materials provided by the Central Election Management Committee (CEMC) was used. See, CEMC (1993).
Note: 1. The question reads: "Considering policies of the current political parties in Korea, how do you evaluate their ideological positions? Answer the following in relation to parties one by one: (A) Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) (B) Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) (C) Democratic Party (DP)." The coding schedule is exactly identical with that for Figure 3-2. In order to calculate the positions of the political parties on the conservative-progressive continuum, all codes were transformed except '3': '1' to '5', '2' to '4', '4' to '2', and '5' to '1'. According to the recode scheme, the averages for the three parties, i.e. DLP, PPD, and DP, were 3.8, 2.5 and 3.1, respectively. Based on the data of Table 3-3 and the same recode scheme as above, positions for all voters were also calculated for three successive years: 2.9 (1988), 3.0 (1989), and 3.1 (1990). The figures confirm the previous discussion on the "conservativization" of the Korean voters in recent years.

2. The PPD merged into the DP in 1992 in response to the amalgamation of three parties that resulted in a big government party.

Party System Change in the United Kingdom During the Postwar Era

Britain has maintained a stable two-party system during the entire postwar era. Since 1945 there have been seven Labour governments, including Tony Blair's New Labour, and eight Conservative governments, of the total fifteen government formations. Until the Liberals made a successful comeback – at least on a popular level – on the British political scene in the 1970's and 1980's, the two-party system had never been challenged.[57]

A general trend in British party politics during the 1970's and 1980's was the diminishing strength of Labour, stabilization of the Conservative vote and increasing Liberal strength. Since the government following the 1974 October election, under Harold Wilson, Labour did not return to a government position until Blair came to power as prime minister under the banner of New Labour. During this period, Labour suffered a record low level of party support, especially in the elections of 1983 and 1987 with 27.6% and 30.8% of the popular vote, respectively, due to a considerable extent to the successful march of the Alliance of the SDP and the Liberals. During the Thatcher and Major administrations, the Conservatives stabilized at the level of 42.3% of the popular vote.

By contrast, the Conservatives began a new golden age starting with the landslide victory of Margaret Thatcher. In the 1992 election called after the dissolution of the Social Democrats, Labour again proved a very limited capability to expand party support among British voters. Labour managed only a 3 per cent increase in the popular vote in comparison to the 1987 election in which Labour achieved only 31.2 per cent. Labour failed to return to government for the fourth time in a row. After reaching a bottom level of party support with 38.1 and 36 per cent of total votes in the two elections in 1974, the Torys dominated British electoral politics from the end of the

[57] For details on party strength, see Appendix 4.

1970's until 1997. In the four elections held between 1979 and 1992, popular support for the party stabilized between 47 and 43.9 per cent.

After passing through long dormant periods, the Liberals began to expand their electoral strength beginning with the 1974 election. For the Liberals the two elections held in February and October of 1974 were new starts. In the February 1974 election the party staged a successful revival with an increase of 11.7 per cent (from 7.4 to 19.1). In 1981 a breakaway faction from the Labour Party founded the SDP. The former President of the EEC Commission Roy Jenkins and three ex-Cabinet Ministers played a central role in forming the new party. The Liberal leader, David Steel, also played a key role in collaboration with the newly formed SDP. After the formation of the Alliance in 1981 and its successful victories in local elections, many warned that the time was ripe for a shift of the traditional two-party to multi-party system in British politics. In the 1983 election, the Liberal-SDP alliance won 23 seats with 25.4% of the popular vote. The difference between the Alliance and Labour was only 2.2 per cent in popular support. Under the reign of Paddy Ashdown as a new party leader, the Liberal Democratic Party (officially named Social and Liberal Democratic Party) was founded in 1988. After the dissolution of the SDP in 1990, the vote for the Liberals seemed to stabilize at 17.1 per cent in the 1992 election, which meant a return to the party politics of the 1970's in Britain, at least in terms of the strength of the three political parties on the level of popular support.

Figure 3-5. Popular Support Party Strength in the British Lower House Elections between 1964 and 1992 (based on proportion of popular votes)

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1991); 1992 British General Election Studies; Elections Around the World, URL: http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/unitedkingdom.htm.
Note: 1. Entries for Liberal votes in 1983 and 1987 are the total votes for the Alliance.
2. For the result of the 2001 election, refer to Appendix 4.

At the parliamentary level, however, the picture is completely different. The stable two-party system has never been threatened either by the breakthrough of the Liberal Party or of regional parties during the post-war era. The two major parties have never failed to achieve over 90-per cent support taken together. Even in the 1983 and 1987 elections in which the Liberals and the SDP Alliance reached a record high level of 25 per cent of the popular vote, two-party dominance remained firm at a level of 93 per cent[58] This trend

[58] The low representation of the Liberals in the British party system is mainly due to the so-called FPTP (first-past-the-post) system. Britain has a simple

continued to exist until the 1992 election in which John Major, Margaret Thatcher's successor, defeated the Labour Party lead by Neil Kinnock. It was in the 1997 election that the parliamentary strength of the two parties plunged to the 80% level for the first time in the history of modern party politics in Britain.[59]

Table 3-4. Party Strength in the Lower House between 1964 and 1997 (based on proportion of parliamentary seats)

Parties	1964	1966	1970	1974 Feb.	1974 Oct.	1979	1983	1987	1992	1997
Conservative	48.3	40.2	52.3	46.8	43.6	53.4	61.1	57.8	51.6	25.0
Labour	50.3	57.6	45.7	47.4	50.2	42.4	32.2	35.2	41.7	63.6
Liberal	1.4	1.9	1.0	2.1	2.1	1.7	3.5	3.4	3.1	7.0
Others	0.0	0.3	1.0	3.6	4.1	2.5	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.4
C + L	**98.6**	**97.8**	**98.0**	**94.2**	**93.8**	**95.8**	**93.3**	**93.0**	**93.3**	**88.6**

Note: Entries of (C + L) denote magnitude of two-party dominance in the Lower House.

On the left-right continuum, the British party system can be illustrated relatively simply. As measured by the six indicators of progressiveness-conservativeness discussed in Chapter 2, two parties are somewhat easily distinguishable: the Labour on the left end of the

majority system in which candidates compete for a seat in a constituency. The person with a simple majority wins the constituency. The Liberal leader, Paddy Ashdown, ferociously criticized the electoral system as one of main reasons for the maintenance of the firm two-party system in Britain. In this context, reform of the electoral system to improve the proportionality of political parties has been vigorously discussed by politicians and scholars alike. For effects of electoral systems on party systems, refer to Lijphart and Grofman (1984), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Reeve and Ware (1992), Blais and Massicotte (1994), Lijphart (1994), Sartori (1997). For implications and impacts of electoral reform on party systems, see e.g. Bogdanon (1981), Brazier (1991), Dunleavy and Margetts (1995), Bogdanor (1997), and Dummet (1997).

[59] For more details on the changes of two-party dominance, refer to "Regional cleavage" section in Chapter 4.

continuum and the Conservatives on the right.[60] The Liberal Democrats can be categorized as a center-right party. Since the small regional parties – SNP, Plaid Cymru and Ulster Unionist Party – are nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, they can also be classified as conservative-oriented parties.

Summary

As effective indicators for measuring party system dimensions, two indicators – the number of parties and party properties – have been used in the literature on party systems.[61] Based on these two indicators, the party systems of two Asian democracies and the United Kingdom were explored in this chapter.

The party systems of the two Asian countries are characterized by multiparty systems with one dominant party, such as the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) in Japan and the right-oriented DLP (Democratic Liberal Party) in South Korea. In contrast to the two Asian countries, the two-party system in the United Kingdom remained stable during the post-war era. In Japan the political party system has shown a pattern of a 'one-and-half' party system. This implies that there was a dominant LDP in postwar Japanese electoral politics. Although small opposition parties have existed in Japan, they have been split and too weak to assume government power after the post-war elections. In Korea, however, the strength of the ruling parties has been much weaker than that measured in Japan. The weak conservatism in Korea seems to be closely linked to the electoral performance of the opposition parties. The strength of the opposition parties has been

[60] For party doctrines of the major British parties, see Chapter 5 in Birch (1986). For general election manifestos on the main issues including economy, industry, employment, Europe, welfare, health, education and housing, refer to Coxall and Robins, 1995:228-256. For party ideologies and policies, see e.g. Cordell, 1992:68-102.

[61] Duverger (1954), Rae (1971), Sartori (1976), Blondel (1978), von Beyme, (1985), and Lane and Ersson (1987).

much greater than that of Japanese parties. In the 1988 and 1992 National Assembly elections, the ruling parties DJP and DLP were defeated by the opposition parties in the popular vote.

The British party system has been stable during the entire postwar era. There has been two-party dominance in electoral politics on the parliamentary level. In the 1920s, the position of the Liberal Party as the second largest party was assumed by Labour. Despite the improved electoral performance of the Liberal and SDP Alliance in terms of the popular vote, the positions of the first and second largest parties of the Labour and Conservative have never been threatened by the Liberals or other regional parties on the national political scene. At the parliamentary level, the Liberals and regional parties, such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party), did not prove to constitute any challenge to the stable two-party system.

As discussed before, party properties can be measured on the basis of progressive vs. conservative parties containing six dimensions – the left-right dimension, main policy positions, stance on social change and reform, the role of the state, values related to the welfare state and civil society (see details in Table 2-2 of Chapter 2). Based on the indicators, the progressive-conservative parties in the three countries were classified. Three conservative parties – the LDP in Japan, the DJP/DLP in Korea and the Conservatives in the United Kingdom – seem to be easily positioned on the right end of the continuum. The JCP (Japanese Communist Party) and the JSP (Japanese Socialist Party) in Japan were positioned on the left as were Kim Dae Jung's opposition PPD in 1988 and the DP in 1992 in Korea. In the United Kingdom, Labour and the Liberal Democrats can be placed on the left and on the center-right, respectively. As Lipset and Rokkan argue, the pattern of party systems is closely linked to that of voter alignment and structure in society. Social dimensions and their impact on party support, on the one hand, and on party systems, on the other, is the main concern of the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND PARTY SUPPORT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Political phenomena, and especially the emergence of party systems, reflect the structure of cleavage in society. This has been a central proposition of the sociological school based on the link between politics and society. Based on this proposition, without social cleavages or conflict structures in society, it would be meaningless to discuss political change, e.g. political stability and instability closely combined with party politics. The relationship between society and politics seems to be symmetrical. In other words, change in politics can influence and be influenced by changes in society. To separate politics and society into two different units would be meaningless in attempting to analyze this symbiotic relationship. The following questions are, thus, vital at this point for the analysis of the support for parties among British voters: "Which cleavage structures are prevalent in society in relation to politics?" "How closely are they related to each other?" These questions are of central concern in the following sections of this chapter.

In this chapter, rich data sets compiled in the United Kingdom will be examined in order to seek a pattern of voting behavior in Britain. The tradition of British election studies is indeed long and profound.[62]

[62] The British General Election Surveys (BGES) have existed since 1964, yielding a total of 10 survey data sets until 1992. The series was started by David Butler (Nuffield College, Oxford) and Donald Stokes (University of Michigan), who continued to chair the studies until 1970. The series then passed on to Ivor Crewe, Bo Särlvik and James Alt at the University of Essex (later joined by David Robertson), who organized two surveys between 1974

Since the beginning of the 1960's election analyses have been conducted after every parliamentary election in Great Britain. The main concern of this chapter is to analyze the patterns of party support among British voters in conjunction with the social cleavage structure existing in the United Kingdom. General elections during the postwar era in Britain up to the victory of John Major in the 1992 election will be examined. The following questions are to be the focus of attention: (1) How has the role and importance of the cleavage variables changed in relation to voter choice over the last three decades? (2) Which variables were more crucial in relation to others? And, finally (3) what are the most substantial trends concerning changes in patterns of voter support in Britain? Are there any remarkable changes in patterns of British voting behavior? For the analysis of social cleavage patterns and its effects on party support, six-cleavage variables, i.e. sex, age, occupation, education, region and religion, will be used. This chapter begins by taking a closer look at the role of gender in party support among British voters during the past three decades.

Gender Cleavage

When Herbert Tingsten carried out comparative study on voting behavior patterns in the 1920's and 1930's before and after the introduction of universal suffrage for men and women, he found some remarkable differences in political behavior related to gender. One of the most important findings was the pattern of political participation and voting pattern of the two groups. According to him, women showed lower propensities for political participation and more conservative voting patterns than men. As a plausible reason, he pointed out that women were religiously more active.[63] For this

and 1979. The 1983, 1987 and 1992 studies were directed by Anthony Heath (Jesus and Nuffield College, Oxford), Roger Jowell (SCPR) and John Curtice (University of Strathclyde), and Ivor Crewe (University of Essex).

[63] Tingsten, 1963:10-76.

reason, he argued, women held more conservative values than did men.

Lazarsfeld and his companions found from their American study that there has been a close relationship between women's low level of political interest and higher rates of electoral abstention. They argued that women showed lower level of interest in politics and a lower electoral participation than those of men. In their analysis, however, the pattern of party support among women was not reported in detail. They focused more on men's influence upon their wife's electoral decisions. According to them, the almost perfect agreement between husband and wife comes about as a result of male dominance in political situations.[64] Even though one may not know exactly how females vote, one can at least conjecture as to their potential voting patterns, as a result of the fact that the socio-economic status of their husband was traceable.[65]

Another comprehensive research effort on the political role of women carried out by Maurice Duverger, which was based on a four-nation comparison of Germany, France, Norway and Yugoslavia, provides a clear picture of women's electoral behavior: (1) Husbands and wives appear to vote in the same way; any differences between the votes of the sexes therefore depend entirely on those of unmarried men and women; (2) These differences between the sexes are generally slight, but the general trend seems clear; women's voting favors conservative and religious parties more than men's; (3) The influence of women on election results, therefore, seems to be small, since the differences in voting between the sexes are generally almost

[64] Lazarsfeld, et al., 1960:141.

[65] For Larzarsfeld and his companions, SES (Socio-Economic Status) level was regarded as the most crucial factor in voting behavior. Based on three variables, including SES level, religion and place of residence, the IPP (Index of Political Predisposition) was constructed. According to what they found, high SES levels, affiliation with the Protestant religion and rural residence predisposes a vote for the Republican Party, whereas the opposites of these factors make for Democratic predispositions (Larzarsfeld, et al., 1960:16-27).

negligible.[66] There does not seem to be much difference between the findings of Tingsten's, Lazarsfeld, et al.'s and Duverger's. In support of Tingsten's and Lazarsfeld's theories, Duverger also found that there was a crucial relationship between women's religious conviction and conservative propensity in party support.

One of the classic works by Jean Blondel provides very similar findings on gender voting, especially on women's voting patterns. In the book, *Voters, Parties, and Leaders*, Blondel found that female voters had a more conservative party orientation, even though the difference is not so impressive.[67] A relevant question here concerns the origins of the conservatism of female voters.

Seymour M. Lipset provides a more concrete description of the unique characteristics of women's political orientation. According to him, conservative party orientations among female voters are formed by their unique social role.[68] Even though parties that are backed by women cannot be considered to represent women's interests against those of men, women tend to support conservative ideas. He argues that the differences are probably due to the different social roles of women and the way in which this leads to the acceptance of values identified with conservative parties.[69]

In recent research by Vicky Randall on women's political behavior, the above findings are well summarized:

> "A generalization that is by now almost a cliché and which appears more securely founded, at least in terms of the recent past, is that women are politically more conservative than men. It should be noted, however, that according to the survey used by Dunleavy and Husbands (1985), women were still more likely to vote Conservative than men, which if nothing else indicates that these sex differences are becoming too marginal to be reliably identified by current survey methods. . . Female conservatism has also been, and in many cases continues to be, a feature of voting behavior in

[66] Duverger, 1955:45-56.

[67] Blondel, 1963:59-60.

[68] Lipset, 1981:231 and 279.

[69] *ibid.*

> other West European nations. It is strongly associated with the presence of an influential Roman Catholic church".[70]

Based on the findings so far, women's voting can be characterized by 'conservative party preference', which seems to be closely related to women's higher propensity of religious activity and to perception on their different social roles. A remarkable feature, however, is that the differences between men and women in voting behavior have become less pronounced over time due to the apparent secularization process in Western democracies and higher social activity of women. Sweden provides a good example. The deviation in gender voting has been reduced to zero and, more drastically, the pattern was reversed, i.e. women became more center-left oriented than men.[71] The essential characteristics of female voting and its changing patterns are still an interesting theme in the psephological arena. Therefore, three questions will be taken up in more detail in this section. How much does the voting behavior of women differ from that of men? Have women really been conservative voters? If so, to what degree? And, finally, in what direction has the pattern shifted?

The changing patterns in gender voting in Britain are clearly presented in an analysis of contingency table (Table 4-1). From the 1963 survey up to the 1992 election, three distinguishing features are apparent. First, men have accounted for leftist-oriented party support throughout these elections. Support for Labour remained strong among men in all of the elections except for 1969 (+22.4) and the four most recent elections (varying from +7.6 in 1979 to +15.7 in 1983).

[70] Randall, 1987:70-71.

[71] In much recent research carried out by the Swedish Election Program, it has been observed that women have been leaning more towards the Social Democrats since 1979 (also in 1960, 1968 and 1973), while men have leaned more towards the Moderate (Conservative) Party since 1973. It was reported, however, that the differences between men and women in party voting are extremely small in Sweden. For more details on gender voting in Sweden, see Holmberg (1984), Holmberg and Gilljam (1987), Holmberg and Gilljam (1990), Oskarson (1990) and Oskarson (1991).

Second, even though women supported the Labour Party in elections during the 1960's and 1970's, they have been more conservative than men on the whole in elections during the past three decades. And, third, after the gender gap in voting reached a pinnacle in 1970, the difference in gender voting has declined from a high point of 11.1 per cent in 1970 to a low of 0.5 per cent in the 1987 election. As Table 4-1 indicates, it can be said that men dominated among Labour voters in the elections held before 1979 (with the exception of the 1969 survey). There is a similar pattern for women in the 1960's and 1970's in support of Labour. However, the tendency for women to vote Labour is much lower than that for men.

Table 4-1. Party Support by Gender in Britain between 1963 and 1992 (per cent)

Gender	**1963**	**1964**	**1966**	**1969**	**1970**	**1974**	**1974** (Feb)	**1979** (Oct)	**1983**	**1987**	**1992**
Men											
Conservative	32.1	40.2	36.3	56.2	42.7	37.4	34.6	45.3	45.5	44.0	44.1
Labour	53.4	47.4	54.3	33.8	47.5	41.6	44.9	37.7	29.8	31.2	35.8
Liberal	14.2	11.7	8.7	8.0	7.0	17.5	15.6	14.7	23.4	23.5	16.6
Other	0.3	0.7	0.7	2.0	2.8	3.5	4.8	2.3	1.3	1.3	3.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	787	735	741	461	688	989	973	750	1494	1528	1121
Women											
Conservative	41.0	43.1	40.9	56.4	48.3	38.6	37.4	48.5	44.9	44.2	47.0
Labour	46.3	46.5	50.g	28.7	42.0	39.8	40.0	37.5	27.7	30.9	32.9
Liberal	12.6	9.8	7.8	12.9	7.7	20.5	20.4	13.0	26.0	23.4	17.6
Other	0.0	0.6	0.4	2.0	2.0	1.1	2.2	1.0	1.4	1.4	2.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	965	843	829	495	773	1078	982	808	1711	1674	1301
$(C\text{-}L)^{Men}$	-21.3	-7.2	-18.0	+22.4	-4.8	-4.2	-10.3	+7.6	+15.7	+12.8	+8.3
$(C\text{-}L)^{Women}$	-5.3	-3.4	-10.0	+27.7	+6.3	-1.2	-2.6	+11.0	+17.2	+13.3	+14.1
Gender Effect	*16.0*	*3.8*	*8.0*	*5.3*	*11.1*	*3.0*	*7.7*	*3.4*	*1.5*	*0.5*	*5.8*

Source: The tabulated data was taken from Crewe, Day and Fox (1995). The (C-L) entries and Gender Effect were calculated by the author.
Note: 1. The indices of (C-L) denote Euclidean difference between Conservative and Labour votes. The entries were calculated by subtracting the Labour votes from the Conservative votes. The positive signs denote more conservative-orientation in gender voting, whereas the negative ones Labuor-orientation. In cases where values for both men and women are in the same direction (i.e. either negative or positive for both sexes) the absolute numbers of the entries are subtracted. In the case that the values for men and women are in opposite directions in relation to each other (i.e. one negative and the other positive) the absolute numbers of the entries are added.
2. Gender effect was figured out by subtracting $(C\text{-}L)^{Women}$ from $(C\text{-}L)^{Men}$ of absolute numbers.

From a contingency table analysis, a general trend can be detected in three major aspects. Firstly, the British data analysis shows a tendency towards continuous fluctuation. In order to measure the pattern of fluctuation and to increase our understanding of it, a new index must be constructed. The distance between voter support for the Conservatives and Labour on the part of men and women can be regarded as an effective tool for measuring the degree of gender voting in each election. The index is based on 'Euclidean' distance. Regardless of its direction, a high score implies a high degree of difference in party support between the sexes, whereas a low score results in the opposite interpretation. The indices vary from 0.5 to 16. An interesting finding is that in every second election the difference increased and then decreased, a pattern that continued until 1979.

Secondly, despite a continuous fluctuation, a general tendency was that the gap has diminished throughout the past three decades. The diminishing role of gender in party support can be confirmed by comparing the average values of indices divided into three chronological periods. The average values change from 8.2 per cent for the three elections during the 1960's to 6.3 per cent for the four elections during the 1970's and to 2.6 per cent for the last three elections. The trend addresses a typical pattern in gender voting in Western industrial democracies: the significance of gender voting as it relates to the direction of Conservative and Labour Party preference has been drastically reduced.[72]

Thirdly, even though women conservatism has diminished during these periods, it existed evidently. Women have been more conservative than men on the whole in elections during the past three decades. Furthermore, the incidence of gender voting in the 1992 election increased from 0.5 to 5.8 (an increase of 5.3). This was a result of the fact that female voters returned to a Conservative position in the 1992 election. The Conservative vote on the part of women increased

[72] Norris and Lovenduski, 1993:38-39. See also Rose and McAllister, 1990.

from 44.2 per cent to 47 per cent, though men's support for the Conservatives was unchanged at about 44 per cent in both the 1987 and 1992 elections. This shows that the women conservatism is alive in British politics.

What makes for such a unique pattern of gender voting, as witnessed in Britain? There could be some plausible explanations. The first reason for female conservatism seems to be one of the characteristics of British society. Family values, for example, are still held in high esteem among the majority of the British population. About 40 per cent of all women still stay at home and commit themselves to the traditional role of housekeeper. The participation rates of women in the labor market in Britain are much lower than in countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway.[73]

Another reason for female conservatism is attributable to historical events at the time of the formation of a new party system in Britain. An American social scientist, Rasmussen, who analyzed the period of female enfranchisement in Britain, claims that Labour failed to mobilize the young female voting forces from the very beginning of women's enfranchisement in 1928. The new enfranchised groups of women instead supported the Conservative or Liberal parties. He concluded that Labour's failure to mobilize women at the time of the formation of a new party system meant that it was able to obtain major party status only after the end of World War II when a substantial number of middle class men switched to the Labour party.[74]

To sum up the gender effect in Britain, Blondel provides one very persuasive remark. He argues: "We may say that women, most of whom still do not go out to work, do not experience the difficult conditions of life in factories and that in any case many work in offices where work is clean and generally more pleasant".[75] Even though empirical evidences were not provided in this chapter, Blondel's

[73] Lundskaer-Nielsen et al., 1989:260.

[74] Rasmussen, 1984:47.

[75] Blondel, 1963:60.

argument helps us to get a more tangible grasp of the origin of conservative propensities among female voters in Britain. The mixture of these factors is believed to lead women to maintain their conservative political attitudes in modern Britain, even though its meaning has been markedly diluted in the long term in British electoral politics.

Age Cleavage

Observing the changing pattern of partisanship in America during the past decade, Paul Allen Beck placed strong emphasis on the increasing role of generational effects. According to him, the political dealignment in America clearly observable since 1964 was mainly caused by the low partisanship of the generation that attained adulthood after the early 1960's. Partisan changes are highly related to three effects: (1) period effect, (2) life-cycle effect and (3) generational effect.[76] He suggests that period effect, the term applied to forces that affect all cohorts equally, is indicated when the overall partisan means differ over the years as a product of uniform changes of cohort means. The life-cycle effect, however, as the term applied to the effect of passage through different life stages, occurs in its purest form when each generation exhibits equivalent partisanship at the same age or life stage. Generational effect would be a case when partisan levels vary by birth cohort across the life cycle, reflecting different prevailing political forces during the formative years of each cohort.[77] Of the three types of effect, the generational effect was argued to have the most crucial impact on the decreasing partisanship in America.

In their classic book *Political Change in Britain,* David Butler and Donald Stokes discuss the meaning of 'political generation'. They argue that the very concept of 'political generations', of there being a common pattern in the behavior of those entering the electorate during

[76] Beck, 1984:247.

[77] *op.cit.*

the same period, implies that the young show a common susceptibility to political ideas during their years of growing awareness".[78] According to Butler and Stokes, with the ageing of the voter, the relatively plastic attitudes of youth tend to become more deeply fixed. Political generational effect suggested by Butler and Stokes may well imply that there were age cohorts which were permanently advantageous for the party and whose party image was formed at an earlier stage in life. From this view, it is argued that different political age groups maintain their political attitudes and behavior throughout their entire life.

Empirical findings indicate, however, that there has been a weak relationship between age and voting patterns. Lipset argues that there is no regular and distinct correlation between age and party support. In some countries and during certain historical periods, young voters are likely to be found on the left, in others they are more conservative.[79] He points out the role of significant experiences for different generations in their reactions to the political environment. Thus, he treats difference among age groups as a unique generational effect.

The core role of generational effects on political change observed in advanced Western democracies was discussed by the post-materialists. According to Inglehart, the citizens of industrial democracies are experiencing a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values.[80] Older generations who often experienced war, materialistic destitution or economic insecurity, support values such as economic prosperity, domestic order and social and military security. By contrast, postwar generations who have never experienced invasion of their homeland

[78] Butler and Stokes, 1970:44.

[79] Lipset, 1981:231-232.

[80] Inglehart, 1977:3-12. A number of characteristics of post-material societies include: technological innovation, changes in occupational structure, economic growth, expansion of education, development of mass communication and distinctive cohort experiences.

by hostile forces and who have been reared during a period of unprecedented affluence, economic well-being and personal security, seek aesthetic satisfaction and quality of life.[81] Consequently, many young people shift their attention towards post-material, or new political agendas.[82] In the post-materialists' view, the emergence of the new politics and the Green Party are largely due to the support of the younger generations. At large, however, postmaterialism may be regarded as a type of generational effect, as argued by Beck, since value orientations and behavioral patterns of younger and older generation cohorts would have been affected by unique environments in their political socialization process. What kind of age-related effects can be detected in British politics? How strong is the relationship between age and party support? Do the British voters hold intrinsic age-group attitudes or are they changing as they grow up? Table 4-2 hints at plausible answers.

The main characteristic of age-related effect observed in British electoral politics seems to be generational effect. The younger generations and even the medium-aged groups favored Labour, while the older favored the Conservatives. Except for the 1970 and 1979 elections, an overall dominance of Labour votes was observed among young adults and the middle aged (35-44 and 45-54) during the 1960's and 1970's. The pattern, however, was weakened during the period between 1983 and 1992. In the 1983 election, the two youngest groups shifted their support to Conservative. Among the youngest group of 18-24, the conservative dominance was temporally broken in the 1987 election but it returned in the 1992 election. Among the second youngest group of 25-35, the conservative dominance remained stable in the two consecutive elections between 1987 and 1992. Among the middle-aged group of 35-44, a shift of party support for the

[81] For structure of measuring indicators, see Inglehart, *op.cit.,* pp.40-41.

[82] According to Inglehart, the new political agendas often clash with strongly held traditional values and norms. In turn, this has resulted in pressure towards the formation of new political parties. Inglehart, *op.cit.,* p.13.

Conservatives can be evidently detected. From that time on, the pattern continued to exist among this age group.

Table 4-2. Conservative and Labour Votes by Age in Britain (1964-1992) (%)

Age groups		1964	1966	1970	1974	1979	1983	1987	1992	Change (64-92)
18-24	Con.	40.0	39.0	36.9	24.6	39.7	43.2	36.3	40.7	+0.7
	Lab.	51.4	55.8	30.7	46.7	40.5	31.6	40.5	37.0	-14.4
	diff.	*-11.4*	*-16.8*	*+6.2*	*-22.1*	*-0.8*	*+11.6*	*-3.9*	*+3.7*	
25-34	Con.	40.1	30.9	43.1	32.5	44.6	41.7	38.2	44.1	+4.0
	Lab.	47.5	58.3	47.6	40.5	36.6	27.9	36.0	35.0	-22.5
	diff.	*-7.4*	*-27.6*	*-4.5*	*-4.0*	*+8.0*	*+13.8*	*+2.2*	*+9.1*	
35-44	Con.	31.3	35.8	40.9	36.0	47.3	45.9	44.3	42.9	+11.6
	Lab.	52.1	54.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	26.0	27.8	32.2	-19.9
	diff.	*-20.8*	*-18.7*	*-5.1*	*-4.3*	*+9.2*	*+19.9*	*+23.5*	*+10.7*	
45-54	Con.	43.9	37.4	42.3	36.2	44.2	43.1	49.5	50.4	+6.5
	Lab.	45.5	51.1	47.4	44.1	39.0	29.4	29.9	30.9	-14.6
	diff.	*-1.6*	*-13.7*	*-5.1*	*-7.9*	*+5.2*	*+13.7*	*+19.6*	*+19.5*	
55-64	Con.	49.0	46.2	51.9	40.2	47.8	45.6	44.3	44.9	-4.1
	Lab.	42.5	48.1	42.0	41.2	39.6	30.0	28.7	36.0	-6.5
	diff.	*+6.5*	*-1.9*	*+9.9*	*-1.0*	*+8.3*	*+15.6*	*+15.6*	*+8.9*	
65+	Con.	47.8	45.8	58.2	50.8	56.7	53.0	51.0	49.2	+1.4
	Lab.	44.1	49.0	32.3	35.4	33.2	27.2	26.9	35.5	-8.6
	diff.	*+3.7*	*-3.2*	*+25.9*	*+15.4*	*+23.5*	*+25.8*	*+24.1*	*+13.7*	

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).
* The entries for 1974 are the sum of the February and October elections.

Despite the fact that the generational effect has been slightly diluted during recent elections, the overall pattern remains sturdy. In the elections between 1979 and 1992, the increased strength of the Conservatives was by and large based on the support of the older voters. The coherence of conservative support among the younger voters is less intensive than that shown among the older ones. In the 1983 and 1992 elections, for example, the conservative support among the youngest group marked +11.6 and +3.7, while that among the oldest groups recorded +25.8 and +13.7 respectively. Thus, despite the generational effect diminishing in consecutive elections, especially

during the 1980's and 1990's, the pattern seems to have remained to a considerable extent stable throughout the 1960's and 1990's.

A question to be raised here is how the drop in Labour votes, which occurred during the 1980's and 1990's, can be explained. Are there any other age-related effects to be measured? A general pattern of the 1980's and 1990's is an overall drop in Labour votes vis-à-vis a relative stability in conservative votes. Party support for Labour declined about one-third during this period in comparison to the 1960's in which Labour maintained its stronghold among the younger voters. The drop in the younger and middle-aged groups is most dramatic, while that in older generations is slightly less. In contrast, a stable support for the Conservatives can be observed among all age groups between 1983 and 1992. The fact that the Labour decline has been a general tendency within all age groups and that the conservative vote has been stable suggests that the period effect has been one of the dominant factors on voting behavior in British electoral politics during the 1980's and 1990's. It may be said that the period effect, more precisely, the Thathcher effect, prevailed from the 1979 election up to the last election of 1992. Even after the Conservatives changed party leaders from Thatcher to Major, the period effect continued.

In order to measure the life-cycle effect during the period between 1964 and 1992, a cohort analysis was used. A two-spot comparison of three cohorts between 1964 and 1992, i.e. 18-24, 25-34 and 35-44, provides an appropriate measure of the changing pattern of party support among the cohorts in question.[83] Despite the weaknesses of the cohort analysis, the data presented in Table 4-3 gives a clear notion

[83] The data presented in the Table 4.3 should be cautiously interpreted. Ages of three cohorts in 1964 do not fully match in 1992. The first age cohort of 18-24 in the 1964 election, for example, does not perfectly match that of 45-54 in 1992 election. To make two-spot comparison of cohort perfectly matched, the cohort in 1992 must be the range of 46-52. Thus, the cohort of 45-54 in the 1992 election does not fully represent the 18-24 cohort measured in the 1964 election. The case of two other cohorts seems to be similar. The cohorts of 25-34 and 35-44 in the 1964 do not fully match those of 55-64 and 65+ in the 1992 election.

of the general shifts in the party support patterns of British voters. During these three decades the age cohorts of three generations have increased their Conservative votes. The age cohort of 18-24 increased its support for the Conservatives from 40 to 50.4 per cent, while age cohort of 25-34 shows only a slight change in conservative vote. The most drastic change can be detected among the cohort of 35-44. The conservative votes of this cohort increased by 17.9 per cent between 1964 and 1992. What does the shift in conservative voting of three cohorts imply?

Table 4-3. Cohort Analysis and Life-cycle Effect in Conservative Votes in Britain (1964-1992)

Age	1964	1974*	1983	1992	Change in same age voters (64-92)	Change in within-cohort (64-92)
18-24	40.0	24.6	43.2	40.7	+0.7	-
25-34	40.1	31.5	41.7	44.1	+4.0	-
35-44	31.3	36.0	45.9	42.9	+11.6	-
45-54	43.9	36.2	43.1	50.4	+6.5	+10.4
55-64	49.0	40.2	45.6	44.9	-4.1	+4.8
65+	47.8	50.8	53.0	49.2	+2.0	+17.9

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).
* The entries for 1974 are the sum of the February and October elections.

The results indicate a clearcut "conservativization" of the voters during this period. The British voters do not seem to have maintained their party preferences on a long-term basis. The data illustrated in the cohort analysis confirms the assumption of the life-cycle effect, which implies that young radicalism fades away while conservative values fit better to the aged voters. By contrast, the theory of generation effect suggested by Butler and Stokes does not seem to be a case in British politics. According to them, different political age groups maintain their political behavioral patterns during their entire life. However, crystallization of the political attitudes of the youngest cohorts in the 1964 election was not found in the 1992 election.

To sum up, three age-related effects were widely affirmed with the British data. The main characteristic of the age effect in party support is the

generational effect. In all the elections between 1964 and 1992, the youngest generation remained unchanged as loyal supporters of Labour, while the oldest one unfailingly supported the Conservatives. Despite the fact that the pattern has been somewhat weakened during the 1980's, was caused by the period effect, or so-called "Thatcher effect", this general tendency has remained to a large extent unchanged in British electoral politics. Also, as argued by Beck, the life-cycle effect was detected in the cohort analysis of the British voters. The leftist sentiments of the younger generations seem to give way to conservative ideas and values with their aging.

Class Cleavage in Party Support

"Class is the basis of British party politics: all else is embellishment and detail".[84] Pulzer's expression describes the core of class voting in Britain. Occupation was regarded as the most important element characterizing the two classes, non-manual and manual labourers. The Liberal success, which began in the 1970's, however, was seen as a challenge to the general belief in a class-party link. The rise of a significant third party vote has obviously weakened the old class-party relationship.[85] Butler and Stokes concluded that since support for the Liberals was remarkably unrelated to class self-image and occupational level, they constituted a standing challenge to any over-simplified account of class and party.[86]

In a later phase, the gradual increase of the Liberal vote, plus a set of symptoms expressed by the term 'party dealignment', as witnessed in a decreasing Alford index and weakening relationship between party choice and traditional class structure, raised a fierce debate in British party and electoral politics. According to Crewe, class dealignment was caused by a set of changes in the social and economic situation, i.e. an overall increase in standard of living, an

[84] Cited from Butler and Stokes, 1970:54.

[85] Särlvik and Crewe (1979), Heath, e al. (1985) and Kavanagh (1986).

[86] Butler and Stokes, 1992:57-58.

increased number of owners among manual workers, regional factors in the voting patterns of workers in the South and an increase in mixed-class households, etc.[87]

With these general changes in the voting milieu, Dunleavy provided another viewpoint. Public-private sector cleavage-based voting patterns were the norm. A new social cleavage between the private and public sectors of employment was argued to be replacing that of social class as a basis for party choice.[88] It was argued that sector polarization in voting choice is a symptom of modern electoral politics in Britain. According to what he found, between 1979 and 1983 pro-Conservative swing within the private sector was 7.5 per cent, while in the public sector it was 5 per cent.[89] These overall observations were understood as a shift in the pattern of party and election politics in Britain as well as in welfare states such as Scandinavian countries.[90]

These general perceptions of British politics were not questioned for a long time. Nor were the use of notions such as class dealignment, decrease in Alford index and two-category based divisions of class. A vigorous challenge was launched with the publication of *How Britain Votes*. The authors, Heath, Jowell and Curtice, criticized the use of a

[87] Crewe, 1992:66-67.

[88] A new term, 'new middle class', was discussed by Wright (1975). He identifies the new middle class as a qualified professional working in the public sector, a member of the 'salariat' who would not easily identify his or her interests with the aims and ideology of the Conservative Party. In sum, the interests of the 'new' middle class do not coincide with the interests of the more traditional middle class. For more about this, refer to Cordell, 1992:109-110.

[89] Crewe, *ibid.,* p.66.

[90] On Swedish public-private sector voting, refer to Holmberg, 1984:85-87,; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1987:191-198; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1990:125-126; Oskarson, 1990:231-240; and Gilljam and Holmberg, 1993:206-210. For European studies, refer to Dunleavy (1980), Goul Andersen (1984), Goul Andersen (1989), Blais, Blake and Dion (1988), Hoel and Knutsen (1989), and Crewe (1992).

simple two-tiered classification which they regarded as a rough and inadequate approximation.[91] Consequently, they used another set of classifications based on five categories: salariat (the highest managerial posts), routine non-manual (clerk, typist, receptionist, sales workers, etc.), petty bourgeoisie (self-employed, artisans, shop keepers, farmers, etc.), foremen and technicians (supervisors, technicians, etc.) and working class (manual wage-earners). According to them, the conception of class was focused not just on income levels per se but on economic interests. From their perspective, economically both values and interests were argued to be the crucial link between class interests and political behavior.

Based on this five-class categorization, Heath and his companions suggest two different voting patterns: absolute and relative class voting.[92] They argue that relative voting indicates whether the class basis of voting has changed in the United Kingdom. In order to measure this, they developed a new measure, 'odds ratio'. An odds ratio of 1:1 would indicate that there was no class basis in voting at all, that the relative strengths of the two parties were the same. In other words, *the larger the odds ratio, the stronger the class basis of voting*. The Alford index was argued to be inappropriate as a measure of relative class alignment since it confuses relative with overall support.

This view is opposed to the traditional consensus that has dominated election studies. The main point of contention involves the important role of changing values rather than factors previously

[91] As they put it: "This highly simplistic two-class model of the class structure is often used in political analysis. While it may have some value as a first rough approximation, we hold that it is wholly inadequate for studying the social bases of politics since it ignores important divisions which have little to do with the color of a men's or women's collar". Heath, et. al., 1992:68.

[92] Heath, et al, *ibid*., p.76. The overall proportion of the electorate which votes for its natural class party was regarded as a measure of absolute class voting, while what they were interested in was regarded as a measure of relative class voting.

suggested, such as economic progress, improved economic conditions and standards of living. Heath et al. argue that even though living standards have certainly increased for the majority of people, conflicting interest is just as concerned, or even more so, about relative values as they are about absolutes.[93] According to their conclusion, class differences remained at much the same level throughout the postwar period in Britain.

William Miller is another researcher to provide a deviant analysis of class voting and dealignment as observed in British society. In contrast to traditional election studies, he was interested in constituency voting patterns. His focus was on whether or not environmental factors had an influence on the voting behavior of the two classes. By comparing individual-level results, derived from surveys, he tried to clarify both the concept and the measurement of class polarization. He emphasized that living conditions and frequent contacts with neighbors will produce consensus rather than reaction. This main theme was confirmed by comparing individual and constituency components of class polarization.[94] Miller concluded that as the individual component moved downwards, the environmental component moved upwards so as to offset the individual-level depolarization. Consequently constituency polarization did not decline but increased.[95]

A Danish political scientist, Jørgen Goul Andersen, provides an interesting but cautious message concerning the decreasing role of the Alford index and class voting in Western European electoral politics. According to him, there are three aspects that are of utmost importance in such discussions. Firstly, the decline of class voting is often exaggerated. Second, describing the changes in voting patterns

[93] Their idea is well summarized in the following texts: "The cake may grow in size, but rising expectations mean that conflicts over the size of the shares will continue unabated" *op.cit.*, p.83.

[94] Miller, 1992:124.

[95] *ibid.,* p.123.

as a decline conceals important changes in class voting. And thirdly, without a specification of such changes, it is difficult to consider whether class voting will decline or increase in the future.[96]

The first and second aspects seem to be strongly supported by the changing pattern of the Alford index during the period between 1964 and 1990. The Alford index for 1966 and 1990, for example, was 55 and 29, respectively. The index shows a radical drop in class voting by 26 percentage points. He compares this result with the support of the middle class. The support for Socialist parties among farmers and the self-employed remained stable with a variation of +1 and +7, respectively. Thus, the drop in the Alford index during these periods is due to the increase in overall middle class support for Socialist parties from 27 to 42 per cent (+15) in 1966 and 1990. Andersen argues that this pattern should be explored in more detail in relation to the change in social structure during the same period. If one takes this into serious consideration, the Alford index for 1990 would be 40. This would entail a mere 11 per cent drop in the index. According to him, the drastic change in social class composition, i.e. the decline in numbers of the working class and the rise of a new middle class in the public sector (as discussed in the British context), was believed to be the reason for the exaggerated increase in support for Socialist parties among the middle class. His argument is in accordance with the notion that the decline in class voting does not imply a general decline in class-party (or party bloc) loyalties or a general convergence in voting patterns. The decline is merely a move to the right among workers and a move to the left within the new middle class.[97]

Andersen's argument about the exaggeration of the decline was also supported by another empirical study. Jefferey M. Stonecash found that the decline in class voting carried out in the United States was in part exaggerated and wrongly focused. Stonecash measured the changing pattern of voting in terms of changes in income. He argues

[96] Andersen, 1992:91.

[97] Andersen, *ibid.,* p.93.

that if class voting is measured in terms of income, the trend did not decrease but rather increased in American politics during the 1950's and 1990's. He concludes, therefore, that the manner in which the concept is defined is the key to measuring trends.[98]

To sum up the above implications, recent election studies focus on how to define class voting and on whether these voting patterns have decreased or stabilized in recent years. Even though the Alford Index was criticized for its excessive simplicity, it was widely used as the most effective measure for understanding these definitions.

The main interest in this section is to focus on whether the meaning of class voting has diminished in British election politics in recent decades. To explore this and to counteract the oversimplicity of the Alford Index, an alternative index CVI will be created. Table 4-4 presents the elections during the last three decades with respect to the role of class (more precisely, the role of occupational status) in party choice among British voters.

As shown in Table 4-4, it can be broadly confirmed that the middle class have been loyal Conservative supporters while the working class have been Labour supporters.[99] Voting behavior based on one's own class position plays the most important role among the highest and lowest levels of the class variable in the table. The highest middle class position (Class I) yields the most overwhelming Conservative support, while the lowest working class position (Class V) the highest for Labour. Seven out of 10 voters belonging to Class I, cast their ballot for the Conservatives in the elections of the 1960's and even in the election of 1970. Only slightly lower support for Labour has been found among voters belonging to Class V.

[98] Stonecash, 2000:141-142.

[99] Positive signs of the index (*diff.*) denote a Conservative dominance among voter group in question, while negative signs denote a Labour dominance.

Table 4-4. Party Support by Class in Britain (1964-1992) (%)

Occupations		Elections								
		1964	1966	1970	1974*	1979	1983	1987	1992	Change (64-92)
I	Con.	71.7	75.4	73.2	63.0	64.4	52.6	51.6	60.6	-11.1
	Lab.	16.1	13.7	14.6	11.2	15.4	11.3	11.9	17.6	+1.5
	diff.	+55.6	+61.7	+58.6	+51.8	+49.0	+41.3	+39.7	+43.0	
II	Con.	67.6	60.3	60.6	48.6	61.0	53.3	52.7	52.0	-15.6
	Lab.	17.7	24.7	29.5	23.5	23.4	17.9	18.4	20.2	+2.5
	diff.	+49.9	+35.6	+31.1	+25.1	+37.6	+35.4	+34.3	+31.8	
III NM	Con.	58.5	61.8	57.0	54.0	61.6	54.8	54.3	55.4	-3.1
	Lab.	23.6	24.5	29.4	24.0	19.2	20.8	21.4	26.0	+2.4
	diff.	+34.9	+37.3	+27.6	+30.0	+42.4	+34.0	+32.9	+29.4	
III M	Con.	53.8	48.4	54.1	39.2	49.8	37.6	37.5	39.0	-14.8
	Lab.	28.2	37.0	35.8	36.1	33.6	40.2	40.7	44.3	+16.1
	diff.	+25.6	+11.4	+18.3	+3.1	+16.2	-2.6	-3.2	-5.3	
IV	Con.	29.5	25.6	37.1	25.8	36.6	33.2	32.3	32.3	+2.8
	Lab.	61.7	68.3	53.9	55.9	49.7	45.0	45.1	51.0	-10.7
	diff.	-32.2	-42.7	-16.8	-30.1	-13.1	-11.8	-12.8	-18.7	
V	Con.	25.0	24.3	30.7	22.0	33.5	25.3	25.3	25.7	+0.7
	Lab.	68.2	70.0	61.4	60.0	52.4	52.2	51.7	60.2	-8.0
	diff.	-43.2	-45.7	-30.7	-40.0	-18.9	-26.9	-26.4	-34.5	

* The votes for 1974 are the sum of the February and October elections.

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).

Note: The classification of occupations above is based on the Registrar General's classification of social class.[100]

Class I	Higher managerial or professional
Class II	Lower managerial or administrative
Class III NM	Skilled or supervisory non-manual
Class III M	Skilled manual
Class IV	Partly skilled manual workers
Class V	Unskilled manual

Class voting in British politics during the 1970's and even 1980's entered new phases. As many researchers have already reported, the meaning of class voting patterns diminished during these periods. Conservative party votes among Class I fell about 60 per cent in the 1970's and continued this downward trend to the level of 50 per cent

[100] For other classifications, such as Market Researcher's social grade and Heath, Jowell and Curtice's class schemes, see Harrop and Miller, 1987: 185. Butler and Stokes made a detailed classification of class. See, Butler and Stokes, 1974:67-93. Kavanagh made a thorough examination of different ways of defining social class. See Kavanagh, 1986:22-25.

in the 1980's. About half of those in the highest middle class category maintained their party loyalty to the Conservatives. In the 1992 election, the pattern seems to return to the one of the 1960's. Among the voters belonging to the highest position, 60 per cent cast votes for the Conservative Party in the 1992 election, which may imply that party consolidation in this class has increased. Labour votes among Class I fluctuated slightly between 11.2 and 17.6 per cent during these elections. The Class II position yielded somewhat lower Conservative support than did Class I but also shows a clear Conservative dominance. Six out of 10 Class II voters cast their ballots for the Conservative Party during the 1960's and 1970's with only one exception, the election of 1974 (48.6 per cent for the Conservatives). In the last three elections Class II groups cast over half of their votes for the Conservatives with an average of 52.8 per cent. The proportion of Labour votes among Class II voters is somewhat higher than in Class I, which indicates a cross-cutting class perception. Among the non-manual skilled workers the voting pattern has been almost the same as among the Class II voters. The Conservative votes fluctuated slightly, between 54 per cent (1974) and 61.8 per cent (1966) in the three-decade long analysis. Reverse class voting among non-manual skilled workers has also remained at about the same level as among Class II voters.

The voting pattern of the working class has been somewhat different from that of the middle class. The unskilled manual workers (Class V) have shown the most consistent loyalty towards the Labour Party. Between 60 and 70 per cent of the votes in this group were cast for the Labour Party. Since the 1979 election, however, class solidarity seems to have diminished to about 50 per cent support for Labour, which would imply reverse class voting either for the Conservatives or the Liberals (Alliance). It is interesting to note in the table that the proportion of Conservative votes in Class V has been much higher than that of Labour votes in Class I, which has resulted in a weakening of Labour in the British party system. This may also mean that there

has been a lower degree of class consolidation among Labour supporters in Class V than in Class I.

The same is the case among Class IV voters. Votes for Labour have tended towards the lower levels in all of the elections during these three decades. An approximate level of 60 per cent of votes for Labour fell to 50 per cent, and even lower to a level of 40 per cent in the elections in the 1980's. In the 1992 election the proportion of Labour votes increased by 5.9 percentage points (from 45.1 to 51 per cent). The high proportion of Conservative votes among the partly skilled manual workers (Class IV) has been a crucial factor in the weakening party strength of Labour. Approximately 30 per cent of Class IV voters supported the Conservatives throughout these elections. The most critical problem for Labour seems to lie in this section. Their ambiguous class position is regarded as a main reason for Labour's declining popularity. As the table shows, over half of the voters cast their ballots for the Conservative Party in the 1964 and 1970 elections and 48.4 per cent in the 1966 election. The votes for the Conservatives among Class III M decreased to between 37 and 39 per cent, but this was still a very high proportion of the overall Conservative vote. In other words, there was a very low proportion of Labour votes among Class III M voters.

One of the most distinguishing features, as the table indicates, would be that class votes decreased in all groups during the past three decades. The proportion of Conservative votes among Class I to III M voters has decreased between 1964 and 1992. Among Class I and II voters the proportion of votes for the Conservatives diminished by 11.1 and 15.6 percentage points, while that of the Labour vote among Class VI and V voters decreased by 10.7 and 8 percentage points. One positive sign for the Labour party is that the proportion of Labour support among the skilled manual workers (Class III M) increased from 28.2 to 44.3 per cent (+16.1), while Conservative Party votes dropped significantly from 53.8 to 39 per cent (-14.8).

Another positive sign for Labour is that class perception and class consolidation became more salient. Party loyalty based on one's own class position seems to have returned to the level of the 1970's, at least among working class voters. Labour support among Class V and IV recovered to the level of the 1960's. Labour received 60.2 per cent of the votes cast among Class V voters in the 1992 election, which is about same level as in the 1970 and 1974 elections (61.4 and 60 per cent of the votes cast, respectively). Within Class IV Labour received 51 per cent of the votes cast, which also corresponds to the levels of the 1970 and 1974 elections (53.9 and 53.9 per cent of the votes cast, respectively). Thus, it is clear that class voting patterns decreased drastically in the 1970's and then stabilized in the 1980's.

However, the enhanced role of voting behavior, based on voters' class position, is a general feature observed in the elections held in the 1980's and the 1990's. There are some plausible explanations for this revitalization, related to Labour's enhanced performance. As Eulau indicates, the economic situation, i.e. high unemployment rate, long period of economic recession and deteriorated welfare system, could lead to greater class consolidation and solidarity. In the United States, it has only been in times of economic crisis, as prevailed during the New Deal elections, that the identification of the working class with the Democratic Party served as a motivating mechanism, to create working class solidarity in terms of votes.[101] At least one reason for this seems to be that only in periods of social stress do class interests become sufficiently activated. And, it is very likely that in such situations both classes will be activated, as has been the case throughout election history. Some questions which then arise are: How much has voting behavior been affected by the class position of the electorate?; To what degree have class voting patterns changed over time?; And, finally, if we all agree that the most well-known Alford Index has critical points, isn't it possible to construct another

[101] Eulau, Eldersveld and Janowitz, 1956:294.

measure in order to observe the changing pattern of class voting? These questions will be dealt with in the following sections.

The simplest way to see the changing pattern of class voting in British politics is to use the Alford Index. As shown above in Table 4-4, the index fluctuates between 34 and 31 during the period 1964 to 1992, which implies a gradual decrease in class voting patterns. But, this change is not as dramatic as expected. One interesting finding is that even though the patterns became weaker during the post-war period, the pattern of fluctuation has continued. After the decline, the Alford index stabilized at a level between 26 and 29 in the 1979 and 1987 elections. Its role in explaining voting behavior increased from 29 to 31. As the figures illustrate, voting behavior, based on class, fluctuated but steadily decreased up to the 1979 election. Since this election, the pattern leveled out at 29 and even increased in the 1992 election.

Class Voting Index (CVI)

As discussed above, many researchers have strongly criticized the simplicity of the Alford Index based on votes for Labour among two class groups; middle and working. A weakness is the exclusion of conservative votes from the calculation, which means that changing patterns in Conservative voting are completely ignored. Considering this problematic feature, Heath, Jowell and Curtice presented an alternative measure to overcome the weaknesses of the index. However, many British political scientists have sharply criticized the odds ratio. Crewe and Dunleavy led the most trenchant critics. In an article "On the Death and Resurrection of Class Voting: Some Comments on How Britain Votes", Crewe focused his criticism of the odds ratio on five occupational categories. According to Crewe, in using the odd ratio for calculating relative class voting, the three main class groups are omitted, i.e. routine non-manual, petty bourgeoisie and foremen and technicians. This results in an omission of a large

portion of electorate. Just 40-55 per cent of the electorate between 1964 and 1983 was included.[102]

The usage of odds ratio raises two very critical problems: firstly, its sensitivity to small percentage point changes and, secondly, its asymmetric treatment of two classes. Crewe concluded, that when applied to trends in class voting, the odds ratio offers a spurious degree of precision and converts tiny ripples of movement, whether real or illusory, into dramatic tides of change.[103] Concerning the second flaw, the odds ratio was argued to be unrealistic. A change in the working class Labour or middle class Conservative vote would have less impact on the ratio than identical percentage point changes in the working class Conservative or middle class Labour vote. Therefore, it was trenchantly criticized for being influenced by changes in cross-class voting. The Alford-type index, however, seems to capture more consistent changes in class voting patterns.[104] How can we then resolve the problems of the over-simplicity of the Alford index and over-sensitivity of the odd ratio? Let us consider another type of class index.

In constructing the Class Voting Index (hereafter referred to as the CVI), the following basic principles were considered. Firstly, all of the six class groups are included in the calculations of the new index. An advantage in using all six groups is that changes in class voting patterns for all of groups are considered. Secondly, the index is symmetrical, which means that the proportions of both Conservative and Labour votes are equally reflected in the calculation. The problem of the selectivity of the Alford index in only being concerned with the change in Labour (socialist) votes can, thus, be overcome. The case of

[102] Crewe, 1992:92-93.

[103] *Ibid.,* p.89.

[104] Dunleavy contributed to this criticism. His points were almost identical to Crewe's. The problem of oversensitivity of the odds ratio was also criticized. According to him, the odd ratio is excessively sensitive to small change and missing values. See Dunleavy, 1992:111-112.

negative class voting within a class group is also reflected in the calculation. The negative effects are then subtracted from the total effect of class voting. Let us take an example. For Class I, 100 per cent of the votes for the Conservatives and zero per cent for Labour would be regarded as perfect class voting (CVI = 1). In Class V, however, 0 per cent for the Conservatives and 100 per cent for Labour would also be regarded as perfect class voting (CVI = 1). The CVI (Class Voting Index) was calculated according to the following formula:

$$\begin{cases} CVI = \sum x(C\text{-}L)_{diff} * 600^{-1} \\ \\ \text{where } x = \text{I, II, III NM, III M, IV, V;} \\ 0 \leq CVI \leq 1. \end{cases}$$

Thus, the CVI equals the sum of the total differences of all classes in each election. A comparison of the CVI and the Alford Index is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1. Changing Patterns of Alford and Class Voting Index (CVI) in Britain (1964-1992)



* In order to make the two indices comparable, the Alford index was divided by 100. For the Alford index, middle class was defined as non-manual workers (I, II and III-NM), and working class as manual workers (III-M, IV, and V).

For the CVI in 1964, the scores acquired, after subtracting middle class Labour from Conservative votes and middle class Conservative from Labour votes (i.e. +55.6, +49.9, +34.9, -25.6, +32.2, and +43.2), are subsequently added up. The sum is then divided by 600, which represents perfect class voting. A total of 600 means, therefore, that voters cast their ballots completely in accordance with their class allegiance. 'CVI equal to zero' represents perfect non-class voting, whereas 'CVI equal to one' represents perfect class voting. Based on these calculations, the change in the CVI is shown in Figure 4-1. An interesting finding is that those two indices run parallel to each other up until the 1974 election. However, the discrepancy between the two lines has been amplified since the 1974 election. The Alford index curve is situated on a higher position than the CVI, which means that the ratio of other party votes has influenced that of the Conservative and Labour votes.

This section has attempted to seek answers to a number of questions concerning the relationship between class and party support in Britain. Two indices – Alford Index and CVI – used in this section confirm that there has existed a significant relationship between social class and voting behavior in British politics. A majority of the middle class supports the Conservative Party, while the working class voters are the main source of Labour Party support. This general trend has changed in the elections during the 1960's and 1980's. The pattern of class voting has steadily decreased up to the 1979 election, after which the pattern stabilized with a slight increase. In the election of 1992, the pattern of class voting returned to the same level as in 1974. This implies that, as Eulau argues, the British people have probably experienced a more class salient society with a high rate of unemployment and a decline in social security and welfare during the Thatcher era. Despite its reduced role, class voting still strongly affects the behavioral pattern of voting in Britain.

Education Cleavage

Education has been one of the most important variables in the study of political behavior. It is the influencing factor for an entire range of dependent variables reflecting political interest, participation and mobilization.[105] Education is also a major determinant of class position. According to what Butler and Stokes found from their studies, those who were well-educated, public school attendees[106] and university degree holders tended to place themselves in the middle class, whereas those who were poorly educated, left school early tended to place themselves in the working class.[107]

In the era of post-industrialism its significance for political behavior has increased. Post-industrialism often refers to a science-based, professional, white-collar, service-oriented society in which knowledge rather than capital is the key political resource and education rather than class is the major source of political values.[108] With the increased role of the state in providing welfare, the new compulsory school system was introduced during the postwar era.

Comparing the more and less highly educated may reveal a marked difference in political attitudes and behavior between these groups. According to Lipset, a general pattern of the well educated can be detected: "they are more liberal on social issues; they are more tolerant of new ideas, groups and people; they are less religious; they take a more optimistic view of human nature and they are less attracted to political extremes, whether of the left or the right".[109] In contrast, people with more limited education have been associated with support for politicians who offer simple solutions to complex

[105] Converse, 1974: 730.

[106] In Britain, 'public' refers to schools that are referred to as private in other European educational systems and in the American educational system.

[107] Butler and Stokes, 1970:68.

[108] Bell (1974).

[109] Austin, 1977:31-71 and Harrop and Miller, 1987:198.

problems. Likewise, they often tend to vote for socialist or communist parties when they select a party in elections. Lipset supports this argument with similar results detected in third world politics. In India, illiterate voters showed higher tendencies to vote for communist parties than more educated ones.[110]

Investigating the relationship between education and partisanship, Richard Rose confirms a steady association between the two variables. With the three-category definition of the education variable, he found a consistent tendency for those with the lowest level of education to be the most likely to favor Labour, whereas the most educated middle-class voters are slightly less likely to favor the Conservatives than are those with an intermediate level of education.[111]

This connection is supported from two elections as illustrated in Table 4-5. Labour was supported mostly by those with a lower level of education, whereas the Conservatives were supported more by those with a higher level. The tendency is clearly seen in the 1988 election in which the CSE level[112], as a 16-year-old degree, is a stronghold of Labour. Out of those with CSE or equivalent educational qualification 46.5 per cent supported Labour, while 38.1 per cent support the Conservatives. By contrast, those who have higher educational qualifications are the most fervent supporters of the Conservatives. Among them 52.5 per cent were strong Conservative supporters, while only 19.6 per cent supported Labour. Among those who have the highest educational qualification voter support was split between Conservative and Liberal, which resulted in waned support for the Conservatives.

Although the overall electoral support of Labour waned sharply in the 1992 election, the general pattern of Labour dominance among those with the lowest level of education is largely found. In the election, John Major won by a landslide. The strength of Labour

[110] Lipset, 1983:120.

[111] Rose, 1974:506.

[112] The CSE (Certificate of Second Education) was launched in 1965.

support reduced among all levels of education. Still those with CSE or an equivalent level of education are the largest group who support Labour. By contrast, the group that is more likely to support the Conservatives, in other words, the group that is more likely to hold distance from Labour, is those with higher education below degree. This pattern was confirmed in the 1988 election.

Table 4-5. Education and Party Support in Britain (1988 and 1992)

Educational level	Year	Political Parties						
		Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Other	%	N	(C-L)
CSE or equivalent	1988	38.1	46.5	15.4	0.0	100	75	-8.4
	1992	46.7	35.2	16.4	1.8	100	268	+11.5
O level or equivalent	1988	43.8	31.7	22.3	2.2	100	346	+12.1
	1992	49.3	28.9	17.7	4.1	100	464	+19.5
A level or equivalent	1988	42.5	25.2	27.2	5.0	100	117	+17.3
	1992	52.0	27.1	17.0	4.0	100	257	+24.9
Higher education below degree	1988	52.5	19.6	26.0	1.9	100	516	+32.9
	1992	54.2	19.5	22.5	3.9	100	359	+34.7
Degree	1988	37.3	24.8	37.6	0.4	100	256	+12.5
	1992	41.6	22.0	33.8	2.5	100	203	+19.6

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).

The index measuring the difference between the party strength of Conservative and Labour by education indicates that Labour receives the most stable support from the group with the lowest education, while those with a higher education below a degree strongly support the Conservatives. An interesting result is shown in Table 4-5. Within the highest education level, i.e. among those with a university degree, the Conservatives lost their leading position to the Alliance. In the 1988 election, the Conservative received only 37.3 per cent of popular support, while the Alliance including the Liberals and the SDP received 37.6 per cent. This pattern remained in the 1992 election, although the popular support for the Liberals dropped from 37.6 to

33.8 percent. Thus, the electoral support of those with higher education was split between Conservative and Liberal.

In British election studies, the effect of education on party support was also measured by the age for school leaving. As shown in Figure 4-2, the voter group who were older than 17 years at the time of school leaving was the most fervent supporter of Conservative. The pattern remained unchanged during the 28 years of election studies between 1964 and 1992. However, the effect of education on party support seems to have weakened during the twenty-two years between 1970 and 1992. In the two elections held in the 1960's, the gap between the highest and lowest age groups of conservative school leavers marked 27.1 and 36.8 per cent, respectively. Since 1970, however, the gap reduced drastically to a level of around 10 per cent.

Figure 4-2. Conservative Vote by Education in Britain between 1964 and 1992



Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).
* The votes for 1974 are the sum of the February and October elections.

Our assumption stating that those with higher education are more likely to favor the Conservatives proved to be true in both measures used. During the period of study between 1970 and 1992, however, the relative weight of the education variable on party support dropped

drastically. One of the explanations for this tendency is that conservative support among those with a higher education drifted successively away to the Liberals. Another explanation seems to be the overall domination of the Conservatives, as shown in the 1992 election, among all the group categories based on education levels.

Regional Cleavage

From many previous studies, two common features were constantly argued to be the most remarkable in post-war British politics: south-north and urban-rural differences in party support. The electoral divergence of Scotland, Wales and the North from the rest of the country is large. Rural populations were more pro-Conservative, while urban ones more anti. The question can be raised as to how these particular characteristics have arisen in British election politics.

Analyzing data for the period 1955-1979, Curtice and Steed suggest three general explanations for the regional trends in British voting behavior. Firstly, there have been slow changes in the socio-economic make-up of the electorate in different parts of the country. Partly as a consequence of migration and partly due to the change of class structure, the South and rural areas have become more middle class. According to them, the massive migration of members of the middle class between 1961 and 1971 occurred mainly from urban to rural areas. As a result of these demographic changes, the tendency for urban Britain to move towards Labour and rural Britain towards the Conservatives has been matched by congruent changes in the spatial distribution of the classes.[113]

Kevin Cox reported a similar result in the study of voting behavior in London suburbs. He revealed that a relatively low population density but a rapidly increasing population owing to the addition of migrants from the central city could characterize London suburbs. Socially, the suburbs are predominantly middle class, younger rather

[113] Curtice & Steed, 1992:304.

than older, with high percentages of home ownership and married couples but with low occupation-gender ratios.[114] Some of the findings on voting behavior in London suburbs are remarkable. Suburbanism affects both party preference and participation, independent of other social contexts. Suburbanism also impacts on political behavior indirectly by influencing social class structure, age structure and commuter locations in addition to having effects of its own.[115] One of the classics in the study of elections, *The American Voter*, reveals the same pattern of voting behavior in America as found by Curtice and Steed. In that book, Campbell and his companions suggest that there are differences in the level of turnout between the central city and suburbs, the central city showing markedly lower levels of turnout.[116]

Another distinguishing feature in voting behavior based on political geography is an environmental effect. According to Curtice and Steed, there is clear evidence that voters have increasingly responded differentially to the social context in which they live. The role of the social environment in which people live was argued to be an important factor in changes in voting behavior. They suggest that rural workers are less strongly unionized and are, perhaps, more likely to be in an atomized social situation where their patterns of social intercourse are not characterized by regular contact with other workers who might help to reinforce their partisanship.[117] The environments within which people are living can cause them to vote in similar ways. This very fact was argued to be one of the most important factors in the changed voting behavior of the urban and rural populations, given the massive mobility across regional boundaries in the southern part of England.

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[114] Cox, 1969:351.

[115] *op.cit.,* p.368.

[116] Campbell et al., 1960:464.

[117] Curtice and Steed, 1992:307.

A Marxist-inspired approach describes the British regionalism as one of internal colonialism, with an English imperial center systematically controlling and exploiting a 'Celtic periphery'.[118] According to the radical view, the degree of unity in the United Kingdom has largely been called into question and, as a result, the weakened 'we-feeling' as a whole has led to the separate national consciousnesses in Scotland and Wales. The nationalistic feeling seems to have inflated in regions with a high working-class component as well as with location far from London. In these regions, there has been an inherent territorial dimension in the 'they vs. we' dichotomy.

Another factor in differentiated regionalism was provided by the perspective that the United Kingdom was and still is the result of a union of several units that are highly distinctive in cultural terms, each possessing and articulating its own sense of identity.[119] The diversities, derived from history and culture, still have a tremendous influence on contemporary politics in Britain, and those lines of conflict are well reflected in voters' electoral behavior.

A long-term analysis shows a clear trend in British political geography. As shown in Table 4-6, the main source of Conservative votes has been the Southern and Midland areas, whereas the main stronghold of Labour has been Wales and Northern England. In Scotland, Labour has taken a stronger position than the Conservatives but has been consistently challenged by the Scottish National Party and the Liberal Party. Even though the vote for the SNP has fluctuated during period between 1983 and 1992, party support increased to a considerable extent in the 1992 election at the expense of the Liberal party. In the two elections in the 1980's the SNP overtook the Liberals as the third largest party, just slightly behind the Conservative Party (a 1.6 and a 6.1 per cent gap in the 1983 and 1987 elections, respectively).

In the short-term, party support for the Liberals was reduced from 22.9 to 11.1 between the 1987 and 1992 elections, with the SNP

[118] Urwin, 1982:20.

[119] *ibid.*

securing its third party position in Scotland. The proportion of support for other parties, which constitutes mainly SNP votes, increased from 0.7 to 24.3. One of the most alarming trends in British election politics, regional polarization, may be confirmed by our data.[120] The breakthrough of the SNP in Scotland began in 1974, but it was an anomaly in comparison to the results of subsequent elections. The phenomenon reoccurred, however, in the 1992 election, which must be understood as a kind of protest vote against the established parties, primarily against the Conservative.

Table 4-6. Party Support by Region in Britain (1964-1992) (%)

Regions	Elections								
	1964	1966	1970	1974*	1979	1983	1987	1992	Change (64-92)
Scotland									
Conservative	42.0	36.5	41.3	29.7	37.4	23.6	29.0	26.6	-15.4
Labour	53.0	50.6	44.9	40.5	39.0	44.1	38.0	38.0	-15.0
Liberal	4.3	11.7	7.6	4.6	11.4	22.0	22.9	11.1	+6.8
other	0.7	1.1	6.3	25.4	12.2	10.2	10.1	24.3	+23.6
diff(C-L)	-11.0	-14.1	-3.6	-10.8	-1.6	-20.5	-9.0	-11.4	
%(C+L)	95.0	87.1	86.2	70.2	76.4	67.7	67.0	64.6	
Wales									
Conservative	27.0	25.9	28.2	20.9	20.4	33.5	22.2	33.6	+6.6
Labour	54.0	55.7	39.6	57.3	62.4	40.7	54.6	50.0	-4.0
Liberal	14.2	10.0	11.0	16.4	12.9	22.0	17.8	11.5	-2.7
other	4.8	8.5	21.2	5.3	4.3	3.8	5.4	4.9	+0.1
diff(C-L)	-27.0	-29.8	-11.4	-36.4	-42.0	-7.2	-32.4	-16.4	
%(C+L)	81.0	81.6	67.8	78.2	82.8	74.2	76.8	83.8	
The North									
Conservative	36.5	35.5	42.8	35.9	45.0	39.7	37.3	33.6	-2.9
Labour	50.7	57.0	49.1	46.9	41.5	37.0	44.6	46.5	-4.2
Liberal	12.6	7.4	8.1	17.2	13.5	23.4	18.1	16.4	+3.8
other	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	+0.2
diff(C-L)	-14.2	-21.5	-6.3	-11.0	+3.5	+2.7	-7.3	-12.6	
%(C+L)	87.2	92.5	91.9	82.8	86.5	76.7	81.9	80.1	
The Midlands									
Conservative	43.9	39.4	49.5	39.0	45.6	49.8	45.4	54.6	+10.7
Labour	51.5	56.6	44.5	47.2	41.8	28.5	27.8	30.4	-21.1
Liberal	4.6	4.0	5.6	14.7	12.2	21.5	26.6	14.8	+10.2
other	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	+0.2
diff(C-L)	-7.6	-17.2	+5.0	-8.2	+3.8	+21.3	+17.6	+24.2	
%(C+L)	95.4	95.0	94.0	86.2	87.4	78.3	73.2	85.0	

[120] See, for example, Johnston and Pattie's findings on spatial polarization in the political geography of Britain during the period 1979 to 1987. For more in-depth discussion, see Johnston and Pattie, 1989:56-65.

(To be continued)

Greater London									
Conservative	44.4	36.7	47.0	39.6	46.8	46.4	51.8	45.7	+1.3
Labour	43.7	52.7	48.5	42.7	40.5	27.6	28.3	39.6	4.1
Liberal	11.0	10.6	4.5	17.0	10.8	25.5	19.3	13.9	+2.9
other	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.9	0.6	0.6	0.8	-0.1
diff(C-L)	+0.7	-16.0	-1.5	-3.1	+6.3	+18.8	+23.5	+6.1	
%(C+L)	88.1	89.4	95.5	82.3	87.3	74.0	83.1	85.3	
The South									
Conservative	47.4	46.1	51.9	42.1	56.9	55.5	54.7	55.4	+8.0
Labour	37.6	44.6	37.2	30.3	25.9	15.6	16.0	21.1	-16.5
Liberal	14.5	9.3	8.9	27.3	16.7	28.6	29.1	22.7	+8.2
other	0.5	0.0	2.0	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.8	+0.3
diff(C-L)	+9.8	+1.5	+14.7	+11.8	+31.0	+39.9	+38.7	+34.3	
%(C+L)	85.0	90.7	89.1	72.4	82.8	71.1	70.7	76.5	

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).
Note: In the variable 'Region' the following recoding schedules were adopted: Three regions like 'North', 'North West' and 'York and Humberside' were transformed into 'The North', while the Western and Eastern Midlands were recoded as 'Midlands'. The 'South' includes three regions, i.e. East Anglia, South West England and South East England.
* The entries for the 1974 election are the sum of the February and October elections.

One remarkable feature in political geography measured between 1964 and 1992 is the diminished strength of the two major parties. In some regions, however, two-party dominance remains unchanged, while it is extremely low in others. The phenomenon of weak party support for the Conservatives and Labour in certain regions can be measured by the proportion of the votes cast for the two parties. In two regions – Scotland and the South – two-party dominance has diminished drastically. The proportion for the two parties in recent elections in Scotland has dropped to a level of 60 per cent and to 70 per cent in the South.

The weak performance of the parties in Scotland, especially from the 1980's onward is attributable to two phenomena: one is the strong position of the Scottish National Party and the other is the extremely low level of support for the Conservatives in comparison to other regions. Even though support for Labour has diminished over the long term, the party has managed to maintain support to a much greater extent than the Conservatives. The variation in the Labour vote

between 1979 and 1992 is very small indeed (-1), whereas the Conservatives declined by 10 percentage points during the equivalent period (-10.8).

The second region where the total party strength of the Conservatives and Labour is relatively weak is the Southern part of England. There are two major causes for this: the extremely low level of support for Labour and the extremely high level of support for the Liberals. In the long term, Labour support has declined in successive elections from 37.6 to 21.1 per cent. But there was a more positive sign for Labour in the 1992 election. Its support increased by 5.1 percentage points at the expense of the Liberals whose support decreased by 6.4. For the Conservatives the South has been a stronghold since the 1979 election that began the Thatcher era.

Thus, the introduction of nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and, more significantly, the enhanced role of the Liberals led to a weakening of the major parties in those regions. The Liberals and the nationalists have benefited from 'tactical voting' whereby supporters of the weaker of the two major parties in a constituency appear to switch to a third-party candidate where that candidate is seen as having a chance of defeating the other major-party candidate. The third party was able to successfully strengthen its position in those constituencies. This phenomenon is reflected in rural seats in the South and Midlands where the Liberals gained votes at the expense of Labour in particular. Thus the swing in favor of the Conservatives, at least partly, reflects the success of the Liberals rather than an increased preference for the Conservatives over Labour.[121] Insofar as the Nationalists and Liberals are strong in certain regions, it would not be wrong to say that tactical voting will continue and that the Conservatives and Labour will be challenged by those parties in future elections.

A concluding remark would be that the spatial polarization, as Johnston and Pattie argue, seems likely to continue to affect the

[121] Curtice and Steed, 1992:308.

regional divergence on voting behavior in Britain. This seems partly due to it suffering economic stagnation with high unemployment rates and divisions over European policy. These divisions may be exacerbated under circumstances of regional discrepancies in distribution of wealth and welfare in conjunction with access to European integration. As a result, the center-periphery division will become increasingly salient in British politics. Furthermore, there may be very strong dissatisfaction with and distrust of the established parties in regions where a common feeling of social alienation and deprivation in relation to the mainstream of development is considered dormant in the minds of the voters.

Religious Cleavage

Primary social elements, such as religion, language and race, can be a source of both national unity and conflict in societies. Those who belong to a minority group in society are much more likely to be politically consolidated in order to protect their interests. When there is a political party supporting their minority values, voters will back that party in elections. On the other hand, those who belong to the majority group or hold a more privileged position are much more likely to show their loyalty towards the party that can defend existing values.[122] If there is no serious majority-minority group confrontation in society, if there are institutions which can solve social problems without resorting to violent

[122] For more discussion of the American case of minority identification, see Larzarsfeld et al., 1960:23 and Lipset, 1983:261. Lazarsfeld et al. observed that the voting pattern of Catholic-affiliated voters is more Democratic since Catholics perceive themselves as a minority. They assert that support of Catholics for Democratic is an affirmation of this common minority identification. This assertion was supported by Lipset suggesting that many ethnic and religious minorities suffering social or economic discrimination support more leftist parties in different countries (Lipset, 1983:261). For example, in the United States, the black minority tends to be more Democratic; in India, the Andhras, a large linguistic minority, have been among the strongest supporters of the Communist Party; and in Japan, the Korean minority gives considerable support for the Communists.

means or if a harmonious relationship between competing groups is prevailing, those national characteristics such as religion, race and language will not lead to any serious internal conflict, since people in society generally share common interests and values. In such situations, those issues may not be politically salient. The main idea behind these assumptions is adapted from the center-periphery issue.[123]

Religion has been used as a key variable in the study of voting behavior. One of the main issues has focused on the relationship between class and religion. According to Lipset, middle class voters who belong to relatively less well-to-do churches, like the Catholic or Baptist, are more prone to be Labourites or Democrats than their class peers of other denominations.[124] Conversely, workers belonging to more well-to-do churches, like the Anglican in Britain and Australia (Episcopal in the U.S.), are more likely to back more conservative parties than workers belonging to poorer churches.

This finding was strongly asserted by an American election study. In their discussion of the IPP index, as shown in the previous section on class voting, Larzarsfeld and his companions found urban Catholic-affiliated inhabitants with a lower SES level were more likely to support the Democrats, while suburban Protestant-affiliated inhabitants with a higher SES level were more likely to support the Republicans.[125] According to them, differences in the political alignments of the two religious groups raises the question of the relationship between age and voting preference. The age factor leads to a general finding that within each religious group younger voters show tendencies towards opposition. Younger Protestants vote less Republican than older

[123] According to Lipset and Rokkan, the constellation of Western party systems is based on one of four cleavage lines: the center-periphery, the state-church, the land-industry, and the owner-worker cleavages. See Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:33-50.

[124] Lipset, 1981:255.

[125] Larzarsfeld et al., 1960:21-27.

Protestants, and younger Catholics are less likely to be Democrats.[126] The age factor complicates the voting pattern based on religion and class.

Therefore, as far as the relationship between class and religion, on the one hand, and age, on the other, is concerned, the age factor makes the significance of class and religion in voting choice more diluted and more complex. In general, the younger voters show lower class identification and lower religiosity than older ones. This very fact makes it difficult to understand whether class or religion has the most influence on voting in many countries. Due to the age effect, the role of religion and class becomes unclear, and they lose their significance in explaining voting patterns. In such cases, the role of age will perhaps be most influential.

Studying the role of religion in electoral politics, Harrop and Miller present a general finding. According to them, the role of religion is greatest in Catholic countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Italy, Malta and France. In Protestant societies, such as Britain and the Scandinavian countries, religion does not play any important role. Religiously complex countries, such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany, fall between these poles.[127] How does the assumption of Harrop and Miller fit into British electoral politics? Is Britain a clear example of a country in which a specific religion plays a trivial role? In order to explore the effect of religion on party choice, two different measures will be adopted. The first measure is voting difference among various denominational sects and among non-religious voters: Anglican, non-conformist, Roman Catholics and atheists. The second measure is the degree of religious allegiance of the people. It will be measured by regular church attendance.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the equations linking non-conformity with the Liberals and the Anglicans with the Conservatives, still worked well.[128] A half century later, Anglican support for the Conservatives is still apparent. One British study reports that among

[126] *Ibid.,* p.24.

[127] Harrop and Miller, 1987:177-181.

[128] *Ibid.,* p.180.

industrial workers voting in the 1951 elections, the percentage backing the Labour party was 73 among Catholics, 64 among non-conformists and 43 among Anglicans. The proportion of Anglicans who voted for Conservatives is almost exactly twice as great as the proportion of non-Anglicans, and three-fifths of all industrial workers who voted Conservative were Anglican.[129] How has the role of religion changed during the past three decades?

Table 4-7 presents three general voting patterns related to religious affiliation in Britain. Firstly, the voting pattern of Anglicans has never changed in any elections, with the exception of the 1966 election (when Labour lead by 8.1 per cent). This trend remained stable. The pattern seems to have strengthened during the four elections held between 1979 and 1992. Secondly, the Liberal vote of the non-conformists diminished to some degree up until the 1970 election. From then up until the 1987 election, non-conformists seemed to recover their traditional voting pattern in support of the Liberals. In the 1992 election, however, this pattern disappeared completely. And thirdly, Roman Catholics have been a main source of Labour votes. This trend can be clearly detected in the 1960's and 1970's. A Labour lead of 31.2 to 45 per cent among Roman Catholics can be observed in the table. This general pattern has changed to some extent, but the Labour dominance can still be seen in the elections of 1980's and in the 1992 election. Another source of Labour votes, the religiously non-affiliated groups, have changed their support for the Conservative Party. Up until the 1974 election, those with no religious faith strongly supported Labour by margins of between 20.6 per cent and 32.2 per cent. From 1979 on, this pattern cannot be seen any more. The clear Labour dominance within this group changed to a slight advantage for the Conservatives in the last two elections.

[129] Lipset, 1983:255.

Table 4-7. Conservative and Labour Vote by Religious Affiliation in Britain (1964-1992)

Religions	Elections								
	1964	1966	1970	1974*	1979	1983	1987	1992	Change
Anglicans									
Conservative	45.2	42.2	50.8	43.8	54.9	52.3	53.1	54.4	+9.2
Labour	44.3	50.3	41.6	35.2	30.6	22.6	24.1	27.7	-16.6
Liberal	9.7	6.9	6.5	20.4	14.4	24.8	22.5	17.5	+7.8
diff.(C-L)	+0.9	-8.1	+9.2	+8.6	+24.3	+29.7	+29.0	+26.7	
Non-conformists									
Conservative	31.5	28.3	37.8	33.6	48.0	41.7	34.2	38.5	+7.0
Labour	53.1	60.0	43.1	32.8	31.0	27.3	31.8	30.3	-22.8
Liberal	15.5	11.0	12.0	32.i	21.0	29.7	31.7	9.7	-5.8
diff.(C-L)	-21.6	-31.7	-5.7	+0.8	+17.0	+14.4	+2.4	+8.2	
Roman Catholics									
Conservative	26.3	25.5	31.1	26.0	49.4	34.4	34.5	32.7	+6.4
Labour	64.6	70.5	62.3	60.4	42.5	43.3	46.2	50.0	-14.5
Liberal	9.1	4.0	5.8	11.2	8.1	21.0	18.7	14.1	+5.0
diff.(C-L)	-38.3	-5.0	-31.2	-34.4	+6.9	-8.9	-11.7	-17.3	
No Religion									
Conservative	26.9	31.7	29.1	30.1	41.7	42.4	37.1	39.7	+12.8
Labour	50.3	55.0	61.3	50.7	42.8	30.3	36.4	38.1	-12.2
Liberal	20.8	13.3	7.4	14.8	12.6	25.4	25.1	18.9	-1.9
diff.(C-L)	-23.4	-23.3	-32.2	-20.6	-1.1	+12.1	+0.7	+1.6	

Source: Crewe, Day and Fox (1995).
Note: In the election of February 1974 this variable was not included; Entries of (C-L) are the difference between Conservative votes and Labour votes.

Let us move on to how the degree of religiosity is related to patterns of party support. The problem of the variable 'religion' measured in terms of different denominational groups is that one cannot exactly discern how deep people's religious faith might be. Information on belonging to a religious group may be insufficient for determining religiosity. The information we want is to what degree religion affects people's behavioral pattern. Therefore, we need to use the variable 'religious conviction' to understand how the degree of religious faith affects voters' party choice. Two extreme values will be used here to compare differences in party support between persons with a higher degree and a lower degree of religious conviction.

As illustrated clearly in Figure 4-3, those who attend church regularly (i.e. those who have a higher degree of religious conviction) show a clear inclination to support the Conservatives rather than Labour, whereas those who never attend church (i.e. who have a lower level of religiosity) show a clear inclination to support Labour. A conspicuous trend shown in the figures is that the gap between the two extremes narrows more and more over time. The difference between high and low religious convictions in Conservative voting changes from 9 to 4 between 1964 and 1992, respectively. A similar pattern is also found in Labour voting. A difference of 16.8 in 1964 dropped to 7.5 in 1992.

Figure 4-3. Conservative and Labour Votes by Religious Conviction in Britain



Note: Those who attend church (chapel, synagogue, etc.) at least several times a month were coded as "Attend regularly".

Another interesting finding is that those who have a higher level of religiosity tend to support the Conservative Party consistently with very low variation, whereas persons having a lower level of religiosity have radically increased their support for the Conservatives. This pattern yields two different voter groups: loyal Conservative supporters, on the one hand, and floating voters, on the other. The stable trend of Conservative support backs this theory. So does the drastic change in voting patterns among those of low religious conviction. How can we interpret these results? One thing is clear. The general trend towards a narrowing of the difference between groups of differential religious conviction renders the role of this variable trivial. Regardless of which group one belongs to, greater Conservative support and lower Labour support can be observed. This finding was already confirmed in the previous section.

The general trend found above is two-fold: an overall increase in Conservative votes and an overall decrease in Labour votes among all denominational groups and two religiously active voter groups. One traditional feature, however, is still clearly detectable. One of the general findings is: "Anglicans strongly tend to support the Conservatives and Roman Catholics strongly tend to support Labour". "The Church of England is the Conservative Party at prayer" still seems to apply in British society. Non-conformist 'liberalism', however, seems to challenge the religious tradition. Of course, this diagnosis may not be correct, for the unexpected drop in support for the Liberals among non-conformists is only found in the 1992 election. During the 1970's and 1980's the Liberals maintained their strong position among the non-conformist group. It is unclear whether the Liberals can recover their old stronghold or not. It has been generally confirmed that in British election politics the effect of religion has diminished drastically during the past decade but that it still plays an important role when people vote for a party.

Summary

The main concern of this chapter has been to explore the relationship between social cleavage structure and patterns of party support among voters in the United Kingdom. Six variables, i.e. gender, age, class, education, region and religion, were analyzed during the postwar era in Britain up to 1992. The effects of social cleavages on party support have largely reflected the changing patterns of party support among the voters in British postwar politics.

From the longitudinal British data, three major tendencies were found: Firstly, the measured effects of two variables, i.e. gender and education, have drastically waned. Secondly, even though the effect has to a certain extent weakened, three variables, i.e. age, class and regional division, remain as major determinants of voting behavior in Britain. Thirdly, despite the role of religiosity in voting behavior dramatically diminishing during the post-war era, the Anglicans are still one of the stable strongholds of Conservative voting, while the Roman Catholics remain as strong supporters of Labour. By contrast, among the majority of secularized voters there is no difference in their support of Conservative and Labour. Thus, our assumption that secularized voters are more likely to vote for left-oriented parties, as clearly witnessed in the 1960's, should be altered.

Despite their reduced role, however, the impact of three socio-economic variables – i.e. age, class and regional division – may be exacerbated under circumstances of economic hardship such as economic downturn, unstable labor market and soaring consumer price. Another factor that would make a deep impact on revitalized role of socio-economic variables in voting behavior seems to be a group consciousness in conjunction with access to European Monetary Union (EMU), since it is closely linked to center-periphery division of the British society. Those who expect more benefits, e.g. those who have higher education, younger generations and big business, will support more vigorously for the access to EMU, while those who expect no tangible benefit from it will discard the idea of common financial market. In conjunction with the EMU issue, strong

dissatisfaction with and distrust of the established parties may arise in regions where a common feeling of social alienation and deprivation is considered. This will also make the British society break apart.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND PARTY SUPPORT IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

Searching for underlying characteristics of social cleavages and exploring their impact on electoral behavior in the two Asian countries is the main concern of this chapter. Our knowledge of diverse patterns of party support acquired from Western experiences will be applied to the explorations in this chapter. At the beginning of every section of this chapter, a number of relevant hypotheses on a specific social cleavage will be presented. Two indices will be used to explore differences in patterns of party support among Asian voters. Firstly, an index measuring differences in support between government and opposition parties will be used. The index (G-O) is a measure of social change or support for the status quo in both Japan and South Korea. This index is useful when exploring voting support patterns in the two countries. This is mainly because the two countries did not experience shifts of power between ruling and opposition parties until the 1990's. Thus, popular support for the government party or for an opposition party is more or less related to voters' views on issues of social change. Those who support the ruling parties, i.e. LDP in Japan and DJP/DLP in Korea, are voters who appear to be reluctant to accept drastic changes in the existing political and economic order.[130]

Secondly, another index measuring differences in party support between conservative and progressive parties will be used. The index (C-P) is a measure of the difference in the left-right orientation of

[130] For more details on the implications of the index in Korean politics, see Table 5-9 in the second part of this chapter. See also Table 3-2 in Chapter 3 of this volume.

Japanese voters. This index will only be utilized in analyses of Japanese elections, since the left-right dimension has been quite obscure due to the lack of leftist parties in the history of Korean party politics. For the analysis of social cleavage patterns and their effects on party support in the two Asian countries, eight variables, i.e. sex, age, occupation, income, education, urban-rural, region and religion, will be used. However, the variable 'religion' is not included in the Japanese analysis since Japanese society is homogeneous in terms of religion.[131] How can these two indicators be applied to the 1976 and 1983 elections? Let us move on to gender cleavage and its impact on party support in Japan.

(1) Social Cleavage and Party Support in Japan

Gender Cleavage

One of the general findings about gender voting discussed in Chapter 4 is female conservatism. As argued by many others, women lean heavily towards conservative ideas and values.[132] It was argued that the conservative sentiments of women are primarily a consequence of greater activity in religion.[133]

As far as gender gaps in Japanese electoral politics is concerned, the role of gender in conservative vs. non-conservative party support has

[131] Traditionally there have been two religions in Japan – Shintoism and Buddhism. The two religions have long coexisted in Japanese cultural life. Shintoism is the largest religious denomination in Japan with 108,999,505 members (50.2%), and thereafter Buddhism with 96,255,279 members (44.3%), Christianity with 1,463,79 (0.7%) and others (4.8%). See details in Asahi Shimbun, (1992), p. 240. It has to be noted, however, that the total is twice the size of the actual population. This is due to dual religious identification in the analysis.

[132] Tingsten (1963), Blondel (1963), Pulzer (1967), Lipset (1981), and De Vaus and McAllister (1989).

[133] Duverger (1955), Blondel (1963), Tingsten (1963), Rose (1974), and Randall (1987).

rarely played an important role during the postwar war era.[134] The effect of gender on party support is extremely marginal. In party-by-party comparisons based on Table 5-1, it is difficult to find a significant difference between men and women in their party choice with the exception of one party. The gender gap in CGP support is 6.5 per cent. The stronger support among women for the CGP seems to be closely linked to religious activities. Japanese women are more often affiliated with the Buddhist organization *Soka Gakkai,* a political arm of the Komeito (CGP).[135] This is because religious affiliation and activities among women, and especially among older women, are higher than among men. Otherwise, the effect of religion on gender voting is quite marginal in Japanese electoral politics. As previously argued, it seems closely linked to the fact that religious homogeneity is a main characteristic of Japanese society.

As in 1976, the gender effect in the 1983 election is extremely small. There is no conspicuous gap between male and female in relation to party support patterns. A small difference of 2.6 percentage points between male and female votes for the LDP in the 1983 election was measured. This pattern of a small margin between the two gender groups is found for all parties except the CGP. As was found in the 1976 election, there is a distinct gender gap in CGP support. The CGP is widely supported by female voters with a margin of 4.3 per cent. It seems that the CGP successfully mobilized members of Buddhist organizations in which women are most active.

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[134]In a study by Watanuki it was shown that the effect of gender on party choice in Japan was extremely marginal. For example, in the 1958 election, no difference between male and female voters was found in their conservative and socialist votes. Watanuki, 1992:58-59.

[135] There is one more religious group with connections to political parties. Shinshuren (Fedration of New Religious Groups) as a lay organization of a Buddhist sect avidly supports for the LDP and the DSP. It was found that approximately 9-11 per cent of LDP and JSP supporters have a religious affiliation, which makes the religious effect on party support somewhat divided. Watanuki, *op cit.*, p.77.

Group differences based on the two indices show that men are less likely to support political change than women. This general pattern is found in both elections. Men are slightly more conservative than women in Japan. As mentioned above, however, the differences are not so persuasively strong in comparison to those based on total votes. The gender effect on party support is extremely marginal in Japan. Thus, differently from what was found in Britain, there is no clear pattern of female conservatism in the case of Japanese electoral politics.

Table 5-1. Gender and Party Support in Japan (House of Representative Election)

		Political parties									
		LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976											
	Men	47.4	27.7	7.7	2.2	7.1	5.5	2.4	494	+8.2	+10.4
	Women	47.2	26.0	7.0	8.7	4.8	3.6	2.7	631	+4.3	+13.0
	M-W	+0.2	+1.1	+0.7	-6.5	+2.3	+2.9	-0.3			
1983											
	Men	57.5	18.2	6.6	5.0	9.2	1.9	0.4	677	+20.6	+25.1
	Women	54.9	19.8	6.3	9.3	6.3	1.3	1.9	741	+13.7	+23.0
	M-W	*+2.6*	*-1.6*	*+0.3*	*-4.3*	*+2.9*	*+0.6*	*-1.5*			

Notes:

1. The entries of (G-O) were calculated by subtracting the opposition group votes from the LDP votes. The NLC votes were added to the LDP. In the opposition group, four opposition parties, the JSP, the JCP, the CGP and the DSP, were included. The groups with a plus (+) sign are government-oriented (i.e. anti-social change), while those with a minus (-) sign are opposition-oriented (i.e. pro-social change).
2. The entries of (C-P) denote a difference in ideological leaning among voter groups. They were calculated by subtracting the progressive votes from conservative votes. In the conservative group, two parties, the LDP and the NLC, were included, while in the progressive one, three parties, the JSP, the JCP and the DSP, were included. The CGP (Komeito) was excluded from the calculation because of its lack of clarity in ideological position. The plus (+) sign denotes conservative-oriented, while the minus (-) sign implies progressive-oriented.

Age Cleavage

One of the concerns related to age is to what degree party support patterns differ between younger and older generations. As observed by Beck (1984) and Butler and Stoke (1970), the question of whether three age-relevant effects, i.e. the period effect, the life-cycle effect and the

generational effect, are present in Japan is examined in this section. Since measuring the first two effects requires longitudinal data, interest in this volume is limited to the generational effect. Are younger generations more amenable to political change than older ones? Are older generations more enthusiastic about maintaining the existing social and political order than other generational groups? One of Inglehart's arguments on political generations is based on the assumption that new generations rise while older generations die off.[136] Social change occurs in all post-materialistic societies, since younger generations are more reform-oriented and yearn for a new look in society. Let us move on to the Japanese evidence.

As depicted in Table 5-2, the variable 'age' plays a rather meaningful role in differences in party support patterns. Party support among the younger generation is more left-oriented than among older generations. The most radical trends are found among younger voters aged between 20 and 39. They are more inclined to vote for one of the progressive parties than for conservative parties. Votes cast for the Social Democrats and Communists among members of the younger generation exceed those cast for the Liberal Democrats. The data asserts that the young are less likely to support conservative dominance than the elders in Japanese politics.

The medium aged group assumes a center position. A clear contrast in government-opposition and conservative-progressive votes exists between the two older generations. The most enthusiastic support for the LDP is found in these age groups (57.9 and 61.9 per cent). The percentage of conservative party votes exceeds that of opposition party votes by a large margin (+22.5 and +36.2). The difference between conservative and socialist votes is also quite remarkable (+28.1 and +39.8). Considering the party support patterns, we can reach the following conclusion: "The older generation is a stronghold for LDP success, while the younger are more opposition oriented".

[136] Inglehart (1977), Inglehart, 1984:187 and Harrop and Miller, 1987:203.

The generation effect in 1983 remains similar to that detected in 1976. Each age group's voting pattern is unique. The youngest age groups tend to be the most radical in their electoral debut. They are more likely than older generations to vote for one of the opposition parties, especially one of the leftist parties. Support for the Communists is found mainly between the two younger generations, whereas a large portion of support for the socialist JSP is deeply rooted in the 40-year-old age group and two younger generations.

Table 5-2. Age and Party Support in Japan (House of Representative Election)

		Political parties									
		LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976											
	20-29	34.7	28.1	10.2	7.1	6.6	8.2	5.1	196	-9.1	-2.0
	30-39	38.1	29.5	10.8	7.2	6.8	5.4	2.2	278	-10.8	-3.6
	40-49	47.7	33.6	4.2	5.3	6.1	2.3	0.8	262	+0.8	+6.1
	50-59	57.9	22.1	6.2	5.6	4.1	2.6	1.5	195	+22.5	+28.1
	60-	61.9	17.0	4.6	3.6	4.6	4.1	4.1	194	+36.2	+39.8
1983											
	20-29	47.7	22.1	9.3	9.3	9.3	1.7	0.6	172	-0.6	+8.7
	30-39	48.9	20.9	11.6	8.4	7.4	1.3	1.6	311	+0.9	+9.3
	40-49	48.7	23.3	5.5	8.1	9.5	3.5	1.4	347	+4.6	+13.9
	50-59	63.9	17.3	4.0	6.1	5.8	0.4	2.5	277	+41.5	+36.1
	60-	69.5	13.2	3.2	5.1	6.8	1.0	1.2	311	+41.6	+46.7

Note:
1. The missing data was excluded.
2. For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) have been caluclated, see Table 5-1.

Among the oldest group, strongest support in the 1983 election was for the LDP. The voting pattern of different generations seems to be related to a generational factor: Confucian culture and tradition. The overwhelmingly superior standing of the LDP among the older generation is largely related to the old values of the Confucian order and principles of 'rule' and 'obedience' between rulers and subordinates. This assumption would probably be strongly linked to the generational variation in party support patterns among Japanese voters. According to this assumption, as older generations die off, society will constantly change through the emergence of new generations. However, it has to be noted that since life-cycle is also

crucial in measuring age-related effects, it is not possible to determine whether this assumption is correct or not in this volume. This would require more long-term observations.

Occupational Status and Class Consciousness in Party Support

Social status has been argued to be meaningful in the formation of the attitudinal and behavioral patterns of voters. Max Weber argued that social class as a consequence of position in the labor market is a main source of similar life chances.[137] A central assumption in this section is: Those who occupy higher social positions are more likely to vote for a conservative party, while those whose jobs require more physical and strenuous manual labor have a strong tendency to support a leftist oriented party.[138] This assumption is also closely linked to a class consciousness approach. Those whose class identity is upper or middle class would be more likely to support a conservative party, while those whose class identity is much lower or working class are more likely to support leftist parties. Is this statement true in Japanese politics?

The assumption seems to be hard to accept on the basis of the Japanese data. Among the white-collar groups, our proposition is thoroughly contradicted. Votes for leftist oriented parties within the two white collar groups are higher than for the LDP. The second white-collar group, public official and office worker, are also more likely to support socialist parties. The second lowest level of LDP support is found within this group (the lowest being among students). The leftist socialist tendency of the white-collar group was previously found in an empirical study conducted by a Japanese scholar.[139] By contrast, three groups enthusiastically supporting the LDP deserve mention: merchants and manufacturers; farm, fishery and forest

[137] Weber, 1948:181.

[138] Alford, 1963; Butler and Stokes, 1976:77-81; and Denver, 1989:10-11.

[139] Watanuki, 1977:79.

workers; and unemployed and others. The first two groups have traditionally been strong supporters of the conservative LDP.[140]

As expected, manual workers and odd-jobbers strongly support opposition parties or leftist parties. The most vigorous supporters of the JSP are also workers. In the 1983 election, however, this pattern disappeared completely. Support for the JSP among workers dropped to a level of 30.8 per cent, which was lower than that of the LDP at 45.3 per cent. It is quite odd that support for the JSP is largest within the primary sectors.

Table 5-3. Occupational Status and Party Support in Japan (House of Representatives Election)

	Political parties									
	LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976										
Professional, Manager	44.7	31.6	10.5	2.6	5.3	5.3	0.0	38	+0.0	+2.6
Public officer/Office worker	28.9	41.2	11.3	5.2	4.1	7.2	2.1	97	-25.7	-20.6
Merchant /Manufacturer	55.2	15.4	10.0	3.5	7.5	5.5	3.0	201	+24.3	+27.8
Sales, Service worker	42.0	29.0	7.2	7.2	4.3	2.9	7.2	69	-2.8	+4.4
Farm-, Fishery-, Forest worker	81.0	15.5	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.0	116	+63.7	+64.4
Manual worker/Odd-jobber	31.1	41.7	10.6	4.5	7.6	3.0	1.5	132	-30.3	-25.8
Student	20.0	6.7	26.7	0.0	6.7	40.0	0.0	15	+19.9	+1.2
Housewife	39.7	30.9	4.8	10.3	7.0	4.2	3.0	330	-9.1	+1.2
Job1ess, Other	61.2	16.4	6.0	5.2	5.2	2.6	3.4	116	+31.0	+20.7
1983										
Professional/Manager	40.0	27.1	7.1	4.3	17.1	2.9	1.0	70	-12.7	-8.4
Public officer/Office worker	42.5	25.3	12.1	6.3	10.3	12.1	1.7	174	-9.8	-3.5
Merchant/Manufacturer	76.1	9.9	4.2	3.9	3.9	1.5	0.6	335	+55.4	+59.3
Sales, Service worker	57.3	22.7	5.3	2.7	9.3	2.7	0.0	75	+20.0	+22.7
Farm-, Fishery-, Forest worker	61.5	30.8	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13	+26.7	+23.0
Manual Worker/Odd-jobber	45.3	24.3	6.6	9.9	8.8	1.7	3.4	181	-3.2	+6.7
Student	45.5	27.3	0.0	18.2	9.1	0.0	0.0	11	-9.1	+9.1
Housewife	49.0	19.7	7.2	11.9	8.4	2.1	1.8	335	+2.7	+14.6
Job1ess/Other	62.7	17.5	4.0	5.6	7.9	0.6	1.7	177	+27.2	+32.8

Note:
1. The missing data was excluded.
2. For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) have been calculated, see Table 5-1.

The data also reveals that the highest percentage of LDP votes are again found among the same three groups as in the 1983 election: merchants (76.1%), farmers (61.5%) and the unemployed (62.7%). Two

[140] Watanuki, *ibid.,* and Watanuki, 1991:58-59.

white-collar groups seem to be most critical to LDP dominance. They are more likely than other occupational groups to support one of the leftist or opposition parties. Two indices in the table reveal the truth of this notion (G-O = -8.4 and C-P = -3.5). As previously pointed out, however, one interesting finding is that the voting pattern of manual workers and odd-jobbers is less progressive than that of voters with white collar occupations. Among semi-white collar occupations, i.e. sales and service workers, there is a strong inclination to support the conservative ruling party (57.3%). Thus, it may be generally said that middle class conservatism is not very prevalent in Japanese electoral politics. Yet it would be true to state that primary and secondary industrial sector conservatism is much more powerful in explaining the patterns of party support in Japan.

Class consciousness of voters is also regarded as a major factor in electoral support of political parties. The analysis of this variable provides a completely divergent picture in comparison to that of occupational position. Table 5-4 reveals that those identifying with the middle class are more likely to support the conservative LDP, while those identifying with the working class are more likely to support one of the socialist parties. LDP support was greatest among those identifying with the middle class in 1976 and with the upper class in 1983. By contrast, the working class is a stronghold of opposition and progressive party support. The two indices evidently measure the effect of class consciousness on voters and their party preferences. The middle class is more government oriented and conservative, while the working class is much more opposition oriented and progressive. Despite the fact that this pattern was not as strong in the 1983 election, it nonetheless seems to persist.

Table 5-4. Class Identification and Party Support in Japan (House of Representatives Election)

		Political parties									
		LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976											
	Middle class	61.2	17.3	5.3	2.2	5.8	6.5	1.4	139	+37.1	+39.3
	Working	40.4	31.4	8.3	6.8	6.2	4.0	2.8	745	-8.3	-1.5
1983											
	Upper	61.8	17.3	2.7	6.9	8.7	2.1	0.6	335	+27.7	+34.6
	Middle	55.9	18.9	7.0	7.0	7.3	7.2	1.6	667	+17.2	+24.2
	Lower	50.0	22.1	10.2	7.8	7.1	0.0	2.7	294	+3.1	+10.3

Note:
1 The missing data was excluded.
2 For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) have been calculated, see Table 5-1.

To sum up, the validity of our assumption is unclear and sometimes thoroughly contradicted by occupational positions. Within the two white-collar groups, leftist votes are more common than votes for the LDP. Another white-collar group, public officials and office workers, are also more likely to support one of the leftist parties. The second lowest level of LDP votes is found in that group. The left-socialist tendency of the white-collar group is an obvious feature of Japanese politics. However, primary and secondary industrial sectors are loyal supporter of the LDP. Thus, it may be said that evidences based on occupational positions and on class affiliation do not correspond well with each other, which makes it difficult to judge our assumption of middle class conservatism and working class leftist support. Instead, it would be more plausible to state that there is a difference in patterns of party support in Japan based on the industrial sector. The primary and secondary sectors are much more conservative, while the tertiary sector is much more critical of the ruling conservative party.

Income Cleavage

In an occupational position, the income variable constitutes one of the major indicators of social and economic status. A central assumption based on the Columbia School Model would suggest: Those who benefit from higher income and higher SES status are more likely to

support a conservative party, while those whose income and SES status is lower are more likely to support one of the leftist parties. This pattern has been widely observed in Western democracies.[141] To what extent is this proposition applicable to Japanese society?

Our empirical evidence leads to a cautious conclusion that the hypothesis does not seem to hold in Japanese electoral politics. Support for the LDP is strongest among the lower income group. This pattern can be observed in both elections. In the 1976 and 1983 elections, the difference between government oriented and opposition oriented votes is 11.9 and 17.2, respectively, which constitutes the highest level of support for the ruling LDP. LDP dominance can also be observed in the (C-P) index. The difference between conservative and progressive orientated votes is largest among the lowest income group. Among the middle range and high income groups, LDP support is somewhat weaker than that found among the lowest income group. This pattern is clearly visible in the 1976 election. The largest proportion of the socialist JSP vote comes from the middle range income group. This pattern, however, disappears in the subsequent election in 1983 in which LDP support increased among all income groups.

Table 5-5. Income and Party Support in Japan (House of Representatives Election)

	Political parties									
	LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976										
Low (0-1 million Yen)	50.6	23.5	7.2	6.4	4.3	4.0	2.8	251	+11.9	+18.3
Middle (1-4 million Yen)	42.4	30.9	7.2	6.8	5.9	4.7	2.0	443	-3.7	+3.1
High (Over 4 milion Yen)	49.3	25.8	8.6	2.9	7.2	2.4	3.8	209	+7.2	+10.1
1983										
Low (0-1 million Yen)	57.2	17.6	6.6	9.4	7.1	1.2	2.7	425	+17.2	+26.4
Middle (1-4 million Yen)	51.8	21.2	8.9	5.9	7.9	1.9	2.3	471	+9.4	+15.3
High (Over 4 milion Yen)	52.7	21.5	6.3	3.8	11.4	3.0	1.2	237	+12.3	+16.1

Note: 1. The missing data was excluded.
2. For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) have been calculated, see Table 5-1.

[141] Lipset, 1981:234-248. In a recent American study, Miller and Shanks argue that the poor vote less often and more Democratic, while the well-to-do vote more often and vote heavily Republican (Miller and Shanks, 1996:270).

In summary, even though the pattern is somewhat weak and inconsistent between the two measuring points, it may be said that the lowest and highest income groups are more likely to support conservative alternatives, which clearly deviates from the patterns found in Western democracies. Since higher incomes are closely related to higher occupational positions and middle class consciousness, the conservatism of the lower income groups is an anomaly in terms of western experiences. This would seem to be related to the Japanese middle class being more progressive, on the one hand, and striving for reform and renewal on the political scene, on the other, as discussed in the previous section of this volume. At the same time, it may not be possible to explain the conservatism among the lower income group on the basis of the limited knowledge accumulated from western industrial democracies. Despite the fact that middle class progressiveness is in some ways similar to the New Politics phenomena in post-materialist societies, as argued by Inglehart, this is not the case for lower income conservatism among Western voters.

Educational Cleavage

Education is closely related to character formation and the nature of other variables. As discussed in Chapter 4, education is a prime predictor of attitudinal and behavioral variables reflecting political interest, participation, mobilization and class identification.[142] At the same time, education is also an important variable in the measurement of political values in post-materialist societies.[143] A common pattern found in post-materialist Western democracies implies that the more highly educated category is more liberal on social issues, that they are more tolerant of new ideas, groups and people, that they are less

[142] Butler and Stokes (1970).

[143] Converse (1974), Bell (1974) and Inglehart (1977).

religious, they hold a more optimistic view of human nature and that they are less attracted to political extremism. By contrast, it has been argued that people with limited education have been associated with support for politicians who offer simple solutions to complex problems, they usually have lower political efficacy and that they often tend to vote for socialist or communist parties that are highly related their class position. [144] To what extent are these notions, based on Western democracies, applicable to Japanese society?

As illustrated in Table 5-6, education plays an important role in the voting preferences of Japanese voters. The most clear-cut tendency is for the LDP to have its highest support among people with the lowest level of education and its lowest support from among people with the highest level of education. It turns out that both the Socialist Party and the Communist Party are elite parties whose major support comes from the highly educated group of voters. Among the two highly educated groups of voters, support for the leftist parties is higher than for conservative ones. The discrepancy between (G-O) and (C-P), with a negative or slightly positive difference, reveals that conservative support is weak among the highly educated group of voters.

Table 5-6. Education and Party Support in Japan (House of Representative Election)

	Political parties									
	LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976										
Compulsory, middle school	54.4	21.8	7.3	6.8	4.3	3.2	2.3	533	+17.4	+24.2
High school	42.3	32.7	5.6	5.2	7.0	4.7	2.5	444	-3.5	+1.7
Over university	36.5	27.0	12.2	4.7	7.4	8.1	4.1	148	-6.7	-2.0
1983										
Compulsory, middle school	64.5	16.3	4.0	7.8	5.0	0.5	1.7	575	+31.2	+39.0
High school	52.0	20.3	7.4	7.6	9.5	2.2	1.1	556	+9.2	+16.3
Over university	44.9	23.1	11.1	5.1	10.3	3.4	2.2	224	-2.2	+2.9

Note:
1. The missing data was excluded.
2. For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) have been calculated, see Table 5-1.

[144] Butler and Stokes (1970), Aitkin (1974), Rose (1974) and Lipset (1983).

The strength of the LDP decreases with increases in educational careers. The highest support for the LDP can be found among those with the lowest educational background with 54.4 per cent in the 1976 election. This decreases to 42.3 per cent and 36.5 per cent for people with high school and university education. While this pattern seems to be somewhat less pronounced in the 1983 election, the general pattern remains largely unchanged. The high support for LDP (64.5%) among compulsory and middle school categories drops to 44.9% among people with university education. By contrast, support for the two leftist parties, the JSP and the JCP, increases with education. The main stronghold of DSP support in both elections is also among more educated people.

The clear conclusion to be drawn is that Japanese elites are more opposition oriented and progressive than the less well educated. This pattern was seen in the previous section. The more informed and well educated social strata seem to be keener to pursue reform policies than people with the opposite characteristics, which is also an anomaly in terms of Western experiences.

Regional Cleavage

The regional gap in the party preferences of voters often stems from center-periphery confrontation in the modernization and democratization processes. This has been widely observed in Western industrialized democracies.[145] Regions which have benefited from nation-building or processes of industrialization are much more supportive of regional parties or parties that defend such interests. Center-periphery conflict can be triggered if conflicts between regions over the control and distribution of national resources are not resolved. Confrontation between regional and ideological parties

[145] Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan and Urwin (1982) and Harrop and Millier (1987).

found in many Western democracies is intimately related to this center-periphery conflict.[146]

In terms of geographical difference in party support, two major features of Japanese voting patterns can be found. One feature is the strong conservative voting among rural populations; the other is the negative voting of the metropolitan area and the Kinki region. Two indicators, which measure expectations of political change and conservative or progressive tendencies of voters, are extraordinarily clear-cut. The voting patterns of large city inhabitants are seemingly related to two factors: the concentration of factories around major cities and the high unionization rate of the workers. This proposition would probably be strongly linked to regional variation in patterns of party support among Japanese voters. In the two industry-dominated areas of Kanto (in the mid-eastern part of the main Japanese island of Honshu) and Kinki (the mid-southern part of Honshu) where many factories are concentrated, the number of negative votes against the conservative LDP is high. This is a result of industrial policies that were undertaken in the late 1950's in Japan. These two regions developed as industrial districts that spanned out along a stretch of Japanese railways and highways leading to strategic export cities in the South.[147]

[146] Some examples of region-based parties and activities are the party Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Scottish National Party, the IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque region and the Tamil liberation movement.

[147] In Kanto region, for example, workers were concentrated in the cities like large Tokyo wards, Ichihara, Yokohama and Kawasaki. In Kinki region, many industrial plants and factories were built in the cities like Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, and Kobe and their sub-urban areas. The industrial areas running from Tharaki in the north to Oita, Kyushu in the south is called the 'Pacific Belt' in Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 1992:124).

Table 5-7. Regional Cleavage and Party Support in Japan (House of Representatives Election)

	Political parties									
	LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976										
Hokkaido/Tohoku region	57.3	31.5	4.0	2.4	2.4	0.0	2.4	124	+17.0	+19.4
Kanto region	38.4	29.0	8.7	8.0	2.9	8.7	4.3	276	-1.5	+6.5
Chubu region	52.9	26.1	4.2	2.9	8.0	2.5	3.4	238	+14.2	+17.1
Kinki region	28.5	25.3	17.2	9.7	12.4	7.0	0.0	186	-29.1	-19.4
Chukoku/Shikoku region	59.3	27.9	2.9	2.9	3.6	2.1	1.4	140	+24.1	+27.0
Kyushu region	57.8	21.1	4.3	7.5	4.3	25	2.5	161	+23.1	+30.6
1983										
Hokkaido/Tohoku region	68.1	21.8	4.3	1.6	1.6	0.0	2.6	188	+38.3	+39.9
Kanto region	51.3	14.4	8.9	11.5	7.8	4.9	1.2	425	+12.9	+24.4
Chubu region	67.6	15.4	2.3	3.9	10.4	0.0	0.4	259	+35.6	+39.5
Kinki region	44.7	16.7	9.3	10.7	16.7	0.9	0.9	215	-7.8	+2.9
Chukoku/Shikoku region	59.9	24.7	5.6	6.2	1.9	0.0	1.9	162	+19.6	+25.8
Kyushu region	48.5	32.5	6.5	4.7	4.1	0.0	3.6	169	-1.1	+14.4

Note:
1. The missing data was excluded.
2. For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) have been calculated, see Table 5-1.

The role of the two geographically based variables seems to be somewhat unclear. The largest proportion of LDP votes is cast in the farmer dominated rural areas. The countryside has been a major stronghold of loyal LDP support. In the Hokkaido/Tohoku and Chubu regions that have traditionally been agricultural areas, for example, LDP support is stronger than in other regions. Metropolitan socialist votes are still found in the Kinki region, but to a considerably lesser extent than in the 1983 election. The leftist socialist tendency of voters in the Kinki region declined dramatically from 54.9 to 42.7 per cent between the 1976 and 1983 elections. The socialist superiority in the Kanto region where workers are heavily concentrated did not exist in the 1983 election, which is somewhat of a mystery. In the Kanto region, LDP support reached the 50 per cent level (51.3), while that of the JSP dropped to 14.4 from 29.0 per cent in the 1976 election. In the southern outskirts of the 'Pacific Belt' – Kyushu - support for the JSP increased remarkably from 21.1 to 32.5 per cent between the 1976 and 1983 elections. Regional discrepancies in voting patterns found in Japan can be explained by another center-periphery variable, 'urban-

rural' groupings. Let us move on to the question of whether there is an urban-rural difference in party support patterns in Japan.

Urban-rural Cleavage

In the study of the social bases of politics in *Political Man,* Lipset suggests that the difference between urban and rural populations has constituted an additional basis for cleavage in many Western democracies.[148] In some western democracies, the rural population has formed the backbone of an independent agrarian party. Agrarian parties in Scandinavian countries – Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark – and in Australia are some examples. Otherwise, rural populations identify with other major parties. An important question in measuring differences in urban and rural party choice is whether there is a regional conflict based on a transformation process from pre-industrial to industrial society. In other words, the question concerns whether there is a conflict structure between urban industrial and rural agrarian interests.[149]

Urban-rural differences seem to represent one of the most apparent voting patterns detected in analysis of Japanese voters. An overwhelming number of supporters of the LDP are found in rural areas. In the 1976 and 1983 elections, the proportion of LDP votes reached 66.3 and 72.2 per cent, respectively, in rural societies. In medium sized cities, the pattern has been somewhat less clear. LDP support dropped to the level of 40 per cent in both elections. LDP support is weakest in metropolitan areas.

By contrast, two leftist parties have their strongholds in major cities where there are many workers and well-educated and informed middle class voters, as discussed in previous sections. The largest

[148] Lipset, 1981:232 and Converse, 1974:738-741. For a theoretical discussion of the emergence of urban and rural cleavages vis-à-vis different coalition options during processes of industrialization, refer to Rokkan, 1970:54-56.

[149] Lijphart, 1981:38.

leftist and opposition party, the JSP, is strongest in medium sized cities. In the 1973 election, the JSP won a record high 30.2 per cent support in these areas. Even though this pattern declined drastically to 20.6 per cent in the 1983 election, it still seems to be the case that medium sized cities are a main source of JSP support. For the Communist Party, the main strongholds of support seem to be in the metropolitan areas, including Tokyo and its suburbs as well as the 10 largest cities. The JCP attracted metropolitan dwellers most effectively, with 13.4 per cent and 11.8 per cent in the 1976 and 1983 elections, respectively. These figures are higher than for the other two categories of cities. This same pattern applies to the other opposition parties, the CGP and the DSP.

Table 5-8. Urban-rural Cleavage and Party Support in Japan (House of Representatives Election)

	Political parties									
	LDP	JSP	JCP	CGP	DSP	NLC	Other	N	(G-O)	(C-P)
1976										
Metropolitan (Tokyo/10 largest)	29.9	22.7	13.4	8.8	12.4	7.7	5.2	194	-19.7	-10.9
Small Cities (<100.000<)	42.5	30.2	6.8	7.1	5.5	5.6	2.2	602	-1.5	+5.6
Community (Small village)	66.3	22.8	4.6	1.8	2.4	0.3	1.8	329	+35.0	+36.8
1983										
Metropolitan (Tokyo/10 largest)	46.7	16.6	11.8	9.6	10.5	3.5	1.3	229	+1.3	+10.9
Small Cities (<100,000<)	49.4	20.6	7.1	8.9	10.1	1.9	2.0	743	+4.1	+13.0
Community (Small villages)	72.2	18.4	2.7	3.4	2.2	2.7	0.9	393	+48.0	+51.4

Note:
1. The missing data was excluded.
2. For information on how entries for (G-O) and (C-P) hae been calculated, see Table 5-1.

As a consequence, differences in the two indices, i.e. (G-O) and (C-P), clearly show that there are loyal supporters of the LDP in rural areas and that there are many skeptical voters in medium sized and metropolitan areas who are more likely to support one of the opposition parties. This conclusion was also confirmed by the regional variation in party support patterns in Japan. However, this does not mean that there is a rural-urban and regional confrontation in relation

to the distribution of limited resources in Japan. It seems more likely that it is closely linked to how parties mobilize different groups of people from different regions, on the one hand, and to how traditional values of different groups of people affect their party choice. Thus, the claims of Lijphart concerning urban-rural discrepancies do not fit the Japanese case very well.

(2) Social Cleavage and Party Support in South Korea

Democratization and Formation of Social Cleavages

The election held on April 26, 1988, just after the introduction of the Sixth Republic, is recorded as a momentous event in modern Korean history.[150] For the first time in the history of Korean politics since the first government was formed under the First Republic in 1948, the government party failed to capture a majority of seats in the National Assembly, *Gukhoe*. The election results can be regarded as 'revolutionary' in the sense that the government party could no longer push through key legislative programs without the support of opposition parties, and the opposition parties could place checks on the DJP government.

Like the 1988 election, the 1992 National Assembly election can be regarded as another historical event in Korean history. The government party failed to acquire a stable majority in the National Assembly. The ruling DLP was defeated once again by the opposition

[150] Since the assassination of the dictator President Park Chung Hee in 1979, the process of democratization has led slowly but steadily from authoritarian to democratic forms. Under the reign of the Chun regime, a successor of military rule established by an indirect presidential election, the economy and living standards continued to improve. Student demonstrations and social instability in the 1980's continued to exist as a part of daily life in Korea until a direct presidential election was approved by the ruling party candidate Roh Tae Woo and the then president Chun in 1988. The 1988 parliamentary election held just before the Olympic Games in Seoul can be seen as a crucial turning point in the democratization process in South Korea.

parties. (See the election results in Appendix 3). The choice of the people could be interpreted as bitter dissatisfaction with the government party, which was an amalgamation of the then government party DJP and two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party (Kim Young Sam's party) and the New Democratic Republican Party (Kim Jong Pil's Party). Since the April 1988 parliamentary elections in Korea introduced a competitive four-party system, it was cautiously predicted that the then ruling party DJP would build a coalition with one of the three opposition parties. It can, thus, be argued that Korean voters regarded the party system as manipulated from above and expressed their clear dissatisfaction with a return to conservative dominance in Korean politics.

The rise and fall of the authoritarian regimes have created different kinds of social strata and diversity: the rich and the poor, those relatively advantaged and those alienated from the economic development process, the well-paid and the poorly-paid and the developed regions and the underdeveloped regions. Such cleavage structures as authoritarian versus liberal and the privileged versus the underprivileged (groups, regions and classes) have become most salient in the turmoil of modern Korean politics.

These cleavages are crucially related to the economic development policies of the authoritarian regimes. For example, harsh labor policies directed against the workers, for the purposes of maintaining low prices on manufactured products and competing in world markets, caused growing dissatisfaction among the workers. Those who benefited from the export oriented policies, e.g. big business, export company owners and high wage earners, held their positions by supporting the authoritarian governments. In this social structure, unceasing struggle between two competing groups may easily cause a fatal class conflict.

Another example of cleavage structure may be seen in regional antagonisms in modern Korean politics. Under the long tenure of the Kyongsang based (southeast section of South Korea) presidents, Park

Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, the Cholla (southwest section) remained underdeveloped in relation to the Kyongsang region.[151] Another factor contributing to regional based cleavage is the existence of rival politicians; Kim Young Sam, with ties to the Kyongsan region and Kim Dae-Jung with ties to the Cholla region. In modern politics this rivalry has amplified the antagonistic sentiments of the two regions. Given this competition between the two regions, antagonisms appeared as a salient cleavage in Korean electoral politics.

Although some cleavages do not always contain conflict mechanisms, such groupings as masculine and feminine (gender), old and young (age), Christians and non-Christians (or Buddhists and Christians) (religion), educated and uneducated (education) and developed and underdeveloped in relation to municipalities and regions (urban-rural and region) would be of central interest in understanding different patterns of political behavior. Before moving on to an examination of the impact of social cleavages on patterns of party support in Korea, it is necessary to understand the nature of government and opposition party support. This conceptual classification seems to be unfamiliar to Western democratic culture. Yet in analyses of Korean politics, this categorization has been a significant dimension in the democratization process.

Government-party vs. Opposition-party Orientation in Korean Politics

Two groupings have always been significant in Korean politics. Government party-orientation has dominated ideologies emphasizing economic growth and national security, while opposition party orientation has striven for social justice, human rights and democracy in Korean political history.[152] Focusing our concern on the relationship

[151] Kim, 1972: 218. On the regional policy of the Park regime, refer to Renaud (1974). See also Steinberg, 1988:19-34.

[152] See Chapter 3 for more details. See also Cho, 1992:161-175.

between political orientation and party support, we can identify the unique characteristics of group behavior in Korean politics. Which groups were more government oriented and which were opposition oriented?

A common view is that those who have higher incomes, good jobs, affluence or belong to an elite group in society are generally inclined to have conservative rather than critical attitudes towards prevailing norms and institutions. It would also be true that when people's will and desire to reform society are weak and they are satisfied with prevailing conditions and their privileged status, they are apt to adhere to passive or defensive ideologies. In contrast, those who have low incomes, poor living conditions, little or no property and gloomy futures are more apt to have a radical rather than a conservative view. This is because they have to fight against ruling hegemonies and existing power structures in order to survive and enhance their standard of life. Apart from political apathy and a cynical point of view, this has been broadly believed to be persuasive in the modern history of Western party politics.

Table 5-9 illustrates unique characteristics of Korean society. The groups with a plus (+) sign are more government oriented, whereas those with a minus (-) sign are more opposition oriented. We may find some interesting facts in the data. Those who have the most critical views in relation to the ruling political elite are found among the young (-34), professionals and managers (-22.8), students (-71.7), higher educated people (-32.7) and Cholla residents (-41.8), while those who have positive attitudes toward prevailing power structures are found among the the older in the age group of 50-59 and above (+17.2, +16.3), residents of agricultural and fishing areas (+12,5), lower educated people (+12.5) and the Kyongsang residents (+6.5). Those who have skeptical points of view are older (55.1 %), the unemployed and veterans (55.6 %) and Kyongsang residents (52.5%).

Table 5-9. Social Cleavage and Political Orientation in Korea (1992 Assembly Election)

Socio-economic variables	Political orientations				
	Government-party Oriented	Middle-of the-road	Opposition-party oriented	N	(G-O)
Total	22.7	43.3	33.7	1195	-11.0
Sex					
Men	22.7	39.6	37.7	599	-15.0
Women	23.2	47.1	29.7	596	-6.5
Age					
20-29	13.0	40.0	47.0	315	-34.0
30-39	20.5	44.0	35.5	352	-15.0
4049	24.1	41.5	34.4	212	-10.3
50-59	38.5	40.2	21.3	169	+17.2
60-	30.6	55.1	14.3	147	+16.3
Occupation					
Professiona1/Manager	15.2	46.8	38.0	79	-22.8
Public Officer/Office worker	23.9	36.2	39.9	218	-16.0
Self-employed/Small Firm Owner	22.1	41.6	36.3	113	-14.2
Farm-, Fishery-, Forest Worker	36.1	40.3	23.6	144	+12.5
Service-, Manual Worker	17.3	44.7	38.0	179	-20.7
Student	1.9	24.5	73.6	53	-71.7
Housewife	25.5	46.0	28.4	278	-2.9
Jobless/Veteran	24.4	55.6	20.0	90	+4.4
Income					
Low (0-390.000 Won)	23.6	46.6	29.8	305	-6.2
Middle (400.000-890.000 Won)	18.4	43.4	38.2	364	-19.8
High (900.000 Won)	26.2	35.7	38.1	168	-11.9
Education					
Elementary	32.5	47.5	20.0	200	+12.5
Middle School	26.1	44.7	29.2	161	-3.1
High School	22.3	43.5	34.2	485	-11.9
University	15.9	35.5	48.6	290	-32.7
Urban-rural					
Metropolitan	23.4	40.5	36.1	593	-12.7
Small Cities	21.3	49.7	29.0	314	-7.7
Community	22.9	42.9	23.9	280	-1.0
Region					
Kyongsang	27.0	52.5	20.5	341	+6.5
Cholla	9.8	38.6	51.6	153	-41.8
Others	23.8	39.9	36.2	701	-12.4

Note: 1. The data was taken from a survey by the IKES for the 1992 Assembly election. The missing data was excluded.

2. The question reads: "We sometimes distinguish people in terms of 'government-party oriented' and 'Opposition party-oriented' in Korean politics. Which one is close to you? The former or the latter?"

3. (G-O) has been calculated by subtracting the 'Opposition-oriented' from the 'Government-oriented'. The groups with plus (+) signs are government-oriented, while those with minus (-) signs are opposition-oriented.

Despite overall negative trends being dominant among the Korean people, some distinctive features can also be detected. So-called social elite groups with longer education careers, high status jobs and higher incomes (except workers) have strong tendencies to have negative views of the ruling powers. By contrast, those who are old, reside in rural areas, and would not benefit from the modern education system still maintain their loyalty to conservative forces.

An important finding here is that a negative view among the upper class, the so-called elite group in society, is dominant, whereas somewhat positive attitudes were held by older generations who have been disciplined and brought up under traditional norms and Confucian discipline. In many studies conducted in the 1960's and 1970's, these findings are extensively confirmed.[153] Another interesting finding here is that there are many skeptical groups in Korea. A large number of social groups are characterized by 'middle-of-the-road' views. Besides the three large neutral groups (the older, jobless/veterans and Kyongsang residents) with over 50 per cent neutral, there are 18 different social groups in which more than 40 per cent have neither positive nor negative views.

To sum up, Korean elites and intellectuals have been progressive and strongly dominated by radical dispositions. It is generally believed that the elite group has played one of the most important roles in the democratization process throughout the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's. The 'April 19th Student Revolution' against the Rhee government in 1960, the 'May 18 Kwangju Democratic Uprising' against reactionary military power in 1980 and the 'June 10 Democratic Uprising' against the Chun government in 1987 are some examples. A more optimistic view was held among older Koreans. Another finding is that there are many 'middle-of-the-road' protagonists, which reflects

[153] For more details on the effects of Confucianism on political and social life in Korea and Asia, see Kim et al., 1970:401-403; Koh, 1985:890; Kim, 1985:122; and Kim, 1989:490-491.

the fact that Korea is changing from an authoritarian society to a more pluralistic and democratic one.

Considering the patterns of political orientation among voters found above, let us move on to the main topic. Do our findings remain strong in relation to the social cleavage model and party support? Does the upper class support one of the opposition parties? Do the hinterland based old voters cast their ballots for the ruling Democratic Liberal Party? How does the regional antagonism between Kyonsang and Cholla affect party support? Are Cholla residents still maintaining their absolute loyalty towards the regionally based opposition Democratic Party? Are Kyongsang residents giving enthusiastic support for the DLP? These questions will be dealt with in the following sections.

Gender Cleavage

As found before, women tend to be more conservative in their political behavior than men. Despite female conservatism being widely witnessed in Western democracies, gender differences were often small. Explanatory factors for female conservatism were, among others, more regular church attendance than men. As discussed in the previous section, Korean women were more conservative-oriented than men. To what extent does this finding hold, in terms of their patterns of party support?

Female conservatism seems to be limited but evident in Korea. As well illustrated in Table 5-10, this pattern is clearly found in both elections, although the pattern was somewhat less clear in the latter election. The margin of female conservatism was 4.7 and 2.5 per cent in the 1988 and 1992 elections, respectively. This small but evident tendency for women to support conservative parties can also be seen in the (G-O) index. Women are less likely than men to be opposition-oriented. Women are more or less supporters of the status-quo, while men are more likely to support social and political reform. The gender gap found in Korea is also closely related to patterns of political

interest of both groups. In Korea, women have always proved to be less interested in politics than men.[154] Men have shown a higher political awareness than women. Thus, it may be said that men are more likely to support one of the opposition parties attacking government inertia in democratization and welfare policy.

Table 5-10. Gender and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

	Political Parties							
1988	**DJP**	**RDP**	**PPD**	**NDRP**	**Other**	**Independents**	**N**	**(G-O)**
Men	38.1	24.2	20.6	5.5	0.0	11.6	960	-12.2
Women	42.8	19.9	18.9	4.6	0.2	13.6	962	-0.6
M-W	*-4.7*	*+4.3*	*+1.7*	*+0.9*	*-0.2*	*-2.0*		
1992	**DLP**	**DP**	**UNP**		**Other**	**Independents**	**N**	**(G-O)**
Men	37.8	32.7	15.6		3.4	10.6	508	-13.9
Women	40.3	34.6	14.0		3.3	7.8	486	-11.6
M-W	-2.5	-1.9	+1.4		+0.1	+2.8		

Note: 1. Three parties, the DJP (Democratic Justice Party), the RDP (Reunification Democratic Party) and the NDRP (New Democratic Republican Party), merged into the DLP (Democratic Liberal Party), while the PPD (Party for Peace and Democracy) changed its name to the DP (Democratic Party). A conglomerate leader and Hyundai founder, Jeong Ju Young, founded the UNP (Unification National Party) in 1991. See party strength in Appendix 3.
2. The (G-O) for 1988 is an index calculated by subtracting the opposition group votes from the DJP votes. In the opposition group, the two largest opposition parties, the RDP and the PPD, plus other small parties like the NDRP and the People's Party, were included. (G-O) for 1992 is the difference between the DLP and the opposition votes. In the opposition group, the two largest opposition parties, i.e. the DP and the UNP, and Other were included. Independents were excluded in both calculations. Plus (+) signs denote government party domination in the voter group, while minus (-) signs denote opposition party domination.

By contrast, Korean women staying at home seem to be more receptive to government policies.[155] In the housewife group, there was a quite small difference in party support, but support for the government party has not been overlooked, since it scores 44 and 40 per cent of the

[154] Kim et al. (1970), Yun (1988) and Lee (1998).

[155] It was a general pattern for women not to work in the labor market. On the average 56 per cent of Koran women stayed at home in the 1980's and 1990's. For the source, refer to Ministry of Labor, http://www.molab.go.kr/user/statistics2_frame.html.

vote in both elections.[156] The pattern is seemingly related both to the role of the housewife in the family and to the general voting pattern of women. As housekeepers, they are directly influenced by domestic policies pursued by the ruling party. About 40 per cent of housewives are in support of the ruling party. Another plausible factor can be a general voting pattern for women. There is a clear tendency for women to support the government party as shown in previous election studies based on aggregate data.[157] The fact that votes for the government party among women (42.8%) remains at about the same level as for housewives (44%) asserts this explanation.

Male voters seem to maintain progressive sentiments to a greater extent than female voters. The difference is not so dramatic, being just 2.3 per cent in the 1992 election. An important change seems to have occurred in gender voting between the two elections, however. Female voting patterns moved in a more progressive direction. After the 1988 election analysis, Korean women proved to be more conservative voters than men. But this was not true in the 1992 election. The opposition party vote of women exceeded the government party vote by a margin of 11.6 percentage units. The women's vote turned out to be just as progressive as men's.

What changed women's votes between these two elections? Can this be regarded as a temporary phenomenon? It does not seem to be so simple since, as discussed in the preceding section, previous research on the 1960's and 1970's based on aggregate data showed that women had been loyal conservative voters. If we look at the results of a survey research carried out during the election period, this may become clearer. One day after Election Day, many daily newspapers unveiled their surveys on the election result. In the surveys carried out by the daily newspapers, questions involving the evaluation of the government's economic policy, the reasons the respondents chose the

[156] See details in the proceeding section on 'Occupational Status in Party Support' and in Table 5-12 of this chapter.

[157] Kim et al. (1970).

party they voted for, the evaluation of the reasons for the DLP failure in the election, and so forth, were included. As the most crucial reason for the defeat of the DLP, many pointed to the failure of economic policies, i.e. high inflation, economic stagnation and declines in the economic situation of households.[158] Thus, it can be claimed that the abandonment of the party by women voters is primarily attributable to the damaged image of the government party due to the failure of economic policies and the declining situation of households.

In summary, although female conservatism was challenged in the 1992 election, this pattern seems to be a tangible feature of Korean electoral politics. It is closely related to the fact that women are mostly housewives who are less interested in politics and that women have been impressed by economic prosperity that was constantly increasing during the 1980's. In contrast, men are more politically aware than women and critical of belated democratization measures and social injustice, such as increasing inequality in income distribution and a shabby welfare system. As a result, men are more positive to political reform issues and supportive of opposition parties.

Age Cleavage

Age has been a significant factor in political orientation and behavior in Western democracies. Younger generations have proved to be more radical than older generations in terms of party support. The young generation includes more left-wing supporters than the older one. Conservative voting has long been a characteristic phenomenon of the

[158] Of the respondents 41 per cent chose the item of the failure of economic policy as a reason for the government party failure in the election (Jung-Ang Ilbo, March 26, 1992; Dong-A Ilbo: Dong-A Daily News, March 26, 1992). The majority of the respondents (78.1%) pointed to stability in the economy as the most important task of the new Assembly members (Dong-A Ilbo, March 26, 1992).

elderly in developed democracies.[159] To what extent is this finding based on Western experiences applicable to Korean politics?

As shown in Table 5-11, age is a clear indicator in distinguishing government from opposition orientations. Those in the age group 20-29 support one of the opposition parties by a large margin (-31.4). An increase of 10 years in age results in a decrease in the opposition vote by 10 percentage points (-19.7). With an increase of another 10 years, support for opposition parties drops more drastically (resulting in a per cent difference of just 1.6 between government and opposition votes). The voting pattern of older generations clearly deviates from that of younger generations. Those in their 50s and 60s support the government party by clear margins (+24.6 and +34.6). If we see the percentage of votes of the two older groups, we can capture the voting pattern of older Koreans. Over half of them (55.5 and 63.2 per cent for people in their fifties and sixties, respectively) cast their ballots for the ruling DJP.

Table 5-11. Age and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

	Political Parties							
1988	**DJP**	**RDP**	**PPD**	**NDRP**	**Other**	**Independents**	**N**	**(G-O)**
20-29	29.9	31.2	24.2	5.9	0.4	8.3	471	-31.4
30-39	33.2	26.6	20.6	5.7	0.0	13.8	578	-19.7
40-49	42.4	18.8	17.0	5.0	0.0	16.8	399	-1.6
50-59	55.3	11.3	16.0	3.4	0.0	14.0	293	+24.6
60-	63.2	7.7	17.6	3.3	0.0	8.2	182	+34.6
1992	**DLP**	**DP**	**UNP**		**Other**	**Independents**	**N**	**(G-O)**
20-29	21.3	45.4	17.9		5.8	9.6	240	-47.8
30-39	36.2	35.9	16.0		3.7	8.0	287	-19.4
40-49	42.9	30.4	14.7		2.6	9.4	191	-4.8
50-59	51.7	21.1	13.6		1.4	12.2	147	+5.6
60-	58.1	25.6	7.8		0.8	7.8	129	+23.9

Note: For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.

[159] For a theoretical discussions and different arguments on gender gap, refer to the section on 'Gender Cleavage' in Chapter 4 of this volume.

The age consideration is still effective as one of the major explanatory factors in voting behavior. In the 1992 election, the younger are opposition oriented, while the older are government oriented. Those between the ages of 20 and 29 support one of the opposition parties by a margin of 47.8. An increase of ten years in age is accompanied by a decrease in opposition support by about 30 percentage points (-19.4). Persons between 30 and 39 years of age support the government and opposition party by 36.2 per cent and 55.6 per cent, respectively (*diff.* = -19.4). The voting pattern of the older generations seems to be more stable. The votes of those in their fifties and sixties are to a greater extent supporting the government party (+5.6). In the group of voters over 60 years of age, support is clearly pro-government oriented. The oldest group of voters tends to cast its ballots for the government party, with a 23.9 per cent margin. The voting pattern of the two older groups can be clearly shown in terms of proportion of government party support. Over half of those in their fifties and sixties, 51.7 and 58.1, respectively, cast their ballots for the ruling DLP. This was also found to be the case in the analysis of the 1988 election.

Thus, it may be said that the greater radicalism of younger people seems to be present even in Korean politics. It is more likely for younger people to support one of the reform oriented opposition parties than for older. In contrast, conservatism among older generations, which seems to be closely linked to traditional values strongly attached with elderly people, can be clearly observed in the Korean empirical data.

Occupational Status in Party Support

Based on previous findings, it may be said that occupational status and class consciousness are of great significance in patterns of party support among voters.[160] This was also clearly confirmed with the

[160] For theoretical discussions on the relationship between class (consciousness) and party support as well as on constructing the 'Class

Japanese data examined in the first part of this chapter. Let us move on to find out whether there is any evidence of this in Korea.

Occupation seems to be a major factor in differences in party support in Korea. People with upper class status or higher status jobs have a strong tendency to vote for one of the opposition parties. The total percentage of votes cast for the two major opposition parties among professionals and managers exceeds the government party votes by over 20 percentage points. This pattern remains largely unchanged among the group of self-employed and small firm owners. The difference between votes for the government and for the opposition is somewhat larger than for the groups previously examined (-28.3). The major source of support for the ruling party is from the group comprising farm, fishery and forestry workers. This group shows a strong attachment to the government party. More than half of them (58.1 per cent) vote for the ruling DJP. Group difference also indicates a clear-cut government preference (+12.9).

One more critical anti-regime group is students. A drastic revolt-like voting behavior can be found among the students. The government vote within this group reached about 15 per cent, whereas the vote for the two major opposition parties was 37.2 and 32.1 per cent, respectively. It shows a clear dominance of sentiments critical of the government among students.

The variable 'occupation' could also be regarded as a major factor in patterns of party support in the 1992 election. As in the 1988 election, those who have higher status jobs have strong tendencies to vote for one of the opposition parties, while those who have lower status jobs vote for the ruling government party. The total number of votes for the two major opposition parties among the professionals and managers exceeds the government party vote by more than 40 percentage units. This pattern remains unchanged in the group of self-employed and small firm owners. The difference between government and

Voting Index' (CVI), refer to section 'Class Cleavage in Party Support' in Chapter 4 of this volume.

opposition orientated sympathizers is somewhat smaller than for the groups examined previously (-23.2). The difference in party support between the self-employed and small firm owners is not likely to be of great significance vis-à-vis the total difference in strength of government and opposition parties. The difference in party support between the self-employed and small firm owners (-15.7) does not deviate so much from the total vote. Considering measurement errors, the deviation is not so statistically meaningful.

Other similar patterns can be detected. As found in the 1988 election, farm, fishery and forestry workers seem to be a main source of party strength for the Conservative Party. Those whose occupations are primary economic sectors still maintain strong loyalty to the government party. Over half of their votes (51.8 per cent) were cast for the ruling DLP. The difference in government and opposition votes also indicates a dominance of government support (+17.5).

Table 5-12. Occupation and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

	Political Parties							
1988	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
Professional/Manager	29.6	27.5	22.5	4.6	0.0	15.8	240	-25.0
Self-employed/Small Firm Owner	29.3	23.6	27.7	6.3	0.5	12.6	191	-28.3
Farm-, Fishery-, Forest worker	53.1	11.2	25.0	3.9	0.0	6.6	256	+1.9
Manual worker	38.4	30.6	14.8	5.2	0.0	10.9	229	-12.2
Housewife	44.0	20.9	15.7	5.0	0.1	14.2	759	+2.4
Student	15.4	37.2	32.1	5.1	0.0	10.3	78	-59.0
1992	DLP	DP	UNP		Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
Professional/Manager	20.0	35.4	24.6		0.0	20.0	65	-40.0
Public Officer/Office worker	34.1	32.4	19.7		5.2	8.7	173	-23.2
Self-emp1oyed/Small Firm Owner	37.1	41.6	11.2		0.0	10.1	89	-15.7
Farm-, Fishery-, Forest worker	51.8	24.1	7.3		2.9	13.9	137	+17.5
Service, Manual worker	43.8	33.3	13.2		2.1	7.6	144	-4.8
Student	2.2	50.0	28.3		13.0	6.5	46	-89.1
Housewife	40.3	34.8	16.3		2.6	6.0	233	-13.4
Jobless, Veteran	52.8	333	6.9		2.8	4.2	72	+9.8

Note: For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.

Students seem to have remained radical even in the 1992 election. Their votes for the government party reached a record low 2 per cent level, whereas votes for the two major opposition parties reached 50

and 28.3 per cent, respectively. It shows more deep-going anti-government sentiments. The voting pattern of women was already dealt with. The housewife group changed from loyal conservative voters to radical voters. In terms of party support patterns, support for the government party has not changed so drastically, which means that the opposition parties increased their share of the vote among the housewives. In other words, the pro-government group has not changed, but housewives, or supporters of independent candidates, changed their vote mostly to support the largest opposition party DP.

Our data confirms that occupational status in Korea plays a significant role in the choice of political party. It has to be noted, however, that those in higher social positions are more likely than those in lower status occupations to be associated with support for opposition parties in Korea, which is unique in the sense that a similar pattern does not seem to exist in Western democracies. Due to the lack of data, however, class consciousness is not measured for the Korean case. Even given the lack of data, however, there seems to be no doubt that the upper and middle classes are more apt to support reform oriented opposition parties than the lower working class. In the measurement of two other social status variables, i.e. income and education, as main predictors of class, this question can likely be clarified.

Income Cleavage

Income is an important indicator of socio-economic status. Western experience would suggest that higher socio-economic status is closely related to support for conservatives in elections. Likewise, it may be said that people benefiting from higher incomes are more likely than lower income earners to support rightist oriented conservative parties. How true is this in Korean electoral politics?

In the 1988 election, 'income' was one of the major factors related to party support among different groups in Korea. The lower the income,

the more government friendly an attitude one seems to hold. In the 1988 election, about half of those with low incomes tended to support the government party, 49.6 per cent. The contrast between higher and lower income earners in their support for political parties is clear-cut. People with the lowest incomes are more likely to support conservative parties. This proved to be the case in the 1988 election. There was a difference of 11.5 on the index (G-O). Even though the impact of income on electoral choice diminished in the following election, the pattern remained strong. Those who have high incomes have a strong tendency to vote for the opposition parties (-24.2). The difference in voting patterns among the low income earners shrank drastically in the 1992 election. Even people with the lowest incomes seem to be dissatisfied with government performance in economic policy and democratization measures. The ruling DLP lost many supporters with lower social status, which was also confirmed in our analysis of the occupational status variable.

Table 5-13. Income and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

Monthly income	**Political Parties**							
	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1988 (in Korean currency 'Won')								
Low (0-300.000)	49.6	13.8	20.1	4.1	0.1	12.2	687	+11.5
Middle (310.000-500.000)	38.3	25.1	17.7	5.9	0.1	12.9	690	-10.5
High (510.000 -)	31.9	28.4	22.0	5.1	0.0	12.6	546	-23.6
	DLP	DP	UNP		Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1992 (in Korean currency 'Won')								
Low (0-399.000)	43.2	35.6	10.0		3.2	8.0	250	-5.6
Middle (400.000-899.000)	40.6	31.4	15.4		3.8	8.9	293	-10.0
High (900.000 -)	32.9	35.7	20.7		0.7	10.0	240	-24.2

Note: For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.

Despite the underestimation of the income gap, the general pattern was unchanged in the 1992 election. There existed a clear difference in conservative support between low (-5.6) and high (-24.2) income earners. In comparison to the findings from the 1988 election, the

difference between the two groups clearly decreased. However, the pattern reflecting the impact of income on party choice remains strong.

Thus, income is undoubtedly of importance in party choice in Korean elections. It has to be noted, however, that the pattern found in the Korean data is also a reverse income gap in relation to Western voters. The SES model of the Columbia School envisages higher income earners as being more likely to support a center-right party in Western democracies. In Korea, higher income and socio-economic status is strongly linked to anti-government sentiments, on the one hand, and pro-reform proponents, on the other. This conclusion was confirmed in the preceding sections. In this sense, Korean electoral politics is an anomaly in relation to western experiences. How is the level of education, which is also a major indicator of social status, related to party support? Let us move on to this topic in the forthcoming section.

Educational Cleavage

In Western societies, the vast expansion of higher education since the end of World War II has made it more relevant to understand the link between education and voting. Older generations can be characterized as having relatively poor education, which was a consequence of tougher life styles emphasizing the need to survive various threats: war, lack of material resources and an insecure welfare system. As older generations die off, people's quality of life is enhanced and their values and political behavior affected.

In Korea, this general tendency should be quite similar. For ordinary people born before the Korean War there were extremely limited opportunities to benefit from modern education. The compulsory education system was introduced in the 1960's for elementary school and in the 1970's for middle school when economic growth and prosperity created preconditions for initiating new social welfare programs. People born after the Korean War had greater opportunities to acquire higher education than older generations, who

experienced war, poverty and social and political disorder. Thus, the value systems and political behavior of different generations would be quite different from each other. How is the level of education related to patterns of party support in Korea?

Our assumption is that the lower the level of education one has, the more government-oriented one is likely to be, while the higher the level of education one has, the less government oriented, i.e. the more opposition oriented. Education levels seem to be closely linked to patterns of voting behavior. In the 1988 election, more than half of those with a low level of education supported the government party, 56.2 per cent. By contrast, people with a higher level of education tended to display critical views of government. Parallel to increased levels of education, this tendency can be seen even more clearly. Support for the DJP in the 1988 election dropped by 10 percentage points based on level of education as measured in our data. This tendency is most marked among people with university education. More than half of those with a university education supported either Kim Young Sam's (RDP) or Kim Dae Jung's (PPD) opposition party in the 1988 election.

Table 5-14. Education and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

	Political Parties							
	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1988								
Elementary school	56.2	10.7	17.4	3.4	0.0	12.2	597	+24.8
Middle school	42.0	20.7	22.1	5.4	0.0	9.8	367	-6.2
High school	34.4	26.8	18.0	5.7	0.3	14.8	634	-16.1
Over university	21.2	34.9	25.2	6..5	0.0	12.1	321	-45.4
	DLP	DP	UNP		Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1992								
Elementary school	51.4	29.5	5.8		2.3	11.0	173	+13.8
Middle school	41.7	31.7	13.7		2.8	10.1	139	-6.5
High school	41.6	32.3	14.0		3.1	9.0	387	-7.8
Over university	20.4	40.8	24.5		5.3	9.0	285	-50.2

Note: For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.

The relationship between educational level and pattern of party support seems to be more evident in the 1992 election. The then ruling party won 51.4% of the vote among people with elementary school education. But, the proportion of DLP votes dropped with increased number of years of education. This tendency is most obvious among people with a university education. A nosedive in LDP support (20.4%) was one of the major reasons for the defeat of the ruling party. The largest opposition party, the DP, was supported overwhelmingly by people who had acquired university education.

The overall tendency can be observed in a comparison of the (G-O) index. The difference between government and opposition orientation can be clearly distinguished by length of educational career. The most extreme gap is measured between elementary and university education. People with elementary education are obviously government-oriented, while those with university degrees and higher education show clear support for one of the rival parties competing against the ruling party. Our assumption about the relationship between education and patterns of party support is confirmed. A person with a lower level of education is more likely to be loyal to the ruling party, while one who has had the benefit of higher education seems to be more critical of the government. It is believed that the increase in education during the past three decades has strongly affected awareness of democratic transition and human rights, around which opposition parties have formulated campaign strategies and party manifestos. As a result, the highly informed and educated became more critical of conservative ideas and doctrines, which are strongly connected to national security policies and an export oriented economy.

Regional Cleavage

As previously discussed, one of the most remarkable characteristics of Korean politics in modern political history seems to be regional rivalry between Kyongsang (the Southeastern provinces of the Korean

Peninsular) and Cholla (the Southwestern provinces). The regional antagonism has left its impression on the Korean life style and political behavior.[161] The main concern of this section is the question: "How much evidence is there in the empirical data to indicate that this regional antagonism can explain voting behavior?"

Party support on the basis of the two regions, i.e. Kyongsang and Cholla, is deeply rooted in Korean politics. In the Kyongsang region, the Cholla based party PPD received an extremely low level of support, 2.4 per cent of votes, whereas in the Cholla region it dominated the vote with 74.8 per cent. In contrast, the ruling DJP received 56.6 per cent of the vote in Kyongsang, but only 13.1 per cent in the Cholla region. The supremacy of the opposition vote in the Cholla region is, therefore, extremely high (-63.2), while the dominance of the government vote in the Kyongsang region is only moderately high (+19.6), since there is one major opposition party, RDP, based in the Kyongsang region.

Table 5-15. Region and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

	Political Parties							
	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1988								
Kyongsang	56.6	32.5	2.4	1.9	0.2	6.5	588	+19.6
Cholla	13.1	1.1	74.8	0.0	0.4	10.6	274	-63.2
Other	38.6	21.6	15.2	8.1	0.0	16.5	1061	-6.3
	DLP	DP	UNP		Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1992								
Kyongsang	56.4	14.2	8.5		0.8	10.2	282	+32.9
Cholla	18.9	74.2	0.8		0.8	5.3	132	-56.9
Other	35.2	33.8	21.0		1.2	8.8	580	-20.8

Note: For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.

[161] Lee, 1998:20-21. Lee argues that it is of utmost importance for Korean social scientists to identify the character of and measuring tools for regional antagonism in Korean electoral studies.

In the 1992 election, the regional antagonism between the Kyongsang and Cholla provinces was moderated somewhat, but the general pattern remained. In the Kyongsang region, Kim Dae-Jung's party (with a new name, DP), increased its share of the vote by 14.2 percentage units. This change seems to be related to a relatively successful campaign for the DP in the Kyongsang region compared with the 1988 election results. In the 1988 election, Kim Dae-Jung's party won only 14.2 per cent in the Kyongsang region. In the Cholla region, however, the position of the DP has not changed. The Democratic Party occupies a commanding position with 74.2 per cent of the vote, as compared to 18.9 per cent of the votes for the government party in the Cholla region. The ruling DLP dominates in the Kyongsang region with 56.4 per cent of votes. As a result of its sweeping victory in the Cholla region, the DP remained unchallenged (-56.9), while the government party in the Kyongsang region was moderately successful in comparison to the 1988 election (+15.2).

The most plausible reason for the regional antagonism is undoubtedly the personal influence of the party leaders. In the 1988 election, the then president Roh Tae Woo and his party DJP were most popular in northern Kyongsang where his hometown is located, while the PPD leader Kim Dae Jung enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Cholla people. Another opposition leader Kim Young Sam, who was born in southern Kyonsang, won sweeping support in his home region. In the 1992 election, the archenemy of the then president Kim Young Sam and the largest opposition party leader Kim Dae Jung gained momentum from the regional antagonism. Thus, it may be said that regional antagonism and rivalry between the two regions and party leaders are clearly to be found in our empirical data.

To put it theoretically, the pattern of voting behavior among Cholla populations can be regarded as a form of reaction to Kyongsang hegemony in Korean politics. The pattern of support for the regional party of the Cholla population seems to be closely related to defending their core interests that suffered during the reign of authoritarian

dictators and during the democratization process. Thus, it may be said that the regional antagonism observed in Korea is another pattern linked to the center-periphery dimension that characterizes party systems in many western democracies.

Urban-rural Cleavage

Urban and rural difference, as discussed in the analysis of the Japanese data, is one of the major indicators of the center-periphery dimension. This variable measures the difference between urban and rural areas in party support. That is, the size of the population of various places being the key indicator. The urban and rural dimension enables us to measure two different aspects. First, differences on major national issues affecting the quality of life of densely or sparsely populated areas, such as the distribution of national resources, labor market policy, access to and quality of culture, etc., can give rise to the formation of differential values between people living in different places. Second, the urban-rural variable can help to measure not only industrial (or occupational) structure but also the functions of traditional and modern values. There is a significant number of people still engaged in inherent occupations in rural areas, whereas in more populated urban and suburban areas there are service sectors, industrial workers and managers and white collar workers. Are there any marked contrasts based on the urban and rural dimension in Korean society, and how does this dimension affect patterns of party support among voters?

It may be argued that in Korea those who reside in large cities are strongly inclined to vote for opposition parties, while those who live in the countryside show strong tendencies to vote for the government party. The gaps between government and opposition party vote among metropolitan and small city dwellers indicate a rather clear dominance of opposition parties (-11.4 and -16.5). Among the countryside dwellers, about half (50.2 per cent) cast their ballots for the

government party. Thus, the evidence indicates that urban voters are more likely to take a critical stance towards the ruling party.

The urban and rural gap in voting patterns remained in the 1992 election. Metropolitan citizens maintained their critical views of the government party, while countryside residents changed their views a bit. As to the voting patterns of rural area populations, they seem to be dissatisfied with government policies and are not loyal supporters anymore of the ruling party (*diff.* = -1.2). This result may be caused by the failure of the economic and agricultural policies of the government of then president Roh Tae Woo, as discussed in previous sections. The support of metropolitan and small city residents would seem to be as a consequence of their critical stance towards the government party.

Table 5-16. Urban-rural Cleavage and Party Support in Korea (1988 and 1992 Assembly Elections)

	Political Parties							
	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1988								
Metropolitan (6 largest cities)	36.7	26.2	17.5	4.4	0.1	15.0	861	-11.4
Small Cities ('Shi', 'Kun', 'Ku')	34.5	23.9	20.6	6.5	0.0	14.5	447	-16.5
Conmunity ('Eop', 'Myon')	50.2	14.6	22.3	4.9	0.2	7.8	615	+8.4
	DLP	DP	UNP		Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1992								
Metropolitan (6 largest cities)	40.2	38.9	12.6		3.9	4.4	478	-15.2
Small Cities ('Shi', 'Kun', 'Ku')	33.3	27.3	22.5		2.5	14.2	267	-19.0
Community ('Eop', 'Myon')	42.6	31.0	9.9		2.9	13.6	242	-1.2

Note: For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.

A general pattern in the urban-rural gap can be observed in Korean data. The degree of opposition orientation in metropolitan areas is much stronger than in the countryside. The gap between densely (-15.2) and sparsely populated (-1.2) areas is 14 per cent in terms of support for government and opposition parties. This seemingly reflects the fact that there are many members of older generations whose traditional heritage from Confucian culture still seems to be strong in countryside areas. It seems to be the case that small rural

areas where social mobility is quite low are more likely to maintain their traditional belief systems and political behavior.

Given the Korean data in this study, it is difficult to find whether there are policy issues that may affect patterns of party support in different population areas. At the same time, it is hard to imagine serious confrontations between urban and rural populations over issues without directly or indirectly linking such issues to regional interests.[162] Thus there are no purely population related issues that can inflame a conflict between rural and urban areas. It seems to be more plausible to argue that there is a cultural and value-related divergence between rural and urban populations. The Korean data shows evidence of this. Let us examine one more variable, 'religion', in order to explore the cultural impact on their political behavior.

Religious Cleavage

An interesting finding in the Korean data is the voting pattern based on religious affiliation. Voters who are affiliated with a 1700-year old traditional religion, Buddhism, strongly support the government party, while those who believe in imported religions from the West are more likely to vote for one of the opposition parties. The difference in party support based on religion among Buddhists is +16.6, which implies a clear dominance of government party support. By contrast, the opposition party vote exceeds this by 23.3 and 22.2 percentage points between Protestant and Catholic believers. Buddhists show the highest degree of government party support.

Is there a plausible explanation for this? According to a survey Gallup Korea conducted in 1990, Buddhists consist of 31 per cent of the lowest education level (lower than 6 years of education), 32 per cent older than 50 years of age and 34 per cent among those who dwell

[162] Agricultural subsidies and price policies on agricultural products would be some examples of population related questions. However, these issues are also correlated with the interests of different industrial sectors.

in rural areas.[163] Among Protestant and Catholic voters, conservative party voting is relatively low (30.2 and 32.2 per cent, respectively), which can be related to the leading role of Christian voters in advocating social change and democratic development in Korea. It is a well-known fact that many religious groups, especially Christian organizations, have been active in anti-government and democratization movements during the 1970's and 1980's and that they played a significant role in the democratization of Korean politics.[164]

Table 5-17. Religion and Party Support in Korea (1988 Assembly Election)

	Political Parties							
	DJP	RDP	PPD	NDRP	Other	Independents	N	(G-O)
1988								
Buddhist	53.5	21.1	11.8	4.0	0.0	9.7	527	+16.6
Protestant	30.2	22.1	23.9	7.5	0.0	16.2	398	-23.3
Catholic	32.2	22.8	26.2	5.4	0.0	13.4	149	-22.2
No religion	38.7	22.7	21.2	4.5	0.1	12.8	820	-9.7

Note: 1. For all party names and entries for (G-O), see Table 5-10.
2. The variable 'religion' was not included in the 1992 KES election study.

What seems to be of interest is the close relationship between the Buddhist religion and the Confucian tradition. Buddhism in Korea was introduced around AD 300, while Confucian ideas have been affecting the daily lives of Koreans since around AD 1400.[165] These

[163] Korea Gallup, 1990:60-63, 188.

[164] For example, activities of Christian and Catholic organizations like CISJD (Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development) and JOC (Jeune Ouvrières Catholique) were deeply involved in the process of democratization under the reign of authoritarian regimes in the 1970's and the 1980's. Cardinal, Kim, Su-Hwan, has also been regarded as a symbol of justice and liberty by many Koreans and especially by many mass movement leaders and dissidents.

[165] Buddhism was officially approved as the state ethics by the first unified Korean Dynasty *Shilla* in 668. For the second unified *Goryeo* Dynasty in the 10th century, Buddhism remained as the state religion, and Confucianism

long traditions and value systems among the older generations with Buddhist beliefs may well be closely linked to their political behavior.[166] They are more likely to support the ruling party than those without such characteristics. The empirical data examined in the previous sections strongly supports this notion.

Summary

The aim of this chapter was to explore the relationship between social structure and party support in Japan and South Korea. Based on two election surveys conducted in 1976 and 1983 in Japan and in 1988 and 1992 in South Korea, respectively, several common as well as separate features can be discerned.

Bivariate analyses used in the two Asian countries reveal that the conservative tradition is still very strong. In Japan, there are many conservative and traditional traits: a long religious tradition in Buddhism and Shintoism, social hierarchy and clientele-patronage relationship based on Samurai culture, the wide popularity of and loyalty to the Japanese monarchy, and finally the Confucian tradition deeply rooted in family ethics. Although all the conservative forces identified in Japan are not identical in Korean society, many conservative traditions remain strong: family ethics and social hierarchy deeply rooted in Confucian ideas, on the one hand, and social harmony and collectivism strongly embedded in Buddhism, as the strongest religion, with 1700-year of history, on the other. The

formed the philosophical and structural backbone of the state. Confucianism was adopted by *Chosun* Dynasty in 1392 as the guiding principles for state management and moral decorum of the Korean people. Therefore, the two religious and ideological traditions have existed in Korean peninsula for several hundred years together.

166 For the discussions on the effect of Confucian ideology on modern life-style in Korea, see Song (2000). The modernization and democratization process in the Confucian regions was dealt by Zhang (1999), Diamond and Plattner (1998). On the relationship between Buddhism and freedom, see Mabbett (1998).

unprecedented success of the conservative parties achieved in Japan and Korea until the power shift of the 1990's is closely related to broad support of the people equipped with traditional values and belief systems.

In Korea, however, a unique regional antagonism has existed as a primary source of the Korean life style and political behavior. The fierce power struggle between politicians who originated from Kyongsang and Cholla, made the elections a battlefield between the two regions.[167] The southeast region (Kyongsang) dominated politics and economics during the democratization process, while the southwest region (Cholla) of the Korean Peninsular has never been in the ruling position until 1998. The pattern of voting behavior among Cholla residents can be regarded as a form of reactionary actions for defending their regional interests, in the struggle for political and economic rights against the Kyongsang hegemony. Thus, Korean regionalism is a peculiar form of the center-periphery dimension, which has never been salient in Japanese electoral politics. Instead, the Japanese party system has been more or less close to that of Western democracies characterized by electoral competition based on a left-right dimension.

[167] For more details on regional animosity in Korea, see pages 129-131 of this chapter.

CHAPTER 6

CAUSAL MODELS OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND PARTY SUPPORT

In the preceding chapters, we examined a simple relationship between social cleavages and party support. In studying voting patterns, however, more considerations have to be made than the simple relationship. It has to include the aggregate influence of various factors. There can be three different types of effects of social cleavages on electoral choice. First, patterns of party support can be influenced in a direct manner. This constitutes one independent and one dependent variable while controlling for other relevant variables, which leads to a partial relationship. Second, the party choice of voters can also be related to indirect effects of intervening variables through which the total effects of the variables in question are cumulatively loaded. The indirect effect measures the magnitude of the cumulative effects of each variable in question. Third, the two effects mentioned above constitute the total effect of social cleavage variables on party support patterns. Thus, the total effect is the sum of direct and indirect effects.

As discussed in Appendix 1, the sociological model is one of three models used in election studies worldwide. This model is based on voters being divided into different social groups. How well can this model explain patterns of party support among voters in elections? In statistical terms, to what extent is the variance in party support explained by the social cleavage variables and to what extent are there residuals?

The main concern of this chapter is to explore the multivariate relationship between social cleavage variables and party support as

well as the explanatory power of the social cleavage model. In what way does each of the cleavage variables have an effect on party support? How can the cumulative effects of each cleavage variable on voter choice in elections be measured? How powerful is the sociological model in explaining patterns of support among voters in the three countries?

A Path Modeling

To explore the total effect of the cleavage variables as well as the explanatory power of the social cleavage model, a causal model based on path analysis will be created. This chapter is based on Haerpfer and Gehmacher's study of the sociological model.[168] In taking the causal and logical order of the cleavage variables into account for the three-country comparison, every path of paired variables was reevaluated in consideration of theoretical relevance.

As depicted in Figure 6-1, two variables, age and sex, are regarded as indirect predictors of voting behavior.[169] The direct effects of age and sex on voting are usually negligible.[170] However, these two variables are closely linked to socio-economic status variables, such as education and income.[171] The age variable is also closely related to religious affiliation.[172]

[168] For their model, see Haerpfer and Gehmacher, 1984:27.

[169] Age and gender should not be taken into account as a source of political conflict but as a relevant source of political differentiation in the society in question. Lipset, 1981:232.

[170] Duverger, 1955:45-56; Blondel, 1963:59-60; Randall, 1987:70-71; Dunleavy and Husbands (1985); De Vaus and McAllister (1989); and Denver, 1989:33-35.

[171] Lipset, 1981:283 and Converse, 1974:740-741.

[172] Lipset, *op cit.,* p.281-282. Empirical evidence from studies of American voting behavior conducted in the 1940's and 1950's indicates that younger Catholics were more likely to vote Republican than their elders, while younger Protestants were more prone to be Democratic than older ones. See

The education variable can have potential effects on other social cleavage variables, such as class or occupational status, religion and urban-rural divisions.[173] Another variable likely to be of importance is income, a crucial background variable in relation to class.[174] Therefore, a higher level of education should be associated with a higher social class.

Regional differences could have a potential impact on religious affiliation and urban-rural constellations. Findings from national revolutions in Western democracies indicate that religion is an important center-periphery variable.[175] Therefore, regional differences in religiosity may well exist. Thus, there are five variables that have a direct impact on patterns of party support: urban-rural, region, religion, class and income.[176] These social cleavages may constitute three different effects – direct, indirect or both. All three effects and their paths are depicted in Figure 6-1. Let us proceed to the empirical evidence.

also Lazarsfeld et al., 1944:24 and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954:70.

[173] Converse, 1974:730.

[174] Butler and Stokes, 1974:73 and Lipset, 1981:233-234.

[175] Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan (1970), Lijphart (1971), Lijphart (1981), Rose and Urwin (1969) and Converse (1974).

[176] To measure regional effects on party support in South Korea, a direct relationship will be explored. In Japan, religious effects are beyond the scope of this chapter. Denominational affiliation in religion will be used as a measure of religious conviction in South Korea. The class variable in South Korea will be derived from occupational positions.

Figure 6-1. A Causal Model of Social Cleavage Effects on Party Support



Note: See the formulae for the three effects of each variable, i.e. direct, indirect and total, in Appendix 6.

As illustrated in Figure 6-2, empirical evidence from the British data leads to several hypotheses. First, there is a close relationship between age and education. Younger people are more likely than older people to benefit from modern education. Secondly, the British evidence reveals that age is closely linked to religious affiliation. Older people seem to be more actively involved in religion than younger people. Thirdly, region is a strong predictor of religion in Britain. Our evidence shows that region is a major factor related to differences in religious affiliation. Fourthly, education is undoubtedly a major factor related to income. Those who have had access to higher education have a greater chance of earning higher incomes than those with lower education. Fifthly, the dual effects of education and income are crucial to class status. Higher income and a higher level of education will lead to higher class status. Let us move on to path analysis of the 1992 election.

In terms of the indirect effect, the relationship between the three independent variables and conservative voting proves to be quite low.

The highest indirect effect measured among the independent variables seems to be educational effect. The standardized Beta value is 0.09. By contrast, gender seems to have an extremely small impact on party support. The Beta value is only 0.2. The effects of the two intervening variables – region and income – are also quite low. In general, it can be said that the indirect effects of the independent and intervening variables on party choice are negligible.

The direct effect of the four variables is somewhat higher than the other independent variables. Religious affiliation has the largest effect with a value of 0.14. Two of the variables – class and income – have a clear though weak effect on British voting patterns. Region as a predictor of conservative vote, however, is quite weak. The total effects of religion and income are somewhat exaggerated when the indirect effects are added together, however this is rather marginal.

In terms of explanatory power (R^2), the multiple regression analysis indicates that only 10% of the variance is explained by the social cleavage variables. The relationship between the cleavage variables taken together and party support is quite low (R=0.31). The residuals that cannot be explained by the selected variables in the multiple regression analysis are almost ten times as great as the amount of variance explained. Thus, it can be said that about 90% of the voters do not cast their votes according to their group affiliation defined in terms of social cleavages.

Figure 6-2. A Causal Model of Social Cleavage Effects on Party Support: 1992 British Parliamentary Election



*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$

Note: Entries are standardized Beta coefficients. For the coding schedule for the variables, refer to Appendix 5.

ANOVA[b]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	77.677	7	11.097	53.478	.000[a]
	Residual	731.646	3526	.208		
	Total	809.322	3533			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Sex, Income, Region, Education, Occupation and Religion. All variables were dichotomized. For the coding schedule for the dichotomization, refer to Appendix 5. In the British Election Study, the variable 'Urban-rural' was omitted.

b. Dependent Variable: Conservative Vote.

Table 6-1. Effects of Social Cleavages on Conservative Vote in the United Kingdom: A Path Analysis of the 1992 Parliamentary Election

Cleavage Variables	Types of Effect		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Gender	-	.02	.02
Age	-	.06	.06
Class	.12	-	.12
Income	.13	.04	.17
Education	-	.09	.09
Urban-rural	-	-	-
Region	.09	.03	.12
Religion	.14	-	.14

Note: See formulae for the three effects, i.e. direct, indirect and total, in Appendix 6.

As shown in Figure 6-3 (6-4) and Table 6-2 (6-3), the relationship between the independent and intervening variables in Japan and Korea reveals a somewhat similar pattern to that found in the United Kingdom. The effects of age on education are relatively high in both countries. Likewise, the effects of sex on income are also high. The findings confirm that older people, and especially women, have a lower level of education and lower income in Japanese and Korean society. Education and income are also crucial predictors of class affiliation in Korea. Those with higher incomes and education are more likely to belong to the middle class. Surprisingly, however, the data reveals that income is not closely related to class affiliation in Japan. Different income groups are divided by their leftist and conservative voting in Japan. By contrast, education is an effective predictor of the urban-rural constellation. It seems to be the case that urban residents have a higher level of education. This difference is also a result of elderly people with lower education living in rural areas.

The indirect effects of the three independent variables on propensity toward conservative voting are extremely small in both countries. As was found in the British study, the highest indirect effect measured among the independent variables was that of education, with a Beta value of 0.08. However, the indirect effects of gender, age and income seem to have extremely little impact on party support. The effects vary between Beta values of 0.1 and 0.4. The indirect effect of region is also quite low. As with the British data, the indirect effect of the independent and intervening variables on the party choice of voters in Japanese and Korean elections is quite low.

The direct effect of the four variables on conservative party support varies. The greatest effects are attributable to the urban-rural distinction and class affiliation in Japan, while region is unsurprisingly the most powerful predictor in Korea. The urban-rural distinction and the class variable based on occupational status in Korea also have a rather great effect on conservative party

support. The total effect of the region and income variables remains almost unchanged, even after adding together the indirect effect of the other independent variables. The path analyses and measurements of the three effects in the two Asian countries are illustrated in the following figures and tables.

Figure 6-3. A Causal Model of Social Cleavage Effects on Party Support: 1983 Japanese Lower House Election



* p < .05, ** p < .01
Note: Entries are standardized Beta coefficients. For the coding schedule for the variables, refer to Appendix 5.

ANOVA[b]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	19.951	7	2.850	12.384	.000[a]
	Residual	230-841	1003	.230		
	Total	250-791	1010			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Sex, Income, Region, Urban-rural, Education, and Class. All variables were dichotomized. For the coding schedule for the dichotomization, refer to Appendix 5. For the 1983 Japanese Election Study, the variable 'Religion' was omitted.
b. Dependent Variable: Conservative Vote.

Table 6-2. Effect of Social Cleavages on Conservative Vote in Japan: A Path Analysis of the 1983 Lower House Election

Cleavage Variables	Type of Effects		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Gender	-	.03	.03
Age	-	.04	.04
Class	.11	-	.11
Income	.04	.01	.05
Education	-	.08	.08
Urban-rural	.17	-	.17
Region	.06	.01	.07
Religion	-	-	-

Note: See formulae of three effects, direct, indirect and total, in Appendix 6.

Figure 6-4. A Causal Model of Social Cleavage Effects on Party Support: 1992 National Election in South Korea



** p < .05, ** p < .01*

Note: Entries are standardized Beta coefficients. For the coding schedule for the variables, refer to Appendix 5.

ANOVA[b]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	5.111	7	.730	3.684	.001[a]
	Residual	43.207	218	.198		
	Total	48.319	225			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Sex, Income, Region, Urban-rural, Education and Occupation. All variables were dichotomized. For the coding schedule for the dichotomization, refer to Appendix 5. For the 1992 Korean Election Study, the variable 'Religion' was omitted.

b. Dependent Variable: Conservative Vote.

Table 6-3. Effect of Social Cleavages on Conservative Vote in South Korea: A Path Analysis of 1992 National Assembly Election

Cleavage Variables	Type of Effects		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Gender	-	.03	.03
Age -	.03	.03	
Class	.12	-	.12
Income	.02	.04	.06
Education	-	.08	.08
Urban-rural	.13	-	.13
Region	.18	.04	.18
Religion	-	-	-

Note: See formulae of three effects, i.e. direct, indirect and total effect, in Appendix 6.

In terms of the explanatory power (R^2) of the sociological model, the path analyses show that only 8 and 11 per cent of the variance was explained by social cleavage variables in Japan and Korea, respectively. The relationship between the cleavage variables taken together and party support is quite low (R=0.28 in Japan and 0.33 in Korea). The unexplained residuals of the multiple regression analysis are huge in both countries. The explanatory power of the sociological model is weakest in Japan. In their selection of political party, 92 per cent of the voters do not cast their votes according to their group affiliation defined in terms of cleavages. The pattern in Korea is similar. There, 89 per cent of the voters do not support a party on the basis of group consciousness. Thus, as was observed in the British data, the overall effect in terms of social cleavages has been shown to be quite low even in the Asian countries.

Summary

It was argued that the strength of the sociological model has declined in western countries in conjunction with the emergence of post-materialistic societies.[177] Two changing patterns, the change in social structure since World War Two and intergenerational turnover, were argued to be the most plausible reasons for the declining role of social cleavages in explaining party support of western voters.[178] As a result of the diminished value of the sociological model and partisan identification, electoral volatility has increased. In a seminal study of western industrial democracies, Franklin and Mackie postulate that since the 1960's there has been a significant decline in cleavage politics

[177] Franklin and Mackie, 1989:2-3.

[178]Harrop and Miller argue that dealignment occurs when generational turnover gradually erodes existing alignments. This trend is accelerated by simultaneous changes in social structure. Four factors are regarded as primary in these structural changes: class, religion, education and the increased role of mass media, especially television. Harrop and Miller, 1987:139-140.

in western democracies.[179] In their comparative study of 14 western democracies, Franklin and Mackie predict that the explanatory power of social cleavage variables will continue to decline until 2010, from around 35% of explained variance to about 10%, despite the existence of five types of variation between nations.[180] How well is this prediction borne out by empirical evidence?

The data tested in the three-country comparison shows that social cleavage variables explain only about 10 per cent of the patterns of party support. Despite the fact that this study does not examine the impact of changes in social structure nor of intergenerational changes, it may be said that the findings are consistent with the argument in Franklin and Mackie's study. As Franklin and Mackie predict, Britain seems to have reached the 10% level in terms of the explanatory power of the sociological model. What is most interesting in our study is that the two Asian countries also show a level as low as that found in western democracies. It may be argued, therefore, that the patterns of cleavage politics indicate that the overall effects, measured on the basis of the sociological model, have limited power to explain patterns of party support.[181]

[179] Franklin and Mackie (1989) and (1992).

[180] Franklin and Mackie argue that there are five different types of declining patterns of cleavage politics. The five types are: (1) historical decline countries (Canada, USA, Italy and Germany); (2) early decline countries (Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Italy and Germany); (3) mid-decline countries (Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden); (4) late decline countries (Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden); and (5) future decline countries (Norway). See Franklin and Mackie, 1989:20-22.

[181] This study does not present an argument in relation to this reduced explanatory power since it did not examine longitudinal developments in cleavage politics.

CHAPTER 7

COMPARING SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND PARTY SUPPORT

More than a half century has passed since Lazarsfeld and his companions conducted the first survey-based scholarly research on voting behavior in America. In the 1940 presidential election they adapted this new technique of social research. After publication of the internationally recognized book *The People's Choice*,[182] studies of elections and voting behavior flourished for five decades in the United States as well as in Western Europe. Parallel to methodological innovations in collecting information and analyzing techniques, such as the development of statistical packages,[183] the search for the meaning and consequences of elections, and of patterns of voting behavior in representative democracies remained an important field in the discipline of political science.

The central objective of this study was to examine the strength of the sociological model. Yet it focused on developing further this model. Probing not only social conditions in people's voting patterns, but also the overall explanatory power of the model was the modest ambition of this volume. The effects of social cleavage structures on party support patterns in Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom was measured in two different ways. Firstly, a simple relationship was

[182] Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944).

[183] Survey research with panel data was widely used in comparative research projects. At the same time, statistical packages as effective means for analyzing data were developed. Some of the statistical software packages widely used throughout the world are SPSS, SAS, DBMS, SYSTAT and LISREL.

studied with bivariate analysis that neither concerned covariance of different independent variables nor intervening variables, dealt with in Chapter 5. Secondly, in order to examine the overall effects of the cleavage variables taken together on party support, path analysis was used in Chapter 6.

The overall effects of simple relationships are shown in Table 7-1. The data reveals that there are some characteristic differences between and changes in electoral politics during the time span of the study. The gender gap pattern is quite weak in the three countries. It is somewhat higher in Korea (4.7) than in Japan (0.2) and Britain (0.2). The gender gap increased in Japan and Britain but decreased in Korea. However, the increases were not very substantial.

Table 7-1. Change of Effect of Social Cleavages on Conservative Vote in Japan, South Korea and Britain: A Bivariate Analysis

Cleavage variables	Japan			South Korea			Britain		
	1976	1983	Change	1988	1992	Change	1987	1992	Change
Gender	0.2	2.6	+2.4	4.7	2.5	-2.2	0.2	2.9	+2.7
Age	19.7	18.3	-1.4	28.1	21.4	-6.7	8.7	5.6	-3.1
Class	20.8	11.8	-9.0	16.3	17.4	+1.1	21.2	23.6	+2.4
Income	1.3	4.5	+3.2	17.7	10.3	-7.4	16.1	21.5	+5.4
Education	15.0	16.1	+1.1	21.3	15.6	-5.7	12.3	11.8	-2.4
Urban-rural	36.4	25.5	-10.9	14.6	5.9	-8.7	-	-	-
Region	12.8	6.5	-6.3	30.8	29.4	-1.4	21.1	20.6	+0.9
Religion	-	-	-	19.8	-	-	17.8	17.4	-0.4

Note: The entries are calculated by subtracting two dichotomies. The entries are the differences between absolute values. Thus, the entries denote the magnitude of the effects of each variable on conservative vote. In Japan, the entries stand for support for the LDP, while the entries for Korea stand for support for the DJP in 1988 and the DLP in 1992. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative votes are calculated. For the coding schedule, refer to Appendix 5.

Age proved to be one of the salient dimensions in electoral politics in Japan and South Korea. There is a strong conservative dominance among older generations in the two Asian countries. The effect of age reflects the difference between older and younger generations in terms of conservative support. The older groups are more conservative than

the younger ones. This seems to be closely linked to the fact that Confucian ideology and ethics are still strong among the older generations, while the role of tradition diminishes among their children. In Britain, however, the effects of age are much weaker than in the two Asian countries. Comparisons over two time periods demonstrate, however, that the effects of age have decreased in Japan and Korea.

The effect of class on party support is more salient in Britain than in Japan and Korea. In a comparison of two consecutive elections, this pattern seems to be gaining strength in Britain. It has to be noted, however, that class voting is a reverse pattern. In Japan and South Korea, the higher class is closely associated with anti-conservatism (or progressivism), while in Britain the reverse is the case. In Japan and Korea, voters who belong to the upper and middle classes tend to be more critical of Conservative party doctrines. In Britain, however, the equivalent class strata are strongholds of conservatism. The reverse pattern of class voting seems to be closely related to differences in the role of elites and more well educated who are more predisposed to the reform of society and democratization. In Japan, anti-conservatism seems to be closely related to the disappointment and anger of the voters over political corruption and scandals involving the LDP. In Korea, support for anti-conservative parties is based primarily on the discontent among voters of conservative orientation towards the preservation of existing power relations, anti-humanitarianism and anti-democratization. However, class voting in Britain is based on the traditional left-right dimension. The materialistic social welfare dimension seems to be closely related to the declining economic situation of the voters. The high unemployment rate and weakened welfare state are likely to be the factors responsible for triggering class identification among people.

The reverse pattern of conservative voting can also be detected in the effects of education and income. Those who receive more benefits from education are more likely to support one of the anti-conservative

parties in Japan and Korea, while the opposite pattern of voter support is the case in Britain. Since performance in terms of education seems to be closely intertwined with social class and profession, the effects of education remain strong in all three of the countries. The education effect reflects the reverse pattern of class voting. In contrast to the pattern found among the Asian voters, voters in Britain with more years of education are more inclined to support the Conservatives, although the effects of education on party support are somewhat weaker in Britain than in the two Asian countries. Income is also a variable displaying a pattern of reverse class voting. In Japan, those with higher incomes are more critical of the conservative party. This pattern is also strong among Korean voters with higher incomes. In contrast, however, in the UK the higher one's income, the greater the likelihood of voting with the Conservatives.

Geographical differences in party support are also clearly discernible. The pro-conservatism in the countryside in Japan seems to be more evident than that in Korea. Urban voters who are more educated and receive higher incomes than those who are engaged in primary sectors, such as agriculture, fishery and forestry, are more inclined to be critical of conservative doctrines. They seem to cling to policies targeting political reform and social change in society. In Britain, however, voters in the urbanized districts, the Midland and South seem to be more inclined to support the Conservatives than Labour. The effects of region measured by the difference between the South belt and the other regions show a clear Conservative dominance in the mid-South-England regions. In Korea, however, an antagonistic sentiment seems to be deeply rooted in political behavior. The regional discrepancy in Conservative voting is the most salient factor in party preference and support among Korean voters. The sense of regional deprivation in southwestern Cholla is a primary factor in the reckless support of Kim Dae Jung's party.

The role of religion seems to be important in Korea and the United Kingdom, while this is not the case in Japan. The 1700-year old tradition of 'Buddhism' has been molded into social and family life in Korea. Buddhists are more likely to be loyal to these traditional ideas and ethics. In political life, they seem to be more prone to support the Conservative party than one of the progressive parties. The effect of religion on Conservative voting was as high as 19.8 in the 1988 election in Korea. However, religion was not included as a variable in the 1992 election study. In Britain, this pattern continues to be strong. Anglican Church attendees are one of the main sources of Conservative votes. The effects of religion on Conservative party support in Britain was as high as 17.8 and 17.4 in 1987 and 1992, respectively. In Japan, however, religion does not seem to be as important in explaining patterns of political behavior among Japanese voters.[184]

Multiple regression analysis based on path analyses measures the overall effects of cleavage variables on party support. The total effects of each variable are the sum of the direct and indirect (if any) effects. The path analyses support the findings of the analyses based on simple relationships. In the United Kingdom, the effect of four variables, i.e. class, income, region and religion, remain strong in the path analysis for 1992. Even the order of magnitudes were identical to those obtained in the bivariate analysis. In the Japanese and Korean studies, however, the impacts of cleavage variables are somewhat different from each other. In the path analysis in the Japanese study, urban-rural and class cleavage proved to have the strongest effects on party support. This pattern can also be found in the bivariate analysis. However, the age effect found in the bivariate analysis disappears in the path analysis. This is understandable since the age effect is measured indirectly in the path analysis, which drastically reduces the

[184] In Japan, there seems to be a high degree of homogeneity in terms of religion. Japanese people widely believe in Shintoism and Buddhism. Christianity is quite a small denomination in Japan. This variable is seldom included in survey research conducted in Japan. See more details in Footnote 2 of Chapter 5.

magnitude of the effect. A similar pattern is found in the Korean data. The clear age effect found in the bivariate analysis decreases drastically for the same reason. However, regional differences in party support are measured in both analyses, which leads to the conclusion that the regional gap is the strongest explanatory variable in party choice in Korea.

An advantage of the path analysis is that it provides a plausible tool for measuring the explanatory power of the cleavage variables taken together. In terms of the explanatory power (R^2) of the sociological model, the multiple regression analysis shows 10%, 8% and 11% variance explained by the social cleavage variables in the United Kingdom, Japan and Korea, respectively. The unexplained residuals of the multiple regression analysis are very substantial in the three countries. The explanatory power of the sociological model is weakest in Japan and strongest in Korea. The magnitude of the residuals for the British data falls in between that of the two Asian countries. Thus, the overall effect in terms of social cleavages proves to be quite low in the three-country comparison.

There is a serious problem, in comparing voting behavior and party systems, which is worthy of mention. The characteristics of the party systems in the three countries have different meanings and imply different levels of democracy. In the Japanese and Korean party systems, Conservative party votes imply support for the ruling party, since there were no shifts in power between ruling and opposition parties until the 1993 elections in Japan and the 1997 elections in Korea. Another difficulty in comparing the three countries is closely related to the level of democracy. Democratic performance in Korea was the worst in the three-country comparison. Thus, a conservative vote in Korea can be seen as an endorsement of social stability and pro-hard line national security policy against the North Korean threat, while a Conservative vote in the United Kingdom can be seen as an expression of support for conservative doctrines on the left-right dimension. Likewise, a conservative vote in Japan would also imply a pro-LDP position rather than support of western conservative values.

Differences in political behavior are deeply rooted in political settings, beliefs and value systems. In other words, political culture is at the core of intersystemic differences. In this context, a study based on the social cleavage model should be seen as a scholarly attempt to understand the impacts of latent conflict structures on their political behavior in a given society.

Even though the social cleavage model is useful in analyzing the effects of political culture on party support, it seems necessary that more extended models have to be simultaneously applied in order to increase explanatory power and understanding of why voters support or change their support for parties.[185] Even though the task of comparative studies in voting behavior is challenging, mainly due to cultural diversity, the results will heighten our insight into the political behavior of voters as well as their values, beliefs and attitudes. It will also lead to a better understanding of representative democracies in general. It should be noted that there is always room for fine-tuning theories that have only been tested on the basis of a limited number of comparisons. It is our task to innovate and develop theories as well as to compile more comprehensive worldwide knowledge about elections and voters, from different cultures and in changing societies.

[185] For further extended models of voting behavior, see Appendix 1 to be followed this page. See also three distinct strategies discussed by Powell (1983). An attempt at including all three strategies was made by Lewis-Beck (1985). He found that three models considered together yielded high level of explanatory power, about 50% of the variance (R^2). However, in his four-nation comparison, only two cleavage variables – class and religion - were included.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1.

MODELS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR

Techniques for analyzing elections and voting behavior have varied to a great extent among researchers and even over time. Although three main schools of thought provided useful analytical tools for understanding elections and patterns of voting behavior, a number of social scientists pointed to controversies between these schools.[186] What are the main features of the models employed in empirical studies of elections and voting behavior during different periods in the postwar era? What are the central aspects of the controversies between the three models? Finally, what efforts have to be made in order to improve the comparative study of elections and voting behavior?

Three Models of Voting Behavior

When three political scientists at Columbia University – Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet – adopted a new technique in panel interviews for the first time in the history of American election studies, major attention was paid to how and when voters made up their minds in the 1940 American presidential election between Roosevelt and Wilkie and in the 1948 Truman-Dewey contest.[187] The question of when they changed their attitudes toward the presidential candidates during the election campaign was regarded as one of the primary questions of interest in the study. Their

[186] On the details of the controversies over the three models, see Niemi and Weisberg (eds.) (1976), Budge and Farlie (1977), Budge and Farlie (1983), Dalton (1988), Franklin (1992) and Norris (1997).

[187] The Columbia Model was used in Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954).

interviews, however, were not based on the entire population of America but solely on the residents of Erie County in the state of Ohio.[188]

The idea of the 'Columbia School Model' was fundamentally based on three elements: (1) class, (2) place of residence, and (3) religion. Elements such as voters' socioeconomic status, where one lives and religious affiliation, they argue, play decisive roles when voters make up their minds to support a party or candidate in a presidential election. To measure the socioeconomic status of the respondents, they employed a new term 'SES (socio-economic status) level'. An underlying assumption is: Those who have good housing, dress in expensive clothes and drive luxurious cars are classified within the high SES-population, whereas those who have poor or no housing, dress in shabby clothes and drive cheap or no cars are classified within the low SES-population. What they found was that the three indicators, i.e. high SES-level, affiliation with the Protestant religion and rural residence, predisposed a voter to support the Republican Party, whereas the opposite elements predisposed one to support the Democratic Party.

The model received wide attention among students of elections and voting behavioral studies. One of the main foci of scholarly interest concerns the usefulness of panel data and its adaptability for empirical research in social science in a broader sense. With the benefit of panel data, it was possible to observe changing attitudes towards the candidates and parties, among voters. That is, the use of the panel data allowed social scientists to analyze when voters made up their minds to support a candidate, why they decided to change their minds as well as whether or not to vote.

[188] As for Erie County in the study *The Peoples Choice*, randomly selected panel data was analyzed in Elmira County in New York for the Truman-Dewey contest in the 1948 presidential election.

Figure 1. The Columbia School Model of Voting



Note: The Columbia Model is also called a sociological model. However, the sociological model contains more variables than the Columbia School model does. Since the sociological model is based on social groupings, it is sometimes called the social cleavage model. See details for more comprehensive model building in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6.

Even though the Columbia School received extensive attention, it seems to have a critical drawback. The sociological model may not address the reasons why the wealthier, Protestant and rural residents voted for the Republican Party. Similarly, answers to why the opposite group of voters, i.e. those with low incomes, Catholics and urban residents, show higher tendencies to vote for the Democratic Party could not be found with the help of the Columbia School Model. The only finding in the study was that there is a close relationship between voters' socioeconomic status and their party preferences. They failed to find psychological grounds for individuals to support specific political parties. Voters were treated as members of groups, not as individual social beings. Despite the critics, however, it cannot be denied that the Columbia Model provided us with a basis for studying elections and voting behavior.

After a series of empirical studies on elections and the behavioral patterns of the electorate,[189] the spirit of the so-called 'Michigan School' flourished parallel to the development of survey research and statistical tools in American research. In 1960 four Michigan scholars – Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes – published *The American Voter*, a pioneer work in the history of voting behavior studies. Based on national panel data between 1948 and 1956, the study concentrated on long-term stability rather than on short-term change. Two elements were regarded as crucial environmental factors related to the formation of voting behavior in a democratic electoral system: political setting and historical background.[190] The political settings in which the electorate lives constantly affects the formation of and change in attitudes toward government, political parties and major social issues on values and value distribution among interest groups and even among individuals.

According to them, without consideration of both social environments circumscribing voters and historical contexts in relation to changing patterns of the society and elections, the findings of research on society is meaningless. This is because research omitting consideration of changing social environments and dynamic historical contexts may not appropriately describe, and may even distort, the real aspects of societal members and of society itself. In this context, it is natural that studies of voting behavior be regarded as a field within political science for the study of the dynamic patterns of social change and their impact on the attitudes and values of members of society.

The Michigan School adopted three psychological attributes: voters' party affiliation, their attitudinal orientation toward salient issues and the images of the candidates. Campbell et al. argued that these three psychological attributes of voters are the most decisive factors in their

[189] Research on two elections based on national surveys were conducted by the Michigan groups. Campbell and Kahn (1952) and Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954).

[190] Campbell, et al., 1960:3-11.

party choice. These factors function as filters affecting the attitudinal and behavioral patterns of the voters in the process of the so-called 'funnel of causality'. Time is regarded as an axis of a funnel. Every level of events occurs consecutively in continuous time lapses, converging in a series of causal chains and moving from the mouth of the funnel to the apex. In the first stage of the funnel process, a person's early environment and present living conditions affect his or her party preference. This stage can be regarded as a product of socialization or secularization processes. In the second stage, party affiliation and magnitude of party loyalty strongly influence the person's political orientation. Thereafter, the person is exposed to the salient political issues in his or her social life. The voter's previous party images can be weakened or reinforced by the magnitude of deviating distances from the salient issues. It could be argued that 'the farther the distance between the party and the voter, the more negative the images of the voter. In the fourth and fifth stages, the person is affected by exposure to the political messages of parties and candidates during the election campaign and by contact with different groups of family members, relatives, neighbors and fellow workers. The concrete cognitive perception of the candidates and parties can be crystallized during the last two short-term processes. Finally, in the last stage of the sequence, the voter makes up his or her mind to vote for a party or candidate in the election.[191] The Michigan School Model of voting is well depicted in Figure 2.

[191] See details in Niemi and Weisberg, 1976:12.

Figure 2. The Michigan School Model of Voting



Note: The model was developed in Campbell, et al., (1960), *The American Voter*. See also, Markus (1982), p.538.

In the Michigan Model, the most crucial factor is long-term party identification of voters. Two different aspects of the voters' party affiliation, i.e. the strength of their loyalty and the direction in which the party image leans, could have a strong influence on party selection in the last stage of the process. Their parents' party preferences, their neighborhood and their social class were argued to be the social basis of partisanship. In the socio-psychological model, the explanatory variables of the sociological model, i.e. the role of socioeconomic conditions, residential area and religious affiliation were no longer regarded as the most influential factors for voters' party choice. It provided different guidelines for election researchers, who had been sceptical of the explanatory power of the sociological model.[192]

[192] The Michigan School Model had widespread influence internationally on national election studies carried out in the 1960's and 1970's. In Western Europe, *Political Change in Britain* (1969) became a classic immediately upon publication. The Swedish election studies produce a series of publication based on national panel data carried out since 1956. Särlvik (1970), Holmberg (1981, 1984) and Holmberg and Gilljam (1987) are several examples. Some other examples of national election studies are the Finnish

The social-psychological model, however, was not free from critics. For instance, it is not easy to understand strategic voters who switch from party to party in each election or voters who cast their ballots for parties as a means of 'protest' directed at a party with whom they maintained loyalty for a long time.[193] In this regard, the model is more useful in analyzing political parties and voters in a stable party system. In a society where shifts in voters' party preferences is not unusual, the explanatory power of the model might easily be challenged. It was after the emergence of the rational choice model that such shortcomings began to be considered in studies of voting behavior.

When V.O. Key, Jr. published his work entitled *The Responsible Electorate* in 1966, his motto "*voters are not fools*" was a centerpiece of the book.[194] His argument was based on the ideas of Anthony Downs, concerning behavioral patterns of rational citizens. According to Downs, citizens cast their votes for the party that is expected to provide them with more benefits than any other.[195] That is, the party or candidates who are closest to them have a greater chance of being chosen by the voters. If voters expect to acquire more by winning an election than by losing, they participate in the election, but if the opposite is expected, they do not. The Downsian rational choice model had a great influence on research trends in the study of voting behavior.

A central idea of Key's study is based on Downsian 'cost-benefit', the so-called 'Rational Choice Model'. According to Key, voters are so rational in elections that they can weigh all kinds of gains and losses

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by Pesonen (1970), Norway's election study led by Valen and Katz (1967), the German by Kaase and Von Beyme (1978). See Norris (1998), *xvi.*

[193] Hirschman labeled this phenomenon the "exit" option in the context of an organization's economic activities. In his terms the activity of loyal party support can be called the "loyalty" option. See details in Hirschman (1970).

[194] Key, Jr., 1966:7.

[195] Downs, 1957:36-50.

by themselves and select a party or candidate who is believed to be closer to them on salient issues. In Key's model, dual factors such as voters issue estimation, on the one hand, and candidate or party images, on the other, affect the voters' cognitive view of parties and candidates. Questions such as what 'they' achieved during their incumbency and what benefits 'we' earned from their incumbency are regarded as the most significant for assessing parties and candidates. If the voter's assessment of a party is positive, the voter will remain loyal to the party which he or she usually supports. Otherwise, the voter will switch his or her loyalty to another party, or at least will not support that party or candidate anymore. The Key's model is, thus, sometimes called the 'reward-punishment model'.

Table 1. Alternative Models for Rational Choice of Voting

Alternative Models	Main Aspects
Retrospective Voting Model	V.O. Key's reward-punishment model
Prospective Voting Model	Prospective judgment of economy and performance of parties and candidates
Spatial Model	A variant of prospective model focusing on weighing attitudes of salient issues and candidate positions
New Institutionalism I	Electoral response to top-down reform of elites by party platform and manifestos
New Institutionalism II	Political consequence of electoral reform, such as electoral system change and electoral laws

Suffice it to say, it seems that the Rational Choice Model employs two different perspectives: a retrospective model, on the one hand, and a prospective model, on the other. Fiorina clearly illustrates the

relationship between the two different perspectives in more detail.[196] The former is based on Key's model, i.e. the 'reward-punishment model'. Key's main focus is voters' image of parties and candidates reflecting their assessment of the achievements of incumbents. In the latter, however, the future image of the party and candidate plays a key role. Voters have clear perceptions and images in relation to certain important issues which the party or candidate take up. Members of the electorate weigh their own position on the important issues and uninterruptedly compare their position to that of the parties and candidates. The total divergence, in terms of the sum of positive and negative positions, is a crucial factor in the choice of party and candidate. In this context, the prospective model is also called the 'Spatial Model'. A number of researchers, including Shapiro, Kelley and Mirer, and RePass, utilized the spatial model in order to test its power and applicability.[197]

How well can the Rational Choice Model, regardless of whether it employs retrospective or prospective evaluation, explain why people vote as they do and when and for what reason they change their minds before an election? There are many who consider the rational choice model to be the most powerful in answering the traditional questions of voting behavior. However, this does not mean that the

[196] Morris P. Fiorina, 1981:6-9.

[197] See further discussions in Niemi and Weisberg, *op cit.,* p.173. The 'Rational Choice Model' is sometimes called 'New Institutional Model'. It concerns the capacity of parties to pursue institutional reforms in order to attract voters. The literature on the new institutionalism has emphasized that fluctuations in electoral fortune may owe more to elite-initiated changes in the party system or to significant reforms in the institutional rules of the game. See also Niemi and Weisberg (1992). The 'New Institutional Model' is also based on Down's economic model. For more details of this, see Pippa Norris (ed.) (1998), *Elections and Voting Behavior: New Challenges, New Perspectives* (Aldershort, etc: Ashgate Dartmouth), *xix-xxii*. In line with the new institutionalism model, party strength is also argued to be influenced by internal party capacity and short-term strategy, such as local campaign organizations (Katz an Mair, 1994) and selection of parliamentary candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Norris, 1997).

model, ignoring other flaws, is superior to other the two models. One drawback of the Rational Choice Model may be found among the loyal electorate who are most likely to support a party out of long habit. Seen from the perspective of the Rational Choice Model, individuals who strongly identify with a given party and who are quite reluctant to switch to other parties in elections are irrational or abnormal. The voting pattern of those traditionally identifying with a party cannot be neatly explained within the Rational Choice Model.

In summary, there are some critical problems with the three models. First of all, the respective models cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of patterns of voting behavior among voters worldwide. Without considering all of the models together, it is not easy to fully understand the complicated and changing aspects of voters' behavioral patterns. We need to rely at times on the logic of the sociological model and at times on that of the other models in analyzing and understanding behavioral patterns of both those who switch parties and those who are loyal. Second, the use of the different models may lead researchers to different findings and conclusions. The sociological model, for example, stresses the role and function of the socioeconomic characteristics of voters, while the socio-psychological model concentrates on long-term party loyalty and identification for explaining voting behavior. An election study based on only one model can lead to an incomplete and distorted interpretation of reality.

As Niemi and Weisberg point out, the problems and controversies associated with the biased use of each model must be overcome in the study of election and voting behavior.[198] They strongly emphasize a research strategy based on the mutual interdependence of the different models for a more comprehensive understanding of voters' behavioral patterns and characteristics.

[198] Niemi and Weisberg, 1976:15.

Appendix 2.

House of Representatives Election Results (Number of Parliamentary Seats and Popular Votes in Japan (1955-2000)

Elections	*Liberal party*	*Democratic Party*	*Right-wing Socialist Party*	*Left-wing Socialist Party*	*Labor Peasant Party*	*Komeito*	*JCP*	*Other*	*Independents*	*Total*	*Turnout %*
Feb. 27, 1955	112 (26.6)	18 (36.5)	67 (13.8)	89 (15.3)	4 (0.9)		2 (1.9)	2 (1.3)	6 (3.3)	467 (100)	75.2
	LDP		**JSP**								
May 22, 1958	287 (57.8)		166 (32.9)				1 (2.5)	1 (0.7)	12 (5.9)	467 (100)	76.4
					DSP						
Nov. 20, 1960	296 (57.5)		145 (27.5)		17 (8.7)		3 (2.9)	1 (0.3)	5 (2.8)	467 (100)	72.7
Nov. 21, 1963	283 (54.6)		144 (29.0)		23 (7.3)		5 (4.0)	0 (0.1)	12 (4.7)	467 (100)	70.4
Jan. 29, 1967	277 (48.8)		140 (27.8)		30 (7.4)	25 (5.3)	5 (4.7)	0 (0.2)	9 (5.5)	486 (100)	73.0
Dec. 27, 1969	288 (47.6)		90 (21.4)		31 (7.4)	47 (10.9)	14 (6.8)	0 (0.1)	9 (5.3)	486 (100)	67,8
Dec. 10, 1972	271 (46.8)		118 (21.9)		19 (6.9)	29 (8.4)	38 (10.4)	2 (0.2)	14 (5.0)	491 (100)	71.1
		NLC									
Dec. 5, 1976	249 (41.7)	17 (4.1)	123 (20.6)		29 (6.2)	55 (10.9)	17 (10.3)	0 (0.0)	21 (5.7)	511 (100)	72.6

Elections	*LDP*				*JSP*	*SDF*	*DSP*	*Komeito*	*JCP*	*Other*	*Independents*	*Total*	*Turnout %*
		NLC											
Oct. 7, 1979	248	4			107	2	35	57	39	0	19	511	67.4
	(44.5)	(3.0)			(19.3)	(0.6)	(6.7)	(9.7)	(10.4)	(0.1)	(4.8)	(100)	
June 22, 1980	284	12			107	3	32	33	29	0	11	511	72.9
	(47.9)	(4.0)			(19.3)	(0.7)	(6.6)	(9.0)	(9.8)	(0.2)	(3.5)	(100)	
Dec. 12, 1983	250	8			112	3	38	58	26	0	16	511	67.4
	(45.7)	(2.3)			(19.5)	(0.6)	(7.2)	(10.1)	(9.3)	(0.1)	(14.8)	(100)	
July 6, 1986	300	6			85	4	26	56	26	0	9	512	71.4
	(49.4)	(1.8)			(17.2)	(0.8)	(8.8)	(9.4)	(6.4)	(0.2)	(5.8)	(100)	
Feb. 8, 1990	275				136	4	14	45	16	1	21	512	73.3
	(46.1)				(24.4)	(0.8)	(4.8)	(8.0)	(8.0)	(0.4)	(7.3)	(100)	
		Sinseito	**JNP**	**Sakigake**	**SDP**								
July 18, 1993	223	55	35	13	64	4	15	51	15	0	30	511	67.3
	(41.7)	(10.1)	(8.0)	(2.6)	(15.4)	(0.7)	(3.5)	(8.1)	(7.7)	(0.2)	(6.9)	(100)	
		Sinshinto	**Democratic Party**										
Oct. 20, 1996	169	96	17	2	4				17		10	300	59.0
(Single-member districts)	(38.6)	(28.0)	(10.6)	(1.3)	(2.2)				(10.6)		(6.7)	(100)	
	70	60	35	0	11				24		0	200	
(PR Districts)	(32.8)	(28.0)	(16.1)	(1.0)	(6.4)				(13.1)		(2.6)	(100)	

Elections	*LDP*		*DP*	*SDP*	*SDF*	*DSP*	*Komeito*	*JCP*	*Other*	*Independents*	*Total*	*Turnout*
		Liberal Party					**New Komeito**				%	
June 25, 2000 (Single-member districts)	177 (41.7)	4 (3.4)	80 (28.1)	4 (3.9)			7 (2.1)	- (12.3)	13	15	300	62.5
(PR Districts)	56 (28.0)	18 (13.0)	47 (25.2)	15 (9.4)			24 (13.0)	20 (11.2)			180	

Source: Hrebenar, 1992: 296; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 18, 1993; Curtis, 1999: 247-8; Inter Parliamentary Union, URL: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2161_E.htm.

Acronyms	*Name of Parties*
DP	Democratic Party
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JNP	Japan New Party (Nihon Shinto)
JSP	Japanese Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NLC	New Liberal Club
Sakigake	Pioneer Party
SDF	Social Democratic Federation
SDP	Social Democratic Party (since 1991 until 1996)
Sinseito	New Party (Renewal Party)
Sinshinto	New Frontier Party

Appendix 3.

National Assembly Election Results (Number of Parliamentary Seats and Popular Votes in Korea (1948-2000)

Elections	Government party (largest Party)	The 2nd largest party (or largest opposition party)	The 3rd largest party (or 2nd largest opposition party)	Others	Independents	Total	Turnout %
The First Republic (1948 – 1960)							
	Korea Independence Promotion National Council	Korea Democratic Party	Dae-Dong Youth Corps.				
1. May 10, 1948	55 24.6	29 12.7	12 9.1	19 15.5	85 38.1	200 100	95.5
	Korea National Party	Democratic National Party	National Council				
2. May 30, 1950	24 9.7	24 9.8	14 6.8	22 10.8	126 62.9	210 100	91.9
	Liberal Party	Democratic Party					
3. May 20, 1952	114 36.8	15 7.9	3 2.6	5 4.8	67 47.9	203 100	91.1
4. May 2, 1958	126 42.1	79 34.2	1 0.6	0 0.6	27 21.5	233 100	90.7
The Second Republic (1960-1961)							
	Democratic Party	Socialist Mass Party	Liberal Party				
5. July 29, 1960	175 41.7	4 6.0	2 2.7	3 2.7	49 41.7	233 100	84.3
The Third Republic (1963-1970)							
	Democratic Republican Party	Civilian Party	Democratic Party				
6. Nov. 26, 1963	110 (22) 33.5	41 (14) 20.1	13 (5) 13.6	11 (3) 32.8	0 0	175 (44) 100	72.1
	New Democratic Party						
7. June 8, 1967	129 (27) 50.6	24 (17) 32.7	1 2.3	0 14.4	0 0	175 (44) 100	76.1
The Fourth Republic (1971-1979)		National Party					
8. May 25, 1971	113 (27) 48.8	89 (24) 44.4	0 4.0	0 0	0 0	204 (51) 100	73.2
9. Feb. 27, 1973	73 38.7	52 32.5	2 10.2	0 0	19 18.6	146 100	73.0

Elections	Government party (Largest Party)	The 2nd largest party (or Largest opposition party)	The 3rd largest party (or 2nd largest opposition party)	Others	Independents	Total	Turnout %
10. Dec. 12, 1978	68 31.7	61 32.8	3 7.4	0 0	21 28.1	154 100	77.1
The Fifth Republic (1981 – 1987)							
	Democratic Justice Party (DJP)	Democratic Korean Party (DKP)	Korea National Party (KNP)				
11. March 25, 1981	153 (61) 35.6	81 (24) 21.6	25 (7) 13.3	8 18.8	11 10.7	276 (92) 100	78.4
12. Feb. 12, 1985	148 (61) 35.3	67 (17) 29.3	35 (9) 19.7	22 (5) 12.3	4 3.2	276 (92) 100	84.6
The Sixth Republic (1988 – 1992)							
		Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD)	Reunification National Party (RNP)				
13. April 26, 1988	125 (38) 34.0	70 (16) 19.3	59 (13) 23.8	36 (8) 18.2	9 4.7	299 (75) 100	75.8
	Democratic Liberal Party (DLP)	Democratic Party (DP)	Unification National Party (UNP)				
14. March 24, 1992	149 (33) 38.5	97 (22) 29.2	31 (7) 17.4	1 3.4	21 11.5	299 (62) 100	71.9
(1993 – 1997)							
	New Korea Party (NKP)	National Conference for New Politics (NCNP)	Federations for Liberal Democracy (FLD)				
15. April 11, 1996	139 (18) 34.5	79 (13) 25.3	50 (9) 16.4	15 (6) 12.0	16 11.8	299 (46) 100	63.9
(1998 – 2002)							
	Millennium Democratic Party (MDP)	Grand National Party (GNP)					
16. April 13, 2000	115 (19) 35.9	133 (21) 39.0	17 (5) 9.8	3 (1) 6.0	5 9.3	273 (46) 100	57.2

Source: The Central Election Management Committee (CEMC) (1983, 1992), *The History of Political Parties in Korea. I, II, III* (Seoul: CEMC); CEMC (1992), *The 14th National Assembly Election* (Seoul: CEMC).

Notes: The entries in parentheses are the number of seats on national lists distributed by allocation formulae. For formulae for the elections in question, see in Choe (1997) and Choe (2000).

Appendix 4.

Election Results for Lower House (Number of Parliamentary Seats and Popular Votes in the United Kingdom (1945-1997)

Year	Conservative	Labour	Liberal (1983-7 Alliance)	Welsh and Scottish Nationalist	Communist	Others	Total	Turnout %
1945	213 (39.8)	393 (48.3)	12 (9.1)	0 (0.2)	2 (0.4)	20 (2.1)	640 (100)	73.3
1950	299 (23.5)	315 (46.1)	9 (9.1)	0 (0.1)	0 (0.3)	2 (0.9)	625 (100)	84.0
1951	321 (48.0)	295 (48.8)	6 (2.5)	0 (0.1)	0 (0.1)	3 (0.5)	625 (100)	82.5
1955	345 (49.7)	277 (46.4)	6 (2.7)	0 (0.2)	0 (0.2)	3 (0.1)	630 (100)	76.8
1959	365 (49.4)	258 (43.8)	6 (5.9)	0 (0.4)	0 (0.1)	1 (0.5)	630 (100)	78.7
1964	304 (43.4)	317 (44.1)	9 (11.2)	0 (0.5)	0 (0.2)	0 (0.6)	630 (100)	77.1
1966	253 (41.9)	363 (47.9)	12 (8.5)	0 (0.7)	0 (0.2)	2 (0.7)	630 (100)	75.8
1970	330 (46.4)	288 (43.0)	6 (7.5)	1 (1.3)	0 (0.1)	5 (1.7)	630 (100)	72.0
1974F	297 (37.8)	301 (37.1)	14 (19.3)	9 (2.6)	0 (0.1)	14 (3.1)	635 (100)	78.1
1974O	277 (35.8)	319 (39.2)	13 (18.3)	14 (3.5)	0 (0.1)	12 (3.1)	635 (100)	72.8
1979	339 (43.9)	269 (37.0)	11 (13.8)	4 (2.0)	0 (0.1)	12 (3.2)	635 (100)	76.0
1983	397 (42.4)	209 (27.6)	23 (25.4)	4 (1.5)	0 (0.04)	17 (3.1)	650 (100)	72.7
1987	376 (42.3)	229 (30.8)	22 (22.6)	6 (1.7)	0 (0.02)	17 (2.6)	650 (100)	75.3
1992	336 (41.9)	271 (34.4)	20 (17.8)	7 (1.9)	0	17 (3.7)	651 (100)	77.7
1997	165 (30.6)	419 (43.2)	46 (16.7)	10 (2.5)	-	19 (7.0)	659 (100)	71.6
2001	166 (31.7)	413 (40.7)	52 (18.3)	11 (2.5)	-	17 (6.8)	659 (100)	59.4

Source: David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (1988), *The British General Election of 1987* (London: Macmillan); David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (1992), *The British General Election of 1992* (London: Macmillan); Elections Around the Word, URL: http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election/unitedkingdom.htm.

Appendix 5.

Coding Schedule for Measuring Effects of Social Cleavages on Party Support in Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom (Table 7-1)

(1) Japan

Gender:	Men =1; Women=2.
Age:	20-49=1; 50 and older=2.
Class:	Middle=1; Working=2.
Income:	Low (0-1 Million)=1; High (over 4 millions)=2. Middle income was omitted in dichotomy.
Education:	Elementary/Middle School=1; Over University=2.
Urban-rural:	Metropolitan/Medium-size cities=1; Countryside=2.
Region:	Kanto=1; Others=2.
Vote:	LDP=1; Others=2.

(2) Korea

Gender:	Men=1; Women=2.
Age:	20-49=1; 50 and older=2.
Class:	Professional/Manager, Self-employed/Small firm owners=1; Farmers/Fishermen/Forest workers, Manual Workers=2.
Income:	Low (1-300.000 won)=1; High (510.000 won and above)=2. Middle income was omitted in dichotomy.
Education:	Elementary/Middle school=1; Above university=2.
Urban-rural:	Metropolitan/Medium-size cities=1; Countryside=2.
Religion:	Buddhism=1; Others=2.
Region:	Cholla=1; Others=2.
Vote:	DJP=1; Others=2 (1988) DLP=1; Others=2 (1992)

(3) United Kingdom

Gender:	Men=1; Women=2.
Age:	18-44=1; 45 and older=2.
Occupation:	I/II/III-NM=1; III-M/IV/V=2.
Education:	Age for leaving school (under 15)=1; Age for leaving school (over 17)=2.
Religion:	Anglican=1; Others=2.
Region:	Greater London/Midland/South=1; Others=2.
Income:	(1987) Below average=1; Above than average=2 (1992) Lowest-£19.999=1; Above than £20.000=2. The variable is for family income.
Vote:	Conservative=1; Others=2.

Appendix 6.

Path Analysis of Social Cleavage Voting



Formulae Used for Figure 6-1 to 6-4 and Table 6-1 to 6-3

Variables	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
Age	-	$k_1k_{15} + k_3k_6k_{17} + k_3k_7k_{15} + k_3k_9k_{16} + k_3k_8k_{13}k_{16} + k_3k_8k_{18} + k_2k_{13}k_{16} + k_2k_{18}$	*same as indirect effects*
Sex	-	$k_4k_6k_{17} + k_4k_7k_{15} + k_4k_9k_{16} + k_{12}k_{15} + k_5k_{13}k_{16} + k_5k_{18}$	*same as indirect effects*
Education	-	$k_6k_{17} + k_7k_{15} + k_9k_{16} + k_8k_{13}k_{16} + k_8k_{18}$	*same as indirect effects*
Region	k_{14}	$k_{10}k_{17} + k_{11}k_{15}$	$k_{14} + k_{10}k_{17} + k_{11}k_{15}$
Income	k_{18}	$k_{13}k_{16}$	$k_{18} + k_{13}k_{16}$
Religion	k_{15}	-	k_{15}
Class	k_{16}	-	k_{16}
Urban-rural	k_{17}	-	k_{17}

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Social Cleavage and Party Support

A Comparison of Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom

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